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Abstract 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) virus H5N1 and Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza (LPAI) 
virus H9N2 are endemic in Bangladesh and pose a threat to both poultry and human health. For 
effective avian influenza (AI) prevention and control, good knowledge of the factors influencing the 
epidemiology of avian influenza virus (AIV) circulation is crucial, but no in-depth investigations have 
thus far been conducted on poultry farms in Bangladesh.  
The overall aim of this research was to improve the understanding of the extent of H5 and H9 virus 
circulation on backyard, and commercial broiler and commercial layer chicken farms in Bangladesh 
and to identify risk factors associated with the presence of H5 and H9 virus. Furthermore, the research 
aimed to investigate the perceptions of chicken farmers to implement HPAI prevention and control 
measures in Bangladesh. 
Two cross-sectional studies were conducted in the Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar districts of 
Bangladesh: 1) between February and April 2016 involving 144 backyard chicken farms in 42 
villages, and 2) between February and April 2017 involving 106 commercial broiler and 113 
commercial layer chicken farms. Blood samples, oropharyngeal swabs and cloacal swabs were 
collected from 576 chickens and 204 in-contact ducks on backyard farms, and from 954 broilers and 
904 layers on commercial chicken farms. Questionnaires were used to collect data on farm-level and 
village-level risk factors for H5 and H9 seroprevalence and on farmer’s perceptions towards 
implementation of HPAI prevention and control measures.  
Although all sampled birds tested negative for H5 by RT-PCR, H5 seropositive chickens were 
detected in all three farming systems. The highest H5 seroprevalence was observed in ducks raised 
with chickens on backyard farms, 14.2% (95% CI: 10.0-19.8), compared to in-contact backyard 
chickens, 4.2% (95% CI: 2.8-6.1). H5 seroprevalence was lower in unvaccinated broiler chickens, 
1.5% (95% CI: 0.9-2.5), than in unvaccinated layer chickens, 7.8% (95% CI: 6.1-9.8). H9 viral 
infection was detected by RT-PCR in 0.5% (95% CI: 0.2-1.3) and 0.6% (95% CI: 0.3-1.5) of chickens 
raised in broiler and layer farms, respectively and in 0.2% (95% CI: 0.0-1.2) of chickens on backyard 
farms suggesting a similar level of exposure to H9 virus is all farming systems. Backyard chickens 
and ducks showed similar H9 seroprevalence, 16.0% (95% CI: 13.2-19.2) and 15.7% (95% CI: 11.3-
21.4) respectively, while it was 5.8% (95% CI: 4.3-7.6) in layers and 1.5% (95% CI: 0.9-2.5) in 
broilers. Over the course of a production cycle, H5 and H9 seroprevalence increased with the age of 
backyard and layer chickens. Clustering of H5 seropositivity in ducks was identified, highlighting 
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that multiple ducks within a flock were H5 seropositive. This was in contrast to backyard and broiler 
and layer chickens, where only individual birds within flocks developed H5 antibodies.  
Using multilevel mixed modelling, farm- and village-level risk factors for AIV exposure for backyard 
farms were identified. For example, garbage around poultry house or on the farms (a farm-level risk 
factor) (OR for H5: 9.1, 95% CI: 1.7-48.8; OR for H9: 28.6, 95% CI:3.4-239.8) and crow abundance 
around garbage dumping places within villages (a village-level risk factor) (OR for H5:3.4, 95% CI: 
1.1-10.8; OR for H9:13.1, 95% CI: 2.3-76.8) increased the odds for H5 and H9 seropositivity on 
backyard farms. Binomial logistic regression was used to identify farm-level risk factors for AIV 
exposure on commercial farms. For example, visits by workers from other commercial chicken farms 
during the current production cycle (OR for H5: 15.1, 95% CI: 2.8-80.8; OR for H9: 50.1, 95% CI:4.5- 
552.7) increased the odds for seropositivity on broiler farms, while access of stray dogs to the sampled 
farm (OR for H5: 3.1, 95% CI: 1.1-9.1; OR for H9: 4.0, 95% CI:1.1-15.3) increased the odds for 
seropositivity on layer farms. 
Structural Equation Modelling was used to explore direct and indirect effects of farmers’ perceptions 
to implement HPAI prevention and control actions on their farms. Results highlighted that farmers 
working in different chicken production systems follow different decision-making processes. 
Perceived barriers to implement prevention and control measures (e.g. wearing protective equipment 
when handling chickens) refrained both broiler (β=-0.41, p<0.001) and backyard farmers (β=-0.52, 
p<0.001) to adopt interventions. Meanwhile perceived benefits (e.g. maintaining high biosecurity to 
reduce the risk of birds becoming sick) strongly influenced commercial broiler (β=0.44, p<0.001) and 
layer farmers’ (β=0.68, p<0.001), but not backyard farmers’ decisions.  Information provided on 
HPAI control through media, meetings or via information campaigns played an important role in 
farmers’ decision making across all production systems. 
Overall, this project provided a holistic picture of the factors influencing the epidemiology of AIV 
circulation across diverse chicken production systems in Bangladesh. The project described AIV 
infection patterns, risk factors of infection and farmers perceptions to implement HPAI prevention 
and control measures. Results from this research project have been used to inform policy makers to 
develop recommendations and improve current AI prevention and control policies in Bangladesh. 
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1.1 Background 
Bangladesh has one of the highest human population (1,240 people/km2) and poultry population 
densities (2,400 poultry/km2) in the world (BBS, 2014b; WB, 2013, 2019b). Unfortunately, 
Bangladesh is also one of the poorest countries with 24.3% people subsisting under the national 
poverty line (ADB, 2019). Poultry production plays an important role in the agricultural dominated 
economy of Bangladesh by providing employment to farmers and workers on poultry farms and by 
generating an important animal protein source for consumption (Bhuiyan, Bhuiyan, & Deb, 2005; 
Hamid, Rahman, Ahmed, & Hossain, 2017). 
Bangladesh experienced its first Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) subtype H5N1 outbreak 
in 2007 and since then a total of 57 outbreaks in backyard and 506 in commercial poultry farms 
occurred in the country (DLS, 2019). Bangladesh is now considered one of six HPAI H5N1 endemic 
countries (Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam) in the world (CDC, 2019b). 
A further concern is that the Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza (LPAI) subtype H9N2 has become 
wide spread in poultry production systems of Bangladesh (Parvin et al., 2019; Parvin et al., 2018). 
The co-circulation of H5N1 and H9N2 viruses in poultry increases the likelihood for a novel re-
assortment of AIV which might spread easily among humans (Marinova-Petkova et al., 2014; 
Marinova-Petkova et al., 2016). Furthermore, H9 viruses play an important role as a “progenitor” 
virus for HPAI H5N1 Eurasian lineage viruses and both LPAI and HPAI H7N9 viruses (Peacock, 
James, Sealy, & Iqbal, 2019; Pu et al., 2015; Su et al., 2018). 
To establish effective avian influenza (AI) prevention and control strategies in Bangladesh, a good 
understanding of the epidemiology of AIV circulation on poultry farms is required. Therefore, the 
overall aim of this research was to quantify the extent of H5 and also H9 virus which play an important 
role as a “progenitor” virus for HPAI H5N1 Eurasian lineage viruses and both LPAI and HPAI H7N9 
viruses, circulation on backyard, and commercial broiler and layer chicken farms in Bangladesh, to 
identify risk factors associated with the presence of H5 and H9 and to describe the perceptions of 
poultry farmers towards HPAI prevention and control measures in Bangladesh. 
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1.2 Research questions 
1) How do the patterns of avian influenza A (H5) and A (H9) virus infection differ 
between backyard, commercial broiler and layer chicken farms in Bangladesh?  
 
2) What are the village and farm-level risk factors associated with avian influenza 
A (H5) and A (H9) seropositivity of backyard chicken farms in Bangladesh? 
 
3) What are the farm-level risk factors associated with avian influenza A (H5) and 
A (H9) seropositivity of commercial broiler and layer farms in Bangladesh? 
 
4) What drives or hinders backyard, commercial broiler and layer chicken farmers 
to implement HPAI prevention and control measures on their farms? 
1.3 General methodology 
To answer the outlined research questions, a cross-sectional study design with the following general 
research methodology was used: 
1) To improve the understanding of the pattern of avian influenza A (H5) and A (H9)  virus infection 
on backyard,  and commercial broiler and layer chicken farms in Bangladesh 
- Collect blood samples, oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs from backyard chickens, in-
contact ducks, commercial broiler and layer chickens 
- Measure antibodies against  H5 and H9 in the serum of backyard chickens, in-contact 
ducks, commercial broiler and layer chickens by Enzyme-linked Immunosorbent 
Assay (ELISA) & Haemagglutination Inhibition (HI) tests 
- Measure H5 and H9 virus presence in the oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs sample of 
backyard chickens, in-contact ducks, commercial broiler and layer chickens by 
Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR) test 
- Estimate bird and flock-level prevalence of current and past H5 and H9 infection  
- Estimate the magnitude or clustering of seroprevalence within flocks 
- Estimate seroprevalence by age groups 
- Estimate the spatial distribution of H5 and H9 infection in backyard flocks 
 
2) To identify village and farm-level risk factors associated with avian influenza A (H5) and A (H9)  
seropositivity of backyard chicken farms in Bangladesh 
- Collect data on farm-level husbandry, management and marketing practices 
conducted by backyard chicken farmers 
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- Collect village-level information on environmental or ecological features, village 
structure, agricultural production, poultry density, previous disease outbreaks in the 
villages, where backyard farms were located 
- Identify village and farm-level risk factors associated with flock-level H5 and H9 
serology status (positive/negative) on backyard farms 
 
3) To identify farm-level risk factors associated with  avian influenza A (H5) and A (H9) 
seropositivity of commercial broiler and layer chicken farms in Bangladesh 
- Collect data on farm-level husbandry, management and marketing practices 
conducted by commercial chicken farmers 
- Identify farm-level risk factors associated with flock-level H5 and H9 serology status 
(positive/negative) on commercial farms 
 
4) To describe perceptions of backyard, commercial  broiler and layer farmers towards 
implementation of HPAI prevention and control measures 
- Describe biosecurity measures implemented by poultry farmers operating under 
different production systems in Bangladesh to prevent HPAI infection in their flocks  
- Collect data on perception of farmers on HPAI risk in chickens and humans, 
consequences associated with HPAI infection, impact of HPAI prevention and control 
measures, constraints that refrain farmers to implement HPAI prevention and control 
measures, engagement of farmers with different sources of information on HPAI 
prevention and control measures, and the likelihood of farmers to implement HPAI 
prevention and control measures 
- Identify factors influencing the implementation of the biosecurity measures on 
backyard, commercial  broiler and layer farms 
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1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis contains 7 Chapters: ‘Introduction’ (Chapter 1), followed by a ‘Literature Review’ 
(Chapter 2), four research Chapters (Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6), and a ‘General 
discussion’ (Chapter 7). 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter provides the general background including the aim of this thesis, the research questions 
and an overview of the research methodology. 
 
Figure 1.1 Structure of the thesis 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Based on the existing literature, this chapter provides an overview of AIVs, diagnosis of AI and AIV 
infection pathways. It also provides an overview about poultry production systems in Bangladesh and 
reviews the AIV infection status in South, South-East Asia and Bangladesh; reviews risk factors for 
AIV infection on backyard chicken and on commercial chicken farms as well as a review of attitudes 
and behaviours of livestock farmers and more specifically attitudes, behaviours and practices of 
backyard and commercial chicken farmers towards AI control measures. The literature review 
identified the knowledge gaps in the epidemiology of H5 and H9 virus circulation on backyard and 
commercial broiler and layer chicken farms in Bangladesh. To address the knowledge gaps identified 
in the literature, four research chapters were develop. 
Chapter 3: Patterns of avian influenza A (H5) and A (H9) virus infection on backyard, 
commercial broiler and layer chicken farms in Bangladesh  
This chapter describes bird-level and flock-level H5 and H9 seroprevalence  and virus-prevalence on 
backyard and commercial broiler and layer chicken farms, infection patterns by age groups, the 
clustering effect for birds being seropositive within a flock, and the spatial distribution of H5 and H9 
seropositive backyard flocks. The findings of flock-level serology status (pos/neg) of H5 and H9 on 
backyard and commercial broiler and layer flocks from this chapter were used as outcome variable in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 to identify risk factors associated with H5 and H9 seroprevalence. 
Chapter 4: Village and farm-level risk factors associated with avian influenza A (H5) and A 
(H9) flock-level seroprevalence on backyard chicken farms in Bangladesh 
This chapter identified farm- and village-level risk factors associated with H5 and H9 seroprevalence 
on backyard chicken farms. 
Chapter 5: Farm-level risk factors associated with avian influenza A (H5) and A (H9) flock-
level seroprevalence on commercial broiler and layer farms in Bangladesh 
This chapter identified farm-level risk factors associated with H5 and H9 seroprevalence on 
commercial chicken farms. As many of the risk factors for H5 and H9 infections identified in research 
Chapters 4 and 5 are related to farmers’ perceptions, detailed investigations explored the likelihood 
of farmers implementing biosecurity and HPAI prevention and control measures in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6: Factors influencing chicken farmers’ decisions to implement prevention and control 
measures to reduce HPAI virus spread in Bangladesh 
This chapter identified perceptions of poultry farmers that influenced the implementation of the HPAI 
biosecurity measures on backyard and commercial farms. 
Chapter 7: General discussion 
The thesis concludes with a general discussion, where research findings are discussed in a broader 
aspect, highlighting the significance of the research and providing recommendations for AI control, 
but also outlining the limitations of the research and providing recommendations for future 
investigations.
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW
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2.1 Avian Influenza (AI) – the pathogen, diagnoses and transmission  
2.1.1 Type of avian influenza viruses 
AI is a highly contagious viral disease caused by type A influenza virus of the family 
Orthomyxoviridae (Alexander, 2000; OIE, 2019; Paul, Vergne, Mulatti, Tiensin, & Iglesias, 2019). 
The avian influenza virus (AIV) is single-stranded, negative-sense, pleomorphic in shape (size: 80 to 
120 nm) and enveloped RNA virus with eight different gene segments that encode 11 different viral 
proteins. These include haemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA), nucleoprotein (NP), matrix 
protein (M1), membrane ion channel protein (M2), polymerase proteins (PB1, PB1-F2, PB2, PA), 
and non-structural proteins (NS1 and NS2) (Nayak et al., 2010; O'Neill, Talon, & Palese, 1998; Palese 
& Shaw., 2007; Swayne, 2008). 
Based on antigenic properties of HA and NA glycoproteins present on the surface of this virus, the 
AIV is further classified into subtypes. A large number of combinations of 18 HA (H1-18) and 11 
NA (N1-11) subtypes have been identified from birds and mammalian hosts (Fouchier et al., 2005; 
Tong et al., 2012; Tong et al., 2013). 
Most importantly, considering the pathogenicity of the AIV in chickens, the virus is generally 
classified into two categories: HPAI, and LPAI. The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 
described the following methods in their Terrestrial Manual (OIE, 2018) to differentiate between 
HPAI and LPAI: (1) HPAI virus causes more than 75% mortality within 10 days following 
intravenous inoculation of a minimum of eight 4 to 8 week old susceptible chickens with infectious 
virus, or, (2) HPAI virus has an intravenous pathogenicity index greater than 1.2 following 
inoculation of 10 susceptible 6 week old chickens. In addition, H5 or H7 viruses with amino acid 
sequences in the HA cleavage site similar to those observed in HPAI viruses are considered as 
influenza A viruses with high pathogenicity (independent of the outcomes of the pathogenicity 
experiments conducted to distinguish between HPAI and LPAI) (OIE, 2018). 
2.1.2 AI diagnosis 
The absence of pathognomonic clinical signs and their variation in different avian species (as well as 
considerable antigenic variations of AIVs) pose a challenge for precise and rapid diagnosis of AI 
(Alexander, 2008).  
The primary method for virological diagnosis of AIV infections recommended by the European 
Union (EU) (CEC, 2006a, 2006b) and OIE (OIE, 2018) involve the isolation, identification and 
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characterization (including estimation of virulence) of the virus. However, as isolation, identification 
and characterization of AIV is labour intensive and due to an increasing demand for rapid results, 
molecular techniques, such as the Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR) and 
real-time RT-PCR are becoming more popular (Alexander, 2008; OIE, 2018). Due to high sensitivity 
(93.3%) and specificity (98.4%) as well as rapid and cost-effective to test a very large number of 
samples, the real-time RT-PCR is now the most reliable and widely used virological test for diagnosis 
of AIV infections (Cattoli et al., 2004). 
Recommended serological tests for detecting antibodies against AIV are agar gel immunodiffusion 
(AGID), HI and ELISA. The preference of using one or more of these recommended serological tests 
depends on the purpose for the testing (Selleck & Kirkland, 2011). The AGID test is very reliable to 
detect antibodies against all AIV subtypes in chickens and turkeys, but as not all avian species 
produce detectable levels of precipitating antibodies, the AGID test is less reliable for avian species 
in general (Alexander, 2000; Beard, 1970; OIE, 2018; Wright, 2007). In contrast, the HI test is 
considered as a ‘gold standard’ for AIV antibody subtyping in all avian species due to its high 
sensitivity (98·8%) and high degree of haemagglutinin subtype specificity (99·5%). Although the HI 
test is labour-intensive, it is recommended by EU and OIE for AIV serological diagnosis (Comin, 
Toft, Stegeman, Klinkenberg, & Marangon, 2013). The ELISA test is considered a potential 
alternative to the HI test for screening large amounts of avian serum samples (Jensen et al., 2013) and 
commercial ELISA kits are readily available. ELISA kits are based on indirect and competitive (AIV 
C-ELISA) or blocking (AIV B-ELISA) strategies (OIE, 2018). 
2.1.3 AIV infection pathways 
While wild aquatic birds are considered as reservoir for AIV (Olsen et al., 2006; Webster, Bean, 
Gorman, Chambers, & Kawaoka, 1992), AIV is able to infect a wide range of species of domesticated 
poultry (e.g. chickens, ducks, gooses, turkeys, quails etc.), pet birds and other wild birds (e.g. crows) 
(FAO, 2016; OIE, 2019). The virus has also ability to cross the species barrier resulting in sub-clinical 
to severe infections, including deaths in humans, thus representing a serious public health threat 
(CDC, 2019c; Webster et al., 2005). 
AIV infection in birds naturally occurs via the faecal-oral transmission route (Gilbert, Slingenbergh, 
& Xiao, 2008). As birds shed AIVs in their saliva, nasal and respiratory secretions, infected feather 
follicles and in their faeces, direct contact with infected birds can result in the rapid spread of the 
disease (Nuradji et al., 2016; OIE, 2019). In addition, indirect pathways for example through 
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contaminated environments (e.g. air, water and dust) and fomites are also considered as an important 
route for AIV transmission (Webster et al., 1992; Webster, Yakhno, Hinshaw, Bean, & Copal Murti, 
1978). Humans are able to carry and spread AIV on fomites (e.g. clothing, equipment, vehicles), 
while biological vectors (e.g. wild birds, rodents, and insects), have been considered as important 
pathways for AIV dissemination between poultry farms and live bird markets (Capua and Alexander, 
2004; Fusaro et al., 2016; Haase et al., 2010; Hernandez-Jover, Schemann, East, & Toribio, 2015; 
Poolkhet, Chairatanayuth, Thongratsakul, Kasemsuwan, & Rukkwamsuk, 2013; Ssematimba et al., 
2013; Vieira, Hofacre, Smith, & Cole, 2009). 
AIV is able to persist in the environment and remain infectious for extended periods of time 
(Stallknecht, Shane, Kearney, & Zwank, 1990; Webster et al., 1978). It can survive for at least 35 
days at 4 °C in faeces and up to 5 weeks within the “environment” of poultry houses (Webster et al., 
1978). At 17 °C, HPAI H5N1 virus can survive in water between 14 and 26 days and, at 28 °C 
between 3 and 5 days (Brown et al., 2006).  
2.2 Poultry production systems in Bangladesh 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has broadly divided the poultry 
production systems into four different sectors: 1. Industrial and integrated production, 2. Large-scale 
commercial production, 3. Small-scale commercial production, and 4. Village or backyard 
production. All of these production systems described exist in Bangladesh, however the small-scale 
commercial production system (sector 3) and village or backyard production system (sector 4) are 
preponderating in the country (FAO, 2008) – this is similar to other South and South-East Asian 
countries (Barua, Biswas, Olsen, & Christensen, 2012; Biswas, Islam, Debnath, & Yamage, 2014). 
Chickens are the dominant poultry species in Bangladesh: chicken production entails nearly 90% of 
the total poultry production followed by ducks with about 8% and other poultry species (pigeons, 
geese and quails) (Das et al., 2008). 
2.2.1 Backyard poultry production  
Village or backyard chickens comprises almost 90% of the Bangladesh’s chicken population (FAO, 
2008), and about 80-90% of rural households in Bangladesh rear backyard chickens (FAO, 2008; 
Fattah, 1999). The predominant backyard chicken breed is a Deshi (meaning ‘indigenous’ in Bangla) 
(Barua & Howlider, 1990; Okada et al., 1987). Other backyard chicken “breeds” or strains such as 
Assel, Naked Neck, Hilly and Red Jungle fowls are rarely seen across the country (Bhuiyan et al., 
2005). Village chickens are traditionally reared under scavenging or free ranging conditions, and they 
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are usually managed by women (SAC, 2017). Many farmers also rear ducks, and sometimes pigeons 
and geese along with the chickens (Alam, Ali, Das, & Rahman, 2014). The average chicken flock 
size ranges from 3 to 10 birds (FAO, 2008). During daytime, chickens scavenge around the 
households, near ponds/wetlands and on agriculture lands (Barua & Yoshimura, 1997). Some farmers 
may provide backyard chickens with supplementary feed (such as rice polish, rice bran, rice husk, 
whole rice) (Das et al., 2008). Shelters made of locally available materials (e.g. bamboo, mud, tin, 
bricks, wood) are used by farmers to protect poultry from predators and extreme weather conditions 
(Barua & Yoshimura, 1997). Beside the consumption of backyard chickens and their eggs, birds may 
also be sold, providing households with an important source of income (SAC, 2017). The backyard 
chicken production system has the lower level of biosecurity compared to commercial chicken 
production (Conan, Goutard, Sorn, & Vong, 2012; FAO, 2008; Hamilton-West et al., 2012) (Figure 
2.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Commercial poultry production  
In Bangladesh, commercial poultry farming started in the 1980s (Begum, Alam, Buysse, Frija, & Van 
Huylenbroeck, 2012). Since the 1990s, the government of Bangladesh has pursued a policy to expand 
the national poultry production which resulted in a remarkable upsurge in the number of commercial 
 
Figure 2.1 Backyard poultry production system in Bangladesh 
 (photo taken by author of this thesis) 
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poultry farms (ECNEC, 1999). Commercial poultry production plays now a significant role in the 
socio-economic development of the country (Rana, Rahman, & Sattar, 2013) and chickens are the 
predominant species raised on commercial poultry farms (FAO, 2008). Bangladesh’s commercial 
chicken production system is broadly divided into two systems: commercial broiler and commercial 
layer farming (Jabbar, Rahman, Talukder, & Raha, 2007). On commercial broiler farms, chickens are 
reared for meat, and on layers farms chickens are raised for the production of eggs, although at the 
end of the production cycle, spent layer hens are sold for meat. The majority of commercial farms in 
Bangladesh are small-scale (flock-size ≤ 2000 birds) with low to minimal biosecurity (DLS, 2012; 
Maduka, Igbokwe, & Atsanda, 2016), and only 4% of commercial farms are large-scale units rearing 
more than 3,000 birds with moderate to high biosecurity (FAO, 2008; Saleque, 2007). 
Day old chicks (DOCs) of different exotic broiler chicken strains (e.g. Hybro-PN, Hubbard Classic, 
Cobb 500, Hybro-PG, Ross etc.) are reared on broiler farms, with the source of DOCs depending on 
the supplying hatcheries (FAO, 2008; Rana et al., 2013). In addition, Fayoumi and Sonali (a cross 
between female Fayoumi and male Rhode Island Red) are also popular as meat breed, though they 
were introduced in the 1980s with different objectives (Das et al., 2008). Broiler chickens are reared 
on the floor of houses (usually without solid walls), where rice husk, saw dust, wood shavings are 
used as litter (FAO, 2003) (Figure 2.2). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Commercial broiler chicken production system in Bangladesh  
 (photo taken by author of this thesis) 
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Similar to broilers, layer chickens are also often reared in sheds without solid walls, but their 
management system is more complex compared to broiler farms (Masud, 2013). Bovan Nera, Shaver 
579, Hisex white and brown, Bovinegold line, ISA brown (FAO, 2008) are the common layer chicken 
strains used in Bangladesh. From DOCs to the grower age (pullets), layer chickens are reared on litter 
and pullets are then placed into cages where they are reared till the end of the production cycle 
(Zaman, Sørensen, & Howlider, 2004) (Figure 2.3). 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Commercial layer chicken production system in Bangladesh 
(photo taken by author of this thesis) 
15 
 
2.3 AIV infection in poultry production systems  
2.3.1 AIV infection in poultry production system - a global overview 
HPAI H5N1was first reported in 1959 on a small poultry farm in Scotland, UK (Capua & Alexander, 
2007). Since then, several localised outbreaks occurred in different countries across the world. 
However, since HPAI H5N1 was detected in geese in China in 1996 (Xu, Subbarao, Cox, & Guo, 
1999), the virus has been frequently found in domestic poultry and in wild birds resulting in 
successive epidemics in many countries across Asia, Europe, and Africa (CDC, 2019a; OIE, 2019; 
WHO, 2016).  
Over the past 5 years a total of  7,122 HPAI outbreaks have been reported on domestic poultry farms 
across 68 different countries, resulting in the loss of approximately 122 million birds, which more 
than half (58.2%) of the losses being reported from Asia, followed by the Americas (23.0%), Europe 
(11.6%), Africa (6.8%) and Oceania (0.4%). Of the 12 different AIV subtypes, the greatest diversity 
was reported from Europe (7 subtypes: H5N1, H5N2, H5N5, H5N6, H5N8, H5N9, H7N7), followed 
by Asia (6 subtypes: H5N1, H5N2, H5N3, H5N6, H5N8, H7N9) and the Americas (6 subtypes: 
H5N1, H5N2, H5N8, H7N3, H7N8, H7N9), then Africa (3 subtypes: H5N1, H5N2, H5N8), and 
Oceania (1 subtype: H7N2). The most widespread subtypes are H5N1, H5N2 and H5N8 (OIE, 2019). 
2.3.2 AIV infection in chicken production systems in South, South-East Asia and Bangladesh  
In South-East Asia, the first HPAI H5N1 outbreak was officially reported from Vietnam in December 
2003 (Martin et al., 2005), but another study indicated that Indonesia experienced an HPAI outbreak 
in early August 2003 (Morris, Jackson, Stevenson, Benard, & Cogger, 2005). In the South Asian 
region of India and Pakistan, HPAI outbreaks in domestic poultry were reported shortly in the month 
of February 2006 (Zhou et al., 2006). 
In Bangladesh, the first HPAI H5N1 outbreak in poultry was officially reported in March 2007. Since 
then, a total of 563 outbreaks (506 on commercial and 57 on backyard farms) were detected in 179 
Upazillas or sub-districts (out of 490 Upazillas) of Bangladesh across 52 districts (out of 64 districts) 
resulting in the culling and destruction of more than 2.87 million birds (and 3.7 million eggs) (DLS, 
2019). Since 2013, the reporting of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks has declined, but HPAI H5N1 is still being 
isolated regularly from live bird markets in Bangladesh (Marinova-Petkova et al., 2016; Rimi et al., 
2019; Turner et al., 2017). In addition to the significant economic impact of HPAI on the poultry 
production in Bangladesh (DLS 2019; FAO, 2014), the country has also experienced eight HPAI 
H5N1 human cases with one fatality as of September 2019 (WHO, 2019). Bangladesh is now 
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considered one of the six HPAI H5N1 endemic countries, which also include China, Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, and Vietnam (CDC, 2019a; FAO 2011, 2013; OIE, 2019). On the other hand, LPAI H9N2 
became the second most dominant and geographically widespread Influenza A subtype in commercial 
and backyard chickens in Bangladesh (Parvin et al., 2018; Parvin et al., 2014; Shanmuganatham et 
al., 2014). The H5N1 and H9N2 co-circulation in poultry increases the likelihood for a novel re-
assortment of AIV, with the potential to infect and spread easily among humans (Marinova-Petkova 
et al., 2014; Marinova-Petkova et al., 2016). 
In 2012, the Government of Bangladesh introduced H5 vaccination on experimental basis in two 
selected districts, one with high poultry density (Gazipur district) and one with low poultry density 
(kishoreganj district) (DLS, 2013). Two inactivated vaccines (1) Re-6 from Merial (produced in 
China), containing the HA gene from a clade 2.3.2.1 H5N1 virus, (2) Nobilis Influenza H5, an 
inactivated H5N2 vaccine from Intervet (produced in the Netherlands) were promoted. In addition, a 
live vector vaccine: Vectormune HVT-AIV from CEVA-Biomune (produced in the USA), comprising 
of an innocent vector Marek’s disease virus of serotype 3 (Turkey Herpesvirus or HVT) expressing 
HA gene of a clade 2.2 H5N1 antigen was recommended by the National Technical Expert Committee 
(the  National Technical Expert Committee comprised of renowned scientists, academicians, national 
experts and international expert from Food and Agriculture Organization of the united Nations FAO), 
and subsequently approved by Department of Livestock Services (DLS) of Bangladesh. All existing 
commercial layers and parent stocks are recommended to be vaccinated with two shots of inactivated 
vaccines at 6-8 weeks interval; whereas, only one shot of live vector vaccine is recommended for the 
vaccination of day-old layer and broiler chicks (DLS, 2013; Drugs.Com, 2020; Gardin et al., 2015). 
Since 2014, the Government of Bangladesh has permitted the use of these three vaccines throughout 
the country (Rimi et al., 2019). However, a study conducted by Ansari et al. (2016) in Bangladesh 
reported vaccination failures and poor immune responses in layer chickens on H5 vaccinated farms, 
though the authors did not mention the type of H5 vaccines used to vaccinate the sampled layer 
chickens. The study reported that out of 221 collected serum samples from vaccinated layer chickens, 
only a small proportion (8.1%) of vaccinated layer chickens had H5 antibodies. This study 
recommended to review the currently available vaccines and the overall vaccination program in 
Bangladesh. 
AI is now been recognized as the most important viral poultry disease in the world (OIE, 2019; 
Swayne, Halvorson, D.A., Saif, Y.M., Swayne, D.E., 2003), with AIV circulation of particular 
concern in resource limited developing countries (Haque, Giasuddin, Chowdhury, & Islam, 2014; 
Rahman, Rabbani, Uddin, Chakrabartty, & Her, 2012). A total of 15 studies on the serological and/or 
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virological status of AIV infections in South and South-East Asia were identified through a review 
of the available literature (Table 2.1). Using a wide range of diagnostic procedures, these studies 
highlighted varying AIV infection levels across different production systems of farmed poultry. For 
serological diagnosis, ELISA and/or HI tests were most common approaches to estimate 
seroprevalence  in South and South-East Asia, while rapid AIV antigen (Ag) detection kits and/or 
RT-PCR were predominately used to estimate AIV prevalence. 
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Table 2.1 Studies on prevalence of AI on farms in Bangladesh and South, South-East Asia 
Sl# Study Study 
location 
Study 
time 
Population 
examined 
Study type, sample 
collected & diagnostic test 
used 
Outcome measured Remarks 
1 Ansari et 
al. (2016) 
Bangladesh 2013 and 
2014 
-Commercial 
layer farms 
-Live Bird 
Market (LBM) 
-Backyard 
poultry 
(chickens and 
ducks) 
 
- Study type: 
 Part of routine 
surveillance activities 
- Samples: 
 Blood 
 Cloacal swabs 
 Oropharyngeal swabs 
- Diagnostic tests: 
 ELISA 
 RT-PCR 
 Rapid AIV Ag 
detection kit  
Bird-level H5 seroprevalence: 
Layer chicken (vaccinated): 8.1% 
Layer chicken (unvaccinated): 7.6% 
Backyard poultry (chicken & 
duck)*: 34.0% 
 
Bird-level AIV prevalence**:  
Duck*: 6.7% 
Chicken*: 17.2% 
 
Bird-level H5N1 virus 
prevalence***:  
Duck*: 1.7% 
Chicken*: 6.1% 
*Samples collected from 
LBMs and farms (didn’t 
differentiate) 
 
**Tested by rapid AIV Ag 
detection kit 
 
***Tested by RT-PCR 
2 Biswas et 
al. (2009a) 
 
 
Bangladesh 
 
- Jan 2002 
to May 
2003 
-Sep.2003 
to Aug 
2004  
- Aug 
2005 to 
March 
2006 
-Backyard 
chickens 
-Small-
commercial 
farms(Sonali 
chickens) 
- Study type: 
 Cross-sectional study 
- Sample: 
 Blood  
-Diagnostic test: 
 ELISA 
 
Bird-level Influenza A 
seroprevalence: 
Chicken*: 20.0% 
 
Flock-level Influenza A 
seroprevalence: 
Chicken*: 23.0% 
 
*Despite separate sample 
collection from both, 
backyard and commercial 
Sonali chickens, the 
prevalence results were 
reported together as chickens 
 
- AI unvaccinated flocks 
- Serological status of 
egg drop syndrome '76 virus 
infectious bronchitis virus, 
Newcastle disease virus 
(NDV), and reovirus was 
also described 
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Sl# Study Study 
location 
Study 
time 
Population 
examined 
Study type, sample 
collected & diagnostic test 
used 
Outcome measured Remarks 
3 Haque, 
Kabir, Ali, 
Rahman, 
and Islam 
(2015) 
Bangladesh Jan to 
Sep. 2014 
-Commercial 
layer chickens 
-Commercial 
broiler chickens 
-Backyard 
chickens 
-Backyard ducks 
-Backyard geese 
-Backyard 
pigeons 
-Quails 
- Study type: 
 Passive surveillance to 
collect samples from 
sick and dead birds 
-  Sample: 
 Cloacal swabs 
-  Diagnostic tests: 
 Rapid AIV Ag 
detection kit 
 HI test 
  Neuraminidase 
Inhibition Test (NIT) 
 RT-PCR 
Bird-level AIV prevalence*: 
Chicken(broiler, layer and backyard 
chicken): 66.7% 
Duck: 33.3% 
Goose: 16.7% 
 
 
*Tested by rapid AIV Ag 
detection kit 
 
-No pigeons and quails were 
positive to AIV 
- Rapid AIV Ag detection 
+ve samples sub-typed by HI 
& NIT using mono-specific 
panel of serum and detected 
H5N1, H9N2, H7N9.  
- All collected swabs samples 
tested by RT-PCR using 
subtype specific (H5N1, 
H7N9 and H9N2) specific 
primers, and detected H5N1, 
H7N9 and H9N2.  
-Sub-type specific prevalence 
for different species didn’t 
quantify 
4 Hussain, 
Islam, Al 
Mahmud, 
Islam, and 
Hasan 
(2016) 
Bangladesh Jan to 
June 2015 
Commercial 
chickens* 
- Study type: 
 Passive surveillance 
to collect sick and 
dead birds 
- Samples: 
 Cloacal swabs from 
sick birds 
 Tracheal swabs from 
dead birds 
- Diagnostic test: 
 Rapid AIV Ag 
detection kit 
Bird-level AIV prevalence: 
Chicken*: 2.0% 
*No mentioning of type of 
chickens sampled (i.e. 
broilers or layers)  
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Sl# Study Study 
location 
Study 
time 
Population 
examined 
Study type, sample 
collected & diagnostic test 
used 
Outcome measured Remarks 
5 Khatun et 
al. (2013) 
Bangladesh Between 
2009 & 
2012 
(Three 
successiv
e winter 
seasons, 
Dec.to 
Feb.) 
Backyard 
ducks 
 
- Study type: 
 Active AI surveillance 
- Samples: 
 Blood samples 
 Cloacal swabs 
- Diagnostic tests: 
 ELISA 
 RT-PCR 
Bird-level Influenza A 
seroprevalence: 
Duck: 39.8%   
 
Bird-level H5N1 seroprevalence: 
Duck: 0.1% 
 
Bird-level AIV prevalence: 
Duck: 22.1% 
-AI unvaccinated flocks 
6 Nooruddin, 
Hossain, 
Mohamma 
and, 
Rahman 
(2006) 
 
Bangladesh 
2006 
(monsoon
,winter & 
summer) 
Backyard 
chickens 
-  Study type: 
 Cross-sectional study 
- Samples: 
 Blood  
 Cloacal swabs 
-Diagnostic tests: 
 ELISA 
 Rapid AIV Ag 
detection kit  
Bird-level Influenza A 
seroprevalence: 
Chicken: 9.8% 
Hen: 10.8% 
Cock: 8.7% 
 
-AI unvaccinated flocks 
-All the swab samples were 
negative to AIV  
7 Osbjer et 
al. (2017) 
Cambodia May 
2011, July 
2012 and 
March 
2013 
-Backyard 
chickens 
- Backyard 
ducks 
 - Backyard 
pigeons  
-Backyard pigs 
 
- Study type: 
 Cross-sectional study 
- Samples: 
 Cloacal  and tracheal 
swabs from chicken 
and duck 
  Fresh fecal sample 
from pigeon 
 Nasal swabs from pig 
- Diagnostic test: 
 RT-PCR 
Bird-level AIV prevalence: 
Chicken:1.4% 
Duck: 1.0% 
Pig: 1.5% 
-No pigeons were positive to 
AIV  
-Full-length genome 
sequencing confirmed triple 
reassortant H3N2 in pigs and 
various LPAI sub-types in 
poultry. 
Chicken:H3N8,H4N6,H6N2,
H3N6,H6N2  
Duck:H6N8 
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Sl# Study Study 
location 
Study 
time 
Population 
examined 
Study type, sample 
collected & diagnostic test 
used 
Outcome measured Remarks 
8 Pawar et al. 
(2012) 
 
India 2009, 
2010, 
2011 
-Backyard 
poultry(chickens 
and ducks) 
-LBM 
-Wild birds 
- Study type: 
 Cross-sectional study 
- Samples: 
 Blood 
 Tracheal swabs 
 Cloacal swabs 
 Environmental 
samples 
- Diagnostic tests: 
 HI  
 RT-PCR 
Bird-level H5N1 seroprevalence: 
Backyard poultry (Chicken and 
duck):2.2% 
 
Bird-level H7N1 seroprevalence: 
Backyard poultry (Chicken and 
duck):1.9% 
 
Bird-level H9N2 seroprevalence: 
Backyard poultry (Chicken and 
duck):9.0% 
 
Bird-level AIV prevalence: 
Backyard poultry (Chicken and 
duck): 5.4% 
-None of the samples 
collected from wild and 
migratory 
birds were positive for AIV  
 
 
9 Henning et 
al. (2010) 
 
 
Indonesia March 
2007 to 
March 
2008 
-Smallholder 
scavenging duck 
farms 
 Ducks  
 In-contact 
chickens 
- Study type: 
 Longitudinal study 
- Samples: 
 Blood 
 Cloacal swabs 
 Oropharyngeal 
swabs 
- Diagnostic tests: 
 HI 
 RT-PCR 
Bird-level H5 seroprevalence: 
Duck: 2.6%,  
Chicken:0.5% 
Flock-level H5 seroprevalence: 
Duck: 19.5%,  
Chicken:2% 
Flock-level H5 virus prevalence:  
Duck: 2.5%,  
Chicken:1.5% 
-AI unvaccinated flocks 
 
 
 
10 Gompo et 
al.(2019) 
 
Nepal March 
2018 to 
April 
2019 
-Commercial 
broiler farms 
-Commercial 
layer farms 
- Backyard 
poultry farms 
- Breeder farms 
- Study type: 
 Outbreaks study 
-Samples: 
 Cloacal swabs 
 Tracheal swabs 
-Diagnostic test: 
 RT-PCR 
Farm-level H9 virus prevalence: 
Commercial broiler: 61.9% 
Commercial layer: 24.4% 
Backyard poultry (chicken and 
duck):11.4% 
Breeder farm*: 2.44% 
 
-Type of breeder farm was 
not mentioned 
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Sl# Study Study 
location 
Study 
time 
Population 
examined 
Study type, sample 
collected & diagnostic test 
used 
Outcome measured Remarks 
11 Karki, 
Lupiani, 
Budke, 
Manandhar, 
and Ivanek 
(2014) 
 Nepal April to 
July, 2011 
Backyard 
ducks  
 
- Study type: 
 Cross-sectional study 
- Sample: 
 Blood  
- Diagnostic test: 
  ELISA 
Bird-level Influenza A 
seroprevalence:  
Duck: 27.2% 
 
Farm-level Influenza A 
seroprevalence: 
Duck: 42.0% 
 
 
-AI unvaccinated flocks 
12 Zaman, 
Haleem, 
Rahman, 
and Ullah 
(2019) 
 
Pakistan 2018 Backyard 
chickens 
- Study type: 
 Cross-sectional study 
- Sample: 
 Blood   
-Diagnostic test: 
 HI 
Bird-level H5N1 seroprevalence: 
Chicken (sick): 76.5% 
Chicken (healthy): 45.0%  
Chicken (vaccinated)*: 9.0% 
Chicken (unvaccinated)*:62.5% 
*No differentiation between 
sick and healthy chickens 
13 Jairak 
(2015) 
 
Thailand July 2013 
to Aug, 
2014 
-Backyard 
chickens  
-Backyard ducks 
- Study type: 
 Surveillance 
- Samples: 
 Blood   
 Oropharyngeal 
swabs 
 Cloacal swabs 
- Diagnostic tests: 
 ELISA 
 RT-PCR 
Bird-level Influenza A 
seroprevalence: 
Chicken:1.1% 
 
Bird-level AIV prevalence: 
Chicken:99.0% 
Duck:2.1% 
-Bird-level Influenza A 
seroprevalence for ducks was 
not specified 
 
14 Serrão et al. 
(2012) 
 
  
Timor-
Lesté 
Dec. 2008 
to Feb 
2009, 
March to 
May 
2009, 
June to 
August 
2009 
Backyard 
chickens 
 
- Study type: 
 Longitudinal study 
- Sample: 
 Blood  
- Diagnostic tests:  
 HI 
 ELISA  
Bird-level Influenza A 
seroprevalence: 
 
Chicken: 0.4% 
- AI unvaccinated flocks 
- AI +ve serum samples 
tested by HI using Ag against 
H5N1, H5N3, H7N3 & 
H9N2, but results negative 
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Sl# Study Study 
location 
Study 
time 
Population 
examined 
Study type, sample 
collected & diagnostic test 
used 
Outcome measured Remarks 
15 Henning et 
al. (2011) 
 
 
 
  Viet Nam 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2007 
to May 
2008 
- Backyard & 
smallholder 
commercial 
duck farms 
 Ducks  
 In-contact 
chickens  
 
- Study type: 
 Longitudinal study 
- Samples: 
 Blood 
 Oropharyngeal swabs 
 cloacal swabs 
-Diagnostic tests: 
 HI 
 RT-PCR 
 
 
 
Bird-level H5 seroprevalence: 
Duck (unvaccinated):17.5% 
Chicken (unvaccinated):10.7% 
Duck (vaccinated):54.3% 
Chicken (vaccinated):55.5% 
 
Flock-level H5 seroprevalence: 
Ducks (unvaccinated):42.6% 
Chickens (unvaccinated):19% 
Ducks(vaccinated):40%,  
Chickens(vaccinated): 48% 
 
Flock-level H5 virus prevalence:  
Ducks*: 0.7% 
* Proportion of flocks with at 
least one bird positive for 
H5 virus of the vaccinated 
and unvaccinated birds tested 
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2.4 Risk factors for AIV infection in poultry production systems 
2.4.1  Risk factors for AIV infection on backyard poultry farms 
As backyard chickens are reared under free- roaming scavenging conditions (Huque, Chowdhury, 
Haque, & Sil, 1999; Spradbrow, 1997), they might be at higher risk of AIV infection compared to 
commercial poultry (Conan et al., 2012). On contrary, owners of backyard flocks argued that due to 
the small flock sizes, the risk of AIV introduction into their flocks is substantial lower compared to 
the commercial flocks (Akey, 2003; Bavinck et al., 2009; Refregier-Petton, Rose, Denis, & Salvat, 
2001). Furthermore, backyard farmers usually rear local breeds or strains of birds, which are 
considered to be less susceptible to diseases than exotic breeds used in commercial production (Barua 
& Yoshimura, 1997; GRAIN 2006). Nevertheless, there is no experimental and field research 
evidence that supports the argument that backyard chickens are less susceptible to AIV compared to 
commercial chicken breeds (FAO, 2019b) 
Very few studies have been conducted in resource-limited developing countries of South and South-
East Asia to identify possible risks factors associated with AIV infections in backyard chickens. For 
example, Biswas et al. (2009c) identified that feeding of slaughter remnants of purchased chickens to 
backyard chickens, contact with pigeons, and presence of water bodies within 0.1km from the 
backyard farms were associated with H5N1 infection in backyard farms in Bangladesh. In addition, 
separating chickens and ducks at night reduced the risk of H5N1 infection on backyard farms. This 
study didn’t explore the possible association between the trading of chickens from backyard farms 
and the risk of AIV infection. A study conducted in Thailand (Paul et al., 2011) illustrated that 
backyard chicken owners, who bought live chickens from another backyard farm had a higher risk of 
introducing H5N1 into their own flocks, emphasizing the important relationship between poultry 
trade and AI. Moreover, this study found that backyard chicken owners, who used disinfectants to 
clean poultry areas had a reduced risk for H5N1 infection in their flocks. It needs highlighting that 
since 2004, the Thai government is providing disinfectants composed of aldehydes, chlorine, and 
quaternary ammonium compounds to villagers (Tiensin et al., 2005), and these disinfectants have 
been showing a good effectiveness against the AIV (De Benedictis, Beato, & Capua, 2007). 
Considering the financial constraints faced by backyard farmers, this Thai approach of a centralised 
distribution of disinfectants might be advisable to other developing countries like Bangladesh to 
improve their AI prevention and control strategies for village poultry. 
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The presence of a large number of broiler flocks in the village and presence of at least one poultry 
trader in the village were identified by Desvaux et al. (2011) as village-level risk factors associated 
with H5N1 HPAI outbreaks in one province of Northern Vietnam in 2007. Interestingly, this study 
found that villages with a higher percentage of households keeping poultry had less HPAI outbreaks. 
The authors argued that villages with a higher percentage of poultry keeping, represented more likely 
rural backyard farms and a had lower human density and less trading activities compared to others 
villages where commercial farms were more present. The author’s argument on lower human density 
relating to less HPAI outbreaks in the village is supported by research conducted by Dhingra et al. 
(2014) in eastern India. Dhingra et al. (2014) found that human population density was associated 
with HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in backyard poultry. The authors suggested that high demand for poultry 
products resulted in increased trading and marketing activities at live bird markets, which highlighted 
the association between human density and HPAI H5N1 outbreaks. In addition to human density, 
improved connectivity (accessibility) in terms of time taken to access a city with more than 50,000 
people, duck density and areas at lower elevation were also identified as factors associated with HPAI 
H5N1 outbreaks in backyard poultry. Therefore, Dhingra et al. (2014) recommended risk-based 
surveillance in the areas with high duck density and at all live bird markets in high-throughput areas 
receiving poultry from diverse locations. 
A study conducted in the Netherlands, identified that rearing of different chicken breeds and/or 
different bird species within the same flocks, and the distance between a backyard farm and an 
infected commercial farm, also increased the risk of AIV infection in backyard flocks (Bavinck et al., 
2009).  
Finally, focussing on backyard duck production, a study carried out in Indonesia on home-based 
stationary ducks (i.e. these are ducks that are allowed to scavenge during the day, but are kept on the 
farm during the night) identified that duck scavenging around neighbouring houses within the village, 
and farmer’s consumption of birds that died two months prior to the farm visit, were risk factors 
associated with flocks becoming H5 seropositive. In addition, confinement of flocks overnight in 
enclosures and reporting of sudden deaths of ducks reduced the likelihood of farms being H5 
seropositive (Henning et al., 2013).  
2.4.2 Risk factors for AIV infection on commercial chicken farms 
Compared to the backyard chicken farms, more studies have been conducted on commercial chicken 
farms in South, East and South-East Asia to identify and quantify the possible risk factors for AIV 
infection. However, the majority of these studies focussed on risk factors associated with AI 
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outbreaks with high mortalities, but did not describe the infection status of any birds (i.e. even healthy 
birds) within the flocks. 
Three case-control studies conducted on commercial poultry farms in Bangladesh identified the 
following risk factors associated with H5N1 outbreak occurrence on commercial chicken farms: 
exchange of egg trays with market vendors, farm workers trading chickens, numbers of farm 
employees, the presence of village chickens scavenging on the commercial farm, mortality observed 
in backyard chickens reared near commercial farms, access of feral and wild animals to the 
commercial farm, and dead crows observed near commercial farms (Biswas et al., 2009b; Biswas et 
al., 2011; Osmani et al., 2014). Surprisingly, one study identified a recommended biosecurity practice 
(provision of footbaths at the entry to commercial farms or at the entrance of commercial poultry 
sheds) to be associated with H5N1 outbreaks (Biswas et al., 2009b). However, the author doubted the 
findings and suggested further investigation to explore whether an effective disinfectant was used in 
the footbath, the concentration of the disinfectant, frequency of changing the disinfectant in the 
footbath, and whether the footbath was actually used by visitors and farm employees. More recently, 
Gompo et al. (2019) used a retrospective case-control approach to explore risk factors associated with 
H9 outbreaks on poultry farms in Nepal between 2018 and 2019. Birds aged 31-40 days, farms 
operating for more than 5 years, use of stream water as drinking water supply for birds, the type of 
poultry production, inadequate fumigation practices, history of H9 outbreaks, visitors not wearing 
boots on farm, visitors allowed to enter farms and no existence of footbaths at entry of farms were 
identified as significant risk factors associated with H9 outbreaks on commercial poultry farms. 
Trading practices as potential source of infection were highlighted in a study conducted in Pakistan 
(Chaudhry, Rashid, Thrusfield, Welburn, & Bronsvoort, 2015) with selling of eggs or birds directly 
to live bird retail stalls being strongly associated with an increased risk of H9N2 infection in 
commercial poultry farms. One interesting finding observed by this study was that farms having a 
previous history of Infectious Bursal Disease (IBD) infection were more likely to become infected 
with AI.  Experimental work conducted by Ramirez-Nieto et al. (2010) on the adaptation of a mallard 
H5N2 LPAI virus in chickens that had a previous history of infection with IBD virus, supported this 
observation. The authors of the experimental study concluded that previous exposure to IBD virus 
contributed to the mechanism of adaptation of AIV strains resulting in an altered host range, tissue 
tropism, and higher virulence of the AIV. 
A case-control study conducted by Kung et al. (2007) focussed on risk factors associated with the 
spread of H5N1 on commercial chicken farms in Hong Kong and identified commercial poultry 
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owners who did not live on farms, a higher death rate in birds older than 30 days compared to younger 
birds, sales of chickens directly to retail markets, relatives working in the poultry industry and farms 
with higher chicken numbers increased the odds of H5N1 infection. Interestingly, wild birds observed 
in feed troughs was identified as a protective factor for H5N1 infection in farms. The authors 
concluded that workers on case farm were perhaps more conscious about the role of wild birds in 
AIV transmission after this issue was discussed with government field officers after the farm was 
declared as infected. This could have resulted in fewer case farms reporting presence of wild birds 
compared to control farms. 
Overall, a wide range of farm management practices have been identified to be associated with a high 
risk of AIV infection on commercial chicken farms. For example, farms employing one or more 
workers, layer flocks older than 400 days and identification of at least one clinical signs (e.g. 
decreased egg production, respiratory syndromes, and increased mortality) were identified as risk 
factors associated with higher H9N2 seropositivity in commercial chickens in Korea (Woo & Park, 
2008). Presence of neighbouring poultry farms was identified as risk factor associated with H5N1 
outbreak occurrence in Nigeria during the 2006–2007 epidemics; however, farm staff washing their 
hands before handling birds and not allowing traders to enter the farm were protective factors; 
emphasized the significance of trade and closeness between poultry farms in the transmission of 
H5N1 as well as the role of biosecurity in AI prevention and control (Metras et al., 2013). In fact, 
poor biosecurity practices have been often associated with AIV infections on commercial chicken 
farms, even in developed countries. For instance, incomplete hygienic measures of farm visitors and 
sharing of farm equipment among farms in Japan (Nishiguchi et al., 2007); disposal of dead birds by 
rendering and presence of mammalian wildlife on commercial farms in USA (McQuiston et al., 
2005); and a high number of contacts between farms through cardboard egg trays in Netherlands 
(Thomas et al., 2005) were significant risk factors for AIV infections on commercial chicken farms. 
Compared to the backyard farms, where risk factor studies focused on the H5 subtype, research on 
commercial farms paid also attention to risk factors associated with H9 virus spread. This might be 
due to the great economic importance of LPAI virus in commercial production systems, in addition 
to the public health concern (Ye & Hu, 2008). LPAI virus infection can result in up to 65 % mortality 
on commercial broiler farms and in a decrease in up to 70 % in egg production in commercial layer 
chickens (Azizpour, Goudarzi, Charkhkar, Momayez, & Hablolvarid, 2014; El Houadfi, Fellahi, 
Nassik, Guérin, & Ducatez, 2016; Seifi, Asasi, & Mohammadi, 2012). Also, as commercial farmers 
rear larger flocks than backyard farmers, the economic impact of LPAI and HPAI infection on the 
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commercial poultry industry might influenced the stronger interest in risk factor research on this 
production type. 
2.5 Attitudes, behaviours and practices of farmers  
2.5.1 Attitudes and behaviours of livestock farmers – an overview 
In livestock production, good biosecurity is considered as the first line of defence to prevent disease 
occurrence on farms (Burrell, 2002; Palmer, Fozdar, & Sully, 2009) with farmer’s behaviours and 
attitudes towards disease control measures playing a vital role in their decision-making processes 
(Blackstock, Ingram, Burton, Brown, & Slee, 2010; Fairweather & Keating, 1994; Small, Murphy-
McIntosh, Waters, Tarbotton, & Botha, 2005). Thus, the success of any national animal disease 
control program is strongly influences by attitudes and behaviours of farmers (Delabbio et al., 2005).   
Research has highlighted that the information provided to farmers on biosecurity and disease control 
measures strongly influenced their attitudes, behaviours and practices towards those measures 
(Heffernan, Nielsen, Thomson, & Gunn, 2008; Olmstead & Rhode, 2007; Palmer et al., 2009), 
although one study with cattle and sheep farmers in the UK (Heffernan et al., 2008) found that farmers 
attitudes towards biosecurity were not influenced by any particular source of information provided, 
although there was a strong negative sentiment towards bio-security information provided in 
government leaflets. This highlights that a good understanding of farmer’s perceptions is required to 
deliver the most applicable and most useful information to farmers. 
Adequate communication strategies are instrumental in delivering good biosecurity outcomes. For 
example, Oliveira, Anneberg, Voss, Sørensen, and Thomsen (2018) studied attitudes of Danish dairy 
farmers towards biosecurity and identified that difficult communication between farmers and their 
employees and visitors, lack of knowledge on disease infection pathways, and economic limitations 
were constraints for correct biosecurity implementation. Moreover, though farmers received 
biosecurity information from different sources, veterinarians were considered the key and most 
trusted source of information. Also, the mass media is an important medium to convey information 
on avian influenza to backyard and commercial poultry farmers in Bangladesh (Sarker et al., 2016). 
In addition, a study conducted with Bangladeshi backyard poultry farmers highlighted that 
information from neighbours and family members strongly influenced their awareness and risk 
perception on avian influenza (Sultana et al., 2012). 
Additional factors impacting on farmers’ behaviours relate to the constraints they experience when 
implement disease control measures.  For example a study conducted by Jemberu, Mourits, and 
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Hogeveen (2015) in Ethiopia on Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) control identified that constraints 
such as cost of vaccination, difficulties in isolating herds and movement restriction negatively 
influenced farmer’s intentions to implement FMD control measures on their farms. The study also 
highlighted that implemented control measures were not uniform, but differed greatly by cattle 
production systems, such as crop-livestock, pastoral and market-oriented systems.  
The impact of benfits of control measues on farmers behaviours were highligted by Valeeva, van 
Asseldonk, and Backus (2011) who conducted a study with Dutch pig farmers. The authors explored 
underlying factors that influenced farmers’ adoption of two risk management strategies: biosecurity 
measures and animal health programs. Farmers acknowledged that biosecurity is a more effective 
strategy than animal health program for preventing and controlling epidemic and endemic diseases. 
In addition, farmers’ perceptions on advantages and the efficacy of these strategies in reducing animal 
disease risk influenced strongly the implementation of the risk management strategies. 
2.5.2 Attitudes, behaviours and practices of backyard and commercial chicken farmers 
towards AI control measures      
The traditional approach to prevent and control of AI includes the implementation of biosecurity 
measures (for example, separating different poultry species, restricting the movement of visitors and 
outside vehicles, cleaning and disinfection of farm equipment, wearing of protective clothing while 
handling  poultry etc.) and conducting vaccinations against AI. However, vaccination is only 
conducted in a few countries with a focus on the commercial poultry industry (Capua & Alexander, 
2008; Kandeil et al., 2018; Kapczynski et al., 2015; Marangon, Cecchinato, & Capua, 2008).  
Different studies highlighted that the likelihood of implementing AI prevention and control measures 
is depended on farmer’s perception on the susceptibility of birds to AIV infection, the consequences 
of the disease, the benefits of implementing actions, any constraints or barriers to the implementation 
of those actions and sources of information that may influence individuals’ perceptions (Cui, Liu, Ke, 
& Tian, 2019a; Cui, Wang, Ke, & Tian, 2019b; Glanz & Bishop, 2010; Glanz, Rimer, & Viswanath, 
2008; Høg et al., 2018; Rimi et al., 2017). These factors towards the implementation of AI prevention 
and control measures will likely differ between backyard, commercial broiler, and commercial layer 
farmers, as farm management practices, production cycles, flock sizes as well level of education of 
flock owners differ between these three production systems (Cui, Liao, Lam, Liu, & Fielding, 2017; 
Cui & Liu, 2016; Jemberu et al., 2015). Unfortunately most of the research conducted, focussed only 
on one production system. For example, a study conducted with commercial chicken farmers in China 
observed that farmers’ perceived risk of infection of chicken with AIV was significantly higher 
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compared to the perceived risk of human infection with AIV. The study also highlighted that farmers 
were less familiar with AIV infection in humans compared to chicken. In addition, biosecurity 
preventive behaviours and personal protective behaviours have been shown to be positively 
associated with farm size and farmers’ perceived risks of both human and chicken infection (Cui et 
al., 2019b). Similar findings on risk perception were observed in backyard poultry farmers in 
Bangladesh (Sultana et al., 2012), where backyard poultry farmers perceived that AIV could transmit 
from poultry to poultry, but not from poultry to humans resulting in some risky behaviour practiced 
by the farmers, for example, keeping sick poultry under the bed and slaughter and consumption of  
sick poultry. 
Thus, a number of studies focussed on the level of knowledge of farmers. For example, a study 
conducted with backyard farmers in Egypt (Ismail & Ahmed, 2010) observed positive attitudes 
towards AI control measures, but highlighted the need for designing and implementation of 
educational programs to improve the knowledge and practices of farmers. In general, multiple 
pathways to communicate AI information are used, and depending on the country and the information 
content, some of them are preferred by farmers. Umar, Thailagavathi, and Yakubu (2015) found that 
most of the Nigerian poultry farmers were aware of AI through communication program, and mass 
media was the primary source of their information. On the other hand, Cui et al. (2019a), observed 
that multiple sources of information were used by farmers to receive information on AI outbreaks in 
China but only information received over business networks translated into changes of biosecurity 
behaviours. A study conducted with Bangladeshi backyard poultry farmers also highlighted that the 
information from neighbours and family members strongly influenced backyard farmers’ awareness 
and risk perception on AI (Sultana et al., 2012).  
2.6 Knowledge gaps identified in the literature 
The review of the literature highlighted that the type of assessment (serological vs virological) of an 
AIV infection status of farms differs between countries, with most of the research conducted 
focussing on a bird-level analysis of H5 subtype prevalence.  
No research had been conducted to compare H5 and H9 infection status across different chicken 
production systems (backyard, commercial broiler and layer chickens), focussing on both, bird- and 
farm-level H5 and H9 antibody and virus prevalence. 
Furthermore, most of the risk factor research conducted focussed on AI outbreaks and was therefore 
implemented as case-control studies. In addition, previous risk factor research focussed on 
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commercial production systems, with little attention been paid to backyard production although this 
production system is crucial for livelihood generation of rural households in developing countries 
like Bangladesh. In addition, the impact of both, village-level and farm-level risk factors associated 
with the risk of both H5 and H9 infection in backyard chickens has not been studied. Finally, although 
management practices vary greatly between chicken production systems, research comparing factors 
influencing chicken farmers’ decisions to implement HPAI prevention and control measures across 
these different chicken production systems has not been conducted. 
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CHAPTER 3     
PATTERNS OF AVIAN INFLUENZA A (H5) AND A (H9) VIRUS INFECTION ON 
BACKYARD, COMMERCIAL BROILER AND LAYER CHICKEN FARMS IN 
BANGLADESH 
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3.1 Introduction 
HPAI H5N1 virus is now considered to be endemic in Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia 
and Vietnam (CDC, 2019a; FAO, 2011), causing sporadic cases in humans, generally associated with 
exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments (Fournié, Høg, Barnett, Pfeiffer, & 
Mangtani, 2017). However, it is feared that the ongoing co-circulation of LPAI virus subtype H9N2 
in H5N1-endemic areas might promote the emergence of reassortants able to spread effectively 
among humans (Marinova-Petkova et al., 2016; Parvin et al., 2019; Parvin et al., 2018; Thuy et al., 
2016). H5N1 infection had also an severe impact on poultry populations in endemically infected 
countries, resulting for example in the death and culling of more than 2.7 million poultry in 
Bangladesh between 2007 and 2019 (DLS, 2019). 
The number of notified outbreaks is now low in H5N1-endemic countries, such as Bangladesh, where 
the annual average number of reported outbreaks dropped from 92 in 2007-12, to 2 in 2013-19 (DLS, 
2019). Underreporting might be one reason for this decline, as compensation policies were interrupted 
(Chattopadhyay et al., 2018) or because farmers might have accepted the ubiquity of HPAI outbreak 
occurrence similar to the endemicity of Newcastle Disease (ND) in many developing countries 
(Spradbrow, 1996). 
Investigations of HPAI outbreaks have generated insights in possible risk factors associated with 
sudden deaths of birds (Biswas et al., 2009b; Loth, Gilbert, Osmani, Kalam, & Xiao, 2010; Osmani 
et al., 2014), but they don’t provide information about the circulation of AIV in farmed poultry 
populations in endemically infected countries. Furthermore, in such countries, studies aiming to 
assess the level of viral circulation in poultry are generally conducted in LBMs (ElMasry et al., 2017; 
Kim et al., 2018; Negovetich et al., 2011; Thuy et al., 2016), and rarely in poultry farms. This can 
partly be explained by the ease of sampling, as birds raised under different production systems are 
brought together in a single location. However, prevalence of infection estimated in marketed poultry 
populations cannot be extrapolated to farmed populations. In addition, the very few studies conducted 
in farms focused on a unique production system (Haider et al., 2015; Henning et al., 2011; Henning 
et al., 2010), and comparison of the level of infection across poultry production systems is lacking. 
In Bangladesh, about 80-90% of rural households (HHs) rear small flocks of poultry in their backyard. 
Backyard chickens, referred to as Deshi, ‘indigenous’ in Bangla (Barua & Yoshimura, 1997; FAO, 
2008) are usually reared under scavenging or free ranging conditions. Many backyard chicken 
farmers also rear ducks, and sometimes pigeons and geese (Alam et al., 2014; FAO, 2008). In contrast, 
in commercial broiler and layer farms, exotic strains or cross-breeds of chickens (e.g. Cobb 500 strain, 
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Hisex brown strain, Sonali cross-breed) are usually reared intensively, under confinement, with 
provision of commercially available feed (FAO, 2008; Huque, Saleque, & Khatun, 2011).  
In order to control and prevent the spread of H5N1 and H9N2 viruses in chickens, a detailed 
understanding of infection patterns at bird- and flock-level is required. It is hypothesized that different 
poultry species as well as different poultry husbandry systems might play different roles in the 
transmission and maintenance of those viruses (Alexander, 2000; Zhang et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
H9 viruses play an important role as a “progenitor” virus for HPAI H5N1 Eurasian lineage viruses 
and both LPAI and HPAI H7N9 viruses (Peacock, James, Sealy, & Iqbal, 2019; Pu et al., 2015; Su et 
al., 2018). Thus, this study aims to quantify the extent of H5 and H9 virus circulation in backyard 
chicken farms, and in commercial broiler and layer chicken farms in Bangladesh. Two cross-sectional 
studies were conducted. We estimated 1) bird and flock-level prevalence of current and past H5 and 
H9 infection, 2) the magnitude of spread of the infection within flocks, and 3) variations in prevalence 
with age. Finally, we assessed 4) the spatial distribution of H5 and H9 infection in backyard flocks. 
3.2 Materials and methods 
3.2.1 Study design 
Two cross-sectional studies were conducted in Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar districts, which were 
identified as the main districts supplying chickens to Chittagong City Live Bird Markets (CCLBMs) 
(Moyen, 2019; Moyen et al., 2018). Backyard chicken farms were surveyed between February and 
April 2016, and commercial broiler and layer chicken farms between February and April 2017. 
3.2.1.1 Sample size  
H5 and H9 bird- and flock-level seroprevalence were assumed to differ according to poultry species 
and production systems. For each poultry species (i.e. ducks and chickens) and each production 
system (i.e. backyard, commercial broiler and layer), a two stage sampling approach was used to 
estimate 1) the number of farms, and 2) the number of birds per farm to be sampled (Humphry, 
Cameron, & Gunn, 2004). Input parameters for sample size calculations and estimated sample sizes 
are listed in Table 3.1. The assumed design prevalence, i.e. the expected bird and flock-level H5 
seroprevalence for backyard and commercial birds, were based on Henning et al. (2011) and Hassan 
(2017); respectively.  
 
36 
 
Table 3.1 Input parameters for sample size calculations and estimated sample sizes. Flock sensitivity: the probability that at least one sampled bird in an 
infected flock is found positive, assuming that the flock is infected at a prevalence equal to or greater than the specified design prevalence (Sergeant & 
Perkins, 2015)   
Parameters Backyard 
chickens 
Backyard 
in-contact ducks 
Commercial 
broiler chickens 
Commercial layer 
chickens 
Test sensitivity (%) 98.0 98.0 98.0 98.0 
Confidence level (%) 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 
Design bird-level H5 seroprevalence (%) 15.0 35.0 15.0 35.0 
Design flock-level H5 seroprevalence (%) 25.0 50.0 25.0 45.0 
Flock size 10 3 1500 1500 
Tolerance (%) 10.0 10.0 10.0 10 
Minimum desired flock sensitivity (%) 65.0 95.0 75.0 95.0 
Calculated flock sensitivity (%) 65.6 98.7 76.2 96.6 
Farms to be sampled 123 99 103 102 
Birds to be sampled 4 2 9 8 
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3.2.1.2 Selection of administrative areas  
For backyard farms, the selection of sub-districts (upazillas) in the Chittagong district was based on 
features identified to influence AIV transmission (Ahmed et al., 2012): 1) their density of backyard 
poultry farms, 2) their density of backyard chickens, 3) their location in the district, 4) their 
environmental characteristics, and 5) their distance to Chittagong City, where most live bird markets 
are located (as distance to LBM is a crude proxy for value chain interactions). The density of backyard 
poultry farms and backyard chickens per square kilometre was calculated based on census data: the 
number of rural households (BBS, 2014a, 2015), with the assumption that 80% of households 
operated as backyard poultry farms (FAO, 2008), and the number of backyard chickens (BBS, 2011a, 
2011b). Quartiles of the density of backyard poultry farms and backyard chickens across the 
Chittagong district were computed and each upazilla was assigned to one of those quartiles. To cover 
most of a district’s geographical area, the Chittagong district was divided into regions (south, north, 
east, west, middle), and upazillas were identified from each of these regions. We also aimed to recruit 
upazillas differing according to the presence of water reservoirs (sea/river/canal/lake/wetland), 
woodlands (forest/hill/jungle), and their distance to Chittagong city. A ranking matrix was then 
developed for all upazillas in the Chittagong district, and eight upazillas were selected representing 
combinations of all five selection criteria.  
Two upazillas in the Cox’s Bazaar district, which were the main suppliers of poultry for CCLBMs, 
were also selected (Moyen, 2019). 
In order for the studied backyard and commercial farms to be from the same geographical areas, the 
upazillas selected for the backyard farm research were also selected for the subsequent commercial 
farm research. 
3.2.1.3 Selection of villages and backyard chicken farms 
We then calculated quartiles for the number of households (or farms) per village across each district.  
In each selected upazilla, each village was assigned to a quartile according to their number of 
households, and one village was randomly selected from each quartile (using syntax 
RANDBETWEEN in Microsoft Excel 2013, Microsoft Corporation, USA). 
Four villages were thus selected from each of the 8 selected upazillas in the Chittagong district, and 
5 villages were selected from each of the 2 selected upazillas in Cox’s Bazaar district. 
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We aimed to sample at least 123 backyard chicken farms, of which 99 also raised ducks. To sample 
3 farms per village, 2 farms had to raise both chicken and ducks, and 1 farm only chicken. Following 
this strategy, we would need to sample 84 farms (42*2= 84) that raised both chicken. Thus, to reach 
our estimated sample size (N=99), for 24 villages, we sampled 3 farms per village (2 farms raised 
both chicken and ducks, and 1 farm only chicken), and for 18 villages, we sampled 4 farms per village 
(3 farms raised both chicken and ducks, and 1 farm only chicken). Following this procedure, we 
selected 144 backyard farms of which 102 also raised ducks. Starting from one the village entrance, 
we counted farms as we walked through the village, and recruited farms matching numbers which 
were randomly generated before the field visit. If a selected farm owner was not available or had an 
insufficient number of birds to be sampled, the neighbouring farm was used as a replacement.  
3.2.1.4 Selection of commercial chicken farms 
For each selected upazilla, a list of commercial broiler and layer farmers was generated through 
consultations with upazilla livestock officers, feed and chick dealers, veterinary pharmaceutical 
representatives, private veterinarians, feed company representatives and hatchery representatives. 
Information about the flock sizes of those farms was not available. 
Then, simple random sampling (using syntax RANDBETWEEN in Microsoft Excel 2013, Microsoft 
Corporation, USA) was used to select broiler or layer farms within each upazilla. In order to sample 
at least 102 layer farms, 10-11 farms were required per upazilla. As only six and eight layer farms 
were identified in two upazillas, all of those farms were selected in these two upazillas, and 10-15 
farms were selected from the other eight upazillas. To sample at least 103 broiler farms, 10-13 farms 
were randomly selected in each selected upazilla. 
3.2.1.5 Selection of birds 
As backyard chickens and in-contact ducks were free-ranging, birds were conveniently recruited in 
each selected farm, with the backyard flock owner capturing available birds until the sample size was 
reached.  A total of 4 chickens and 2 in-contact ducks were selected from farms that had both, 
chickens and ducks, and 4 chickens were selected from farms that had chickens only.  
For commercial farms, chickens were selected from different parts of the poultry shed until eight 
layer and nine broiler chickens were obtained. Bird characteristics that could have made them appear 
as different from other birds in the same flock were not accounted for (e.g. clinical signs, plumage 
colour, body weight etc.).  If several sheds were present on a commercial farm, the shed with oldest 
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birds was selected assuming that these birds had a higher chance of being exposed to AIV throughout 
their production cycle. 
3.2.2 Sample collection and processing 
Informed written consent (signature or thumb impression) was provided by each farmer before 
sampling the birds and conduct of the interview. A blood sample, a cloacal and an oropharyngeal 
swabs were then collected from each bird, and bird’s age, sex and apparent clinical signs (if any) were 
recorded. 
Depending on the body weight, 1-3 ml blood were collected from wing or jugular vein of each bird 
and transferred to individual sterile plastic tube immediately after collection. Oropharyngeal swabs 
were taken by gently rolling the swab tip around the inside of the bird’s mouth and behind the tongue. 
Cloacal swab were collected by inserting the swab into the cloaca and rotating it several times. Swabs 
were placed into separate cryovials containing viral transport media. Tubes and cryovials collected 
in Chittagong district were kept in a cool box filled with ice packs and transported to the Chattogram 
(previously Chittagong) Veterinary and Animal Sciences (CVASU) laboratory within the same day. 
And cryovials were stored at -800C. Blood samples were refrigerated overnight, then the serum was 
separated by centrifugation at 10,000 rpm for 30 minutes at 40c and transferred to Eppendorf tubes. 
The serum was stored at -200C until further processing. In Cox’s Bazaar, samples were transported 
immediately to the local office of the Department of Livestock Services (DLS). Blood samples were 
processed as indicated above, while cryovials were stored in liquid nitrogen for up to 8 days before 
their transfer and storage in a -800C freezer at CVASU. 
3.2.3 Diagnostic tests 
3.2.3.1. Serological tests 
The serum samples were first screened for the presence of antibodies against Influenza A virus using 
a commercially available ELISA. For backyard chicken and duck samples the IDEXX® AI MultiS-
Screen ELISA (Product Code: 5004.20, IDEXX Laboratories, Inc.,USA) and for commercial chicken 
samples the ID Screen® Influenza A Antibody Competition Multi-Species ELISA (Product Code: 
FLUACA ver 1216 GB, ID.vet, FRANCE) or the IDEXX® AI ELISA (Product Code: 5004.00, 
IDEXX Laboratories, Inc.,USA) were used. Positive samples were then tested for the presence of H5 
and H9 specific antibodies using the HI test. Due to the unavailability of local AIV H5N1 and H9N2 
antigens from field viruses collected in Bangladesh, inactivated antigens prepared by the Animal and 
Plant Health Agency in Surrey, United Kingdom were used in the HI test (H5N1-A/Ck/Scot/59, 
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H5N3-A/Teal/Eng/7394-2805/06, H9N2-A/Tky/Wisc/1/66, H9N9-A/knot/Eng/SV497/02). A serum 
sample was positive if there was an inhibition at a dilution of 1/16 (24) or more against 4 
haemagglutinating units of antigen (OIE, 2015).  
3.2.3.2. Virological tests 
Swab samples were pooled at the CVASU laboratory with respect to their type (cloacal and 
oropharyngeal), bird species and farm of origin, with a maximum of five samples per pool. RNA was 
extracted from the pooled samples using the MagMaxTM-96 extraction kit (Ambion Life Technologies 
Corporation®, 2013). Real-time RT-PCR tested for the presence of AIV Matrix gene (M-gene). For 
all M-gene positive pools, RNA was extracted from the corresponding individual samples and tested 
by real-time RT-PCR for H5 and H9 genes (AAHL, 2014). A bird was positive if its cloacal and/or 
oropharyngeal swabs were positive. 
3.2.4 Data analyses 
Laboratory test results were entered into Microsoft Excel 2013 spreadsheets, coded and checked for 
integrity, with the final dataset exported into STATA 14.1(Stata Corporation, College Station, Texas, 
USA). 
3.2.4.1 Bird and flock-level prevalence  
Bird and flock-level apparent virus prevalence were calculated separately for Influenza A (M-gene 
positive), H5 and H9. A flock was positive for a specific serological or virological test if at least one 
of its birds was positive. The 95% logit confidence intervals (CI) for prevalence (Dean & Pagano, 
2015) were calculated using the -prop- command in STATA 14.1. If the prevalence was zero, the 
97.5% binomial exact or Clopper-Pearson confidence interval (Clopper & Pearson, 1934; Dean & 
Pagano, 2015) was calculated using the –cii prop- command in STATA 14.1. To describe infection 
patterns over the duration of a production cycle, the bird-level seroprevalence was stratified by age 
groups and presented with 95% confidence intervals.  
3.2.4.2 Relationship between bird-level and flock-level seroprevalence 
We assessed the correlation between the serological statuses of individual birds within a flock (Shrout 
& Fleiss, 1979) by computing the individual intra-class correlation (ICC): 
𝜌 = 𝐼𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑦𝑖𝑗 , 𝑦𝑖𝑗′) =
𝜎𝑟
2
𝜎𝑟2 + 𝜎𝜖2
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Where, 𝜎𝑟
2= variance between flocks and 𝜎𝜖
2= error variance or variance within flocks 
In our study, chickens (backyard, commercial broiler, layer) and in-contact ducks were considered as 
“raters” for the serological status of flocks (represented as “targets”) in a one-way random effects 
model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇 + 𝑟𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
We observed 𝑦𝑖𝑗, where i= 1,…, n; j=1,…, k;  where 𝑦𝑖𝑗  is the j
th rating on the ith target; 𝜇 is the 
mean rating; 𝑟𝑖 is the target random effect and 𝜖𝑖𝑗 is the random error (StataCorp., 2019). 
3.2.4.3 Spatial clusters for H5/H9 seropositivity of backyard farms 
To explore spatial patterns in viral transmission, we assessed whether H5/H9 seropositive birds were 
randomly distributed across the two study districts. The total number of seropositive and seronegative 
birds on each farm was used as the outcome of a discrete Bernoulli probability model implemented 
in the SaTScan software version 9.4.4 (SaTScanTM, 2016, Boston, USA). Spatial clusters of infection 
were identified based on 999 Standard Monte Carlo replications. The coordinates of the visited 
backyard farms were used as spatial information in the analysis. The maximum size of a spatial cluster 
was 25% of the population at risk (Kulldorff, 1997). The analysis was conducted separately for 
backyard chickens and in-contact ducks, and for both H5 and H9 subtypes.  
3.3 Results 
A total of 576 backyard chickens and 204 in-contact ducks were sampled across 144 backyard flocks, 
and a total of 954 broiler and 904 layer chickens were sampled from 106 broiler and 113 layer chicken 
flocks. None of the sampled backyard (N=144) and commercial broiler flocks (N=106) was 
vaccinated against H5 (using inactivated or live H5 virus strains). Of the total sampled commercial 
layer flocks (N=113), 13 layer flocks were vaccinated against H5 (using inactivated or live H5 strain), 
and the remaining 100 layer flocks were not vaccinated against H5 (using inactivated or live H5 
strain).HPAI outbreaks or mass mortality events were not reported in any of the backyard and 
commercial farms in the 12 months preceding the sampling. 
The average (minimum, maximum) flock size of sampled backyard poultry, commercial broiler, 
unvaccinated and vaccinated commercial layer flocks were 21 (5, 73), 1,657 (200, 6,000), 2,118 (60, 
7,500) and 2,831 (975, 10,500), respectively. 
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3.3.1 Bird-level virus prevalence 
Influenza A virus prevalence was 0.2% (95% CI: 0.0-1.2) for backyard chickens, 1% (95% CI: 0.2-
3.9) for backyard in-contact ducks, 1.8% (95% CI: 1.1-2.8) for broiler chickens, 1.6% (95% CI: 0.9-
2.8) for unvaccinated layer and 1.9% (95% CI: 0.5-7.4) for H5 vaccinated layer chickens (Figure 
3.1). 
None of the sampled birds on backyard and commercial farms was H5 virus positive. 
On backyard farms, 0.2 % (95% CI: 0.0-1.2) of chickens, but none of the in-contact ducks were H9 
virus positive (Figure 3.1). Similarly, low bird-level H9 virus prevalence was observed for broiler 
and unvaccinated commercial layer chickens, with 0.5% (95% CI: 0.2-1.3) and 0.6% (95% CI: 0.3-
1.5), respectively. None of the H5 vaccinated commercial layer chickens was H9 virus positive 
(Figure 3.1). 
3.3.2 Flock-level virus prevalence 
The flock-level Influenza A virus prevalence was 0.7% (95% CI: 0.1-4.9) for backyard flocks, 7.5% 
(95% CI: 3.8-14.5) for broiler flocks, 5.0% (95% CI: 2.1-11.6) for unvaccinated layer and 7.7% (95% 
CI: 1.0-41.6) for H5 vaccinated layer flocks (Figure 3.1). 
Relatively more unvaccinated commercial flocks were H9 virus positive compared to backyard 
flocks, with 1.9% (95% CI: 0.5-7.4) and 2.0% (95% CI: 0.5-7.8) of broiler and unvaccinated layer 
flocks being positive compared to 0.7% (95% CI: 0.1-4.9) backyard flocks. None of the H5 
vaccinated commercial layer flocks was H9 virus positive (Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1 Bird-level (left panel) and flock-level (right panel) Influenza A (M-gene), H5 and H9 virus RNA prevalence detected by Reverse Transcription 
Polymerase Chain Reaction ( RT-PCR) in backyard and commercial chicken production systems in Bangladesh (2016-2017). Data labels represent the 
prevalence values. The confidence intervals are shown as dashed lines. Confidence intervals represent 95% limits if prevalence was >0% and 97.5% 
limits if prevalence was 0%.
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3.3.3 Bird-level seroprevalence  
Bird-level Influenza A seroprevalence was 71.7% (95% CI: 67.9-75.2) for backyard chickens, 75.5% 
(95% CI: 69.1-80.9) for backyard in-contact ducks, 9.3% (95% CI: 7.6-11.3) for broiler chickens, 
33.1% (95% CI: 29.9-36.5) for unvaccinated layer chickens, and 69.2% (95% CI: 59.7-77.4) for H5 
vaccinated (using live or inactivated H5 virus strains) layer chickens (Figure 3.2). 
In backyard chickens, bird-level H5 seroprevalence was lower compared to H9 seroprevalence - it 
was 4.2% (95% CI: 2.8-6.1) and 16.0% (95% CI: 13.2-19.2) respectively; while bird-level H5 and 
H9 seroprevalence were similar in in-contact ducks, with 14.2% (95% CI: 10.0-19.8) and 15.7% (95% 
CI: 11.3-21.4), respectively (Figure 3.2). 
In broiler chickens, bird-level seroprevalence was 1.5% (95% CI: 0.9-2.5) and 1.5% (95% CI: 0.9-
2.5) for H5 and H9, respectively. In unvaccinated layer chickens, bird-level seroprevalence was 7.8% 
(95% CI: 6.1-9.8) for H5 and 5.8% (95% CI: 4.3-7.6) for H9, while in H5 vaccinated (using live or 
inactivated H5 virus strains) layer chickens bird-level seroprevalence was 10.6% (95% CI: 5.9-18.2) 
for H5 and 4.8% (95% CI: 2.0-11.1) for H9 (Figure 3.2). 
3.3.4 Flock-level seroprevalence  
The flock-level Influenza A seroprevalence was 97.2% (95% CI: 92.8-99.0) for backyard flocks, 
17.9% (95% CI: 11.7-26.6) for broiler flocks, 52.0% (95% CI: 42.1-61.7) for unvaccinated layer 
flocks, and 84.6% (95% CI: 53.0-96.4) for H5 vaccinated (using live or inactivated H5 virus strains) 
layer flocks (Figure 3.2). 
In backyard poultry, flock-level seroprevalence was 27.8% (95% CI: 21.0-35.7) for H5 and 60.4% 
(95% CI: 52.1-68.2) for H9 (Figure 3.2). In contrast to backyard poultry, the flock-level H5 
seroprevalence in broiler and unvaccinated layers flocks was relatively higher than H9: it was 9.4% 
(95% CI: 5.1-16.8) and 5.7% (95% CI: 2.5-12.2) in broilers and 31.0% (95% CI: 22.6-40.9) and 
22.0% (95% CI: 14.9-31.3) in unvaccinated layer flocks, respectively. The flock-level seroprevalence 
was 38.5% (95% CI: 16.2-66.9) for H5 and 23.1% (95% CI: 7.2-53.8) for H9 in H5 vaccinated (using 
live or inactivated H5 virus strains) layer flocks (Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.2 Bird-level (left panel) and flock-level (right panel) Influenza A, H5 and H9 seroprevalence in backyard and commercial chicken production 
systems in Bangladesh (2016-2017). Influenza A antibodies were detected by Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA), and H5 and H9 antibodies 
were detected by Haemagglutination Inhibition (HI) test (≥1/16 dilution). Data labels represent the prevalence values. The 95% confidence intervals are 
shown as dashed lines.  
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3.3.5 Relationship between bird-level and flock-level seroprevalence  
The majority of H5 and H9 seropositive backyard flocks (70.0% of H5 and 66.7% of H9 seropositive 
flocks) had only a single bird (either chicken or duck) that tested positive within the flock. 
Interestingly, in only 5.0% of backyard flocks, both chickens and ducks, were found to be H5 
seropositive, while in 13.8% of backyard flocks, both chickens and ducks, were H9 seropositive.  
The clustering effect of birds being seropositive within a flock is represented by the ICC displayed in 
Figure 3.3. As often only single chickens were H5 or H9 seropositive within a backyard flock, the 
ICC was low for backyard chickens (Backyard chicken H5: ICC=0.07, 95% CI: 0.0-0.2; Backyard 
chicken H9:0.04, 95% CI: 0.0-0.1). In contrast, often several ducks with a backyard flock were 
seropositive (Backyard duck H5: ICC=0.48, 95% CI: 0.3-0.6; Backyard duck H9: ICC=0.19, 95% 
CI: 0.0-0.4), which highlights that H5 and H9 seropositivity of backyard flocks are identified with 
multiple in-contact ducks that are H5 and H9 positive within the same flock. 
For all broiler flocks (100%) only 1-2 chickens tested H5 seropositive across the 9 birds sampled per 
flock (Broiler H5: ICC=0.06, 95% CI: 0.0-0.1), whereas for H9 serpositivity, 50% of broiler flocks 
had 1-2 birds, and 50% had 3-4 birds being positive (Broiler H9: ICC=0.22, 95% CI: 0.2-0.3). 
As similar low clustering effect for H5 and H9 seropositivity was observed for unvaccinated layer 
flocks with 1-2 birds of the 8 birds sampled tested H5 seropositive in 71% of flocks and H9 
seropositive in 73% of flocks (Unvaccinated layer H5: ICC=0.15, 95% CI: 0.1-0.2; Unvaccinated 
layer H9: ICC=0.17, 95% CI: 0.1-0.2). In 60% of vaccinated layer flocks only 1-2 birds tested H5 
seropositive (Vaccinated layer H5: ICC=0.19, 95% CI: 0.1-0.5). 
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Figure 3.3 Intra-class Correlation Coefficients (ICCs) for H5 and H9 seropositivity in backyard and 
commercial chicken production systems in Bangladesh (2016-2017). The 95% confidence intervals 
are shown as dashed lines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Backyard ducks
Backyard chickens
Unvaccinated layer chickens
Vaccinated layer chickens
Broiler chickens
0 .2 .4 .6
ICC for H5 ICC for H9
- Horizontal dash lines represent 95% confidence intervals for ICC
48 
 
3.3.6 Infection patterns by age groups 
Over the course of a production cycle, higher bird-level H5 and H9 seroprevalence was in general 
observed in older backyard chickens and ducks as well as in older unvaccinated layers (Figure 3.4). 
Interestingly, H5 seroprevalence peaked around 1.5 years in backyard chickens and unvaccinated 
layers, but then declined afterwards.  A similar decline in older birds was not observed for H9 
seropositivity in backyard chickens and unvaccinated layers.  
An increase in H5 and H9 titres with age was not as prominent in broilers.  
Surprisingly, H5 titres in vaccinated layers were low in the first year of age (when vaccination of 
layers was conducted) and only peaked at 1.5 years of age and drastically declined afterwards. 
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Figure 3.4 Bird-level H5 and H9 seroprevalence by age group in backyard and commercial birds and 
flocks in Bangladesh (2016-2017). The confidence intervals are shown as dashed lines. Confidence 
intervals represent 95% limits if prevalence was >0% and as 97.5% limits if prevalence was 0%. 
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3.3.7 Spatial clusters for H5/H9 seropositivity of backyard farms 
The relatively high flock-level seropositivity of backyard flocks and a strong clustering of ducks 
being seropositive within backyard flocks, intrigued us to further explore the spatial distribution of 
H5 and H9 seropositivity of backyard poultry within our study area.  
When analysing the locations of chickens being positive within backyard farms, a high risk cluster 
for H5 seropositivity (Relative Risk=5.4, p=0.004, radius=16.8 km) and a spatially overlapping high 
risk cluster for H9 seropositivity (Relative Risk=15.2, p=0.036, radius=15.2 km) were identified in 
the central part of the Chittagong district (Figure 3.5). This area is represented by high densities of 
backyard poultry farms, proximity to the Chittagong city, where most live bird markets are located, 
and most importantly, the largest river in Chittagong district, the Karnaphuli river, passes through the 
clusters. 
Interestingly, when locations of ducks being positive within a backyard farm were analysed, only a 
small high risk cluster for H9 (Relative Risk=7.7, p=0.048, radius=0.6 km) was identified, 
highlighting that the risk of ducks being H5 and H9 seropositive was uniform throughout the study 
area (Figure 3.6). 
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Figure 3.5 Spatial distribution and high-risk clusters of H5 and H9 seropositivity for chickens on 
backyard farms in the Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar districts of Bangladesh (2016-2017). 
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Figure 3.6 Spatial distribution of H5 and H9 seropositivity for ducks on backyard farms in the 
Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar districts of Bangladesh (2016-2017). 
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3.4 Discussion 
This is the first study comprehensively investigating the extent of H5 and H9 virus circulation among 
populations of backyard, commercial broiler and layer chickens in a H5N1-endemic country. 
In a recent study, the proportion of birds positive for the AIV was estimated in Bangladeshi LBMs, 
including in CCLBMs which are supplied by our farm study population. The proportion of birds 
positive for H5 and H9 virus reached 1.3% and 8.3 % in backyard chickens, 7.6% and 3.4% in 
waterfowl (including ducks and geese), 0.9% and 13.1% in broiler chickens, respectively (Kim et al., 
2018). In contrast, H9 prevalence was here estimated to be much lower in farmed poultry, and all 
sampled birds tested negative for H5. This may be due to the amplification of the AIV in LBMs 
(Kung et al., 2007), or along the trading networks through which poultry are moved from farms to 
LBMs. 
Interestingly, the proportion of flocks positive for the Influenza A and H9 virus was similar for broiler 
and layer farms. This suggests that the level of exposure of broiler flocks to AIVs may be similar to 
layer flocks. Whereas AI vaccination programmes often focus on layer farms, these results suggest 
that a vaccination aiming to reduce the transmission of AIVs in a poultry population should consider 
the vaccination of broilers. A detailed cost-benefit analysis would be required before such a 
prevention strategy can be implemented. In addition, as vaccinating commercial broilers is a high-
cost approach, vaccinating valuable broiler breeder parent and grandparent stock with HVT-AIV 
vaccine might be a more reasonable and acceptable option for poultry producers in Bangladesh. 
However, the potential risk of antigenic variants of HPAIV H5N1 viruses evolving due to extensive 
use of H5 vaccine need to be considered as this may result in the failure of a vaccination programme 
(Setiawaty, Pratiwi, Pawestri, Ibrahim, & Soebandrio, 2013). 
As infected birds may shed AIVs for 3-7 days, serological testing can be useful to assess past infection 
patterns (Achenbach & Bowen, 2011; Leigh Perkins & Swayne, 2002; Saito et al., 2009; Spackman, 
Pantin-Jackwood, Swayne, & Suarez, 2009; Sturm-Ramirez et al., 2004). For example, it has been 
shown that H5 antibodies persist up to 40 weeks post-vaccination in H5N3 vaccinated chickens and 
ducks (Boltz et al., 2009), while H9N2 antibodies had been detected for up to 15 weeks in 
unvaccinated chickens (Imai et al., 2007). 
In our study, H5 bird-level seroprevalence was higher in in-contact ducks than chickens in backyard 
farms. Such pattern was also described in Vietnam and Indonesia (Henning et al., 2011; Henning et 
al., 2010). One plausible explanation is that chickens infected by some clades of HPAI H5 (for 
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instance, A/chicken/Yamaguchi/7/04 (H5N1, clade 2.5)) will most likely die, whereas ducks may 
survive (Kishida et al., 2005; WHO/OIE/FAO, 2008), although farmers did not report any significant 
increase in chicken mortality over the year preceding the sampling. Other possible explanations for 
the higher seroprevalence in ducks are that antibodies might persist for longer in ducks, or ducks 
might be exposed more frequently to H5 viruses as they are more likely to mingle with (potentially 
infected) wild waterfowls in water bodies (Hill et al., 2015; Khatun et al., 2013). Ducks are considered 
to be a natural reservoir for most AI subtypes due to their immunological characteristics (Hinshaw, 
Webster, & Turner, 1980; Vanderven et al., 2012; Webster, Bean, Gorman, Chambers, & Kawaoka, 
1992). As suggested by former studies, ducks may be a major source of H5 virus for backyard 
chickens and other poultry (Henning et al., 2011; Hulse-Post et al., 2005; Kishida et al., 2005; Sarkar 
et al., 2017).  
Whereas previous studies (Ansari et al., 2016; Karki et al., 2014; Khatun et al., 2013) generally only 
reported bird-level prevalence, we estimated the clustering of seropositive birds within a flock. The 
significant clustering effect of H5 seropositivity in ducks suggests that if one duck was H5 
seropositive in a flock, other ducks were also likely to be H5 seropositive. This was in contrast to 
backyard and commercial broiler and layer chickens, highlighting only individual birds within these 
flocks developed H5 antibodies.  
Similarly to a study on ducks in Vietnam (Henning et al., 2011), H5 and H9 seroprevalence increased 
with the age of backyard and layer birds. Indeed, it is expected that the likelihood of having been 
exposed to endemic viruses increases over time. Although seroprevalence marginally increased with 
age in broilers, we did not observe the same magnitude of increased H5 seroprevalence in broilers 
compared to layers and backyard chickens. The short lifespan of broiler reflects a shorter duration of 
exposure to AIV compared to layers or backyard chickens, and thereby highlights a lower risk of AIV 
infection in broilers (Tombari et al., 2013). Field research highlighted that high H9 antibodies titres 
were only observed after 2 weeks past infection in broilers (Nili & Asasi, 2002). Hence, considering 
the short production cycle of broilers there are limited opportunities to observe a significant rise of 
antibody titres in broilers under field conditions. We also did not find any H5 antibodies in very young 
broiler and layer chicks indicating may be there were no maternal antibodies persisting in this age 
group for commercial birds. For birds of the same age, H9 seroprevalence was higher in backyard 
than layer chickens, which indicates a higher level of exposure to H9 virus as well as lower mortality 
due to LPAI. This would need to be further explored through longitudinal studies. 
Interestingly no major mortalities or clinical HPAI symptoms were observed in backyard and 
commercial chicken flocks although birds developed antibodies. The survival of some chickens to 
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infection by H5 viruses, and their subsequent seropositivity, might result from infection by LPAI H5 
strains and other LPAI H5 subtypes (such as, H5N2, H5N3, H5N8). A number of studies reported 
LPAI H5 viruses (H5N2, H5N3, H5N8) occurring in Asia (Duan et al., 2007; Nguyen et al., 2005), 
including LPAI H5N2 virus in Bangladesh (Gerloff et al., 2016). Another explanation might be a 
reduction in H5N1 pathogenicity due to viral evolution (Li et al., 2017; Londt, Banks, & Alexander, 
2007) and the development of cell-mediated immunity that contributes to host resistance 
(Kapczynski, 2008; Wang, Loh, Kedzierski, & Kedzierska, 2016).  
In Bangladesh, two inactivated vaccines are used for commercial layers and parent stocks: (1) Re-6 
from Merial (produced in China), containing the HA gene from a clade 2.3.2.1 H5N1 virus, (2) 
Nobilis Influenza H5, an inactivated H5N2 vaccine from Intervet (produced in the Netherlands).  The 
Department of Livestock Services (DLS) of Bangladesh approved these two vaccines for the initial 
vaccination of commercial layers and parent stocks, irrespective of their ages. Then, 6-8 weeks after 
the initial vaccination, a booster vaccination is recommended.  
In addition, the live vector vaccine Vectormune HVT-AIV from CEVA-Biomune (produced in the 
USA), comprising of an innocent vector Marek’s disease virus of serotype 3 (Turkey Herpesvirus or 
HVT) expressing HA gene of a clade 2.2 H5N1 antigen is used for vaccination of day-old layer and 
broiler chicks. Due to the development of life-long immunity of Vectormune HVT-AIV (as claimed 
by the manufacturer of vaccine), booster vaccination is not required (DLS, 2013; Drugs.Com, 2020; 
Gardin et al., 2015).  
However, in our study, none of the sampled broiler flocks were vaccinated against H5, and out of the 
113 sampled layer flocks only 13 flocks (11.5%) were vaccinated against H5 (using live or inactivated 
H5 vaccine strains). This low uptake of vaccination might be due to the high cost of the vaccine, 
which is Bangladeshi Taka 5 (US$0.06) for a single dose of the vaccine. Education of farmers about 
the benefits of vaccination and the payment of incentives (through the Government of Bangladesh) 
could potentially increase the uptake of AI vaccinations (DhakaHerald, 2013; DLS, 2013; Rimi et al., 
2019). 
Surprisingly, we found that a substantial proportion of vaccinated layer chickens developed no 
immune response. This findings was consistent with an earlier study in Bangladesh, which reported 
that a small proportion (8.1%) of vaccinated layer chickens had H5 antibodies, although the type of 
H5 vaccine used was not mentioned in this study (Ansari et al.; 2016). This poor immune response 
might be due to improper vaccination, poor vaccine quality, immunosuppressive diseases (for 
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example, Marek’s disease, infectious bursal disease) or the administration of other vaccines at the 
time of the AI vaccination (for instance, Marek’s vaccine) (van den Berg et al., 2008).  Nevertheless, 
higher bird-level H5 seroprevalence was observed in older vaccinated birds, which might be due to 
repeated vaccinations, or exposure to LPAI H5 field viruses. 
Our spatial cluster analysis revealed consistent H5 (past) infection of ducks across the whole study 
areas. In contrast, for backyard chickens, the spatial distribution of H5 and H9 seropositive cases 
were clustered in the same area, with the Karnaphuli River, the largest river in Chittagong district, 
passing through this cluster. Indeed, river systems in Bangladesh have been hypothesized as being as 
potential risky areas for HPAI H5N1 infection, although no biological sampling of birds had been 
reported in those areas (Ahmed et al., 2012; Muzaffar et al., 2008).  
There are some limitations in our study. Firstly, the HI test antigens were prepared from field virus 
isolated from a range of countries, but not from a field virus collected in Bangladesh. This might have 
reduced the sensitivity and the specificity of HI test used in this study. Due to the unavailability of 
local AIV H5N1 and H9N2 antigens prepared from field viruses collected in Bangladesh, we were 
unable to explore the impact of the source of antigen on test characteristics of the HI test. However, 
a study conducted by Yamamoto et al. (2007) estimated sensitivity and specificity of the HI test to be 
99% and 90%, respectively, when different antigens were used. Considering this good specificity of 
the HI test using different antigens, we are confident that our estimated antibody prevalence was not 
overestimated due to many false-positive results. Secondly, recall bias may have led to a miss-
estimation of the age of chickens. This would only relate to backyard farmers, as commercial flock 
owners usually record the dates when they start their production cycle with day-old chicks. 
Unfortunately, the exact dates of vaccinations were not recorded by layer farmers, and, therefore we 
could not assess the patterns of seropositivity according to farm-specific vaccination programmes.  
In conclusion, this research provided unique insights into current and past H5 and H9 infection pattern 
across all chicken production systems in Bangladesh. Our findings can support the development of 
targeted preventions and control measures for chicken production systems and provide import 
parameters for mathematical models exploring the infection dynamics of AIVs in endemic settings.
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CHAPTER 4     
VILLAGE AND FARM-LEVEL RISK FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH AVIAN 
INFLUENZA A (H5) AND A (H9) FLOCK-LEVEL SEROPREVALENCE ON BACKYARD 
CHICKEN FARMS IN BANGLADESH 
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4.1 Introduction 
Backyard chickens reared in a traditional scavenging system are an important source of high quality 
nutrition (Axe, 2016; Islam, Seeland, Bulbul, & Howlider, 2002) and self-employment for rural 
households in low and middle-income countries (LMICs), such as Bangladesh (Huque, 1999; Islam, 
Begum, Kausar, Hossain, & Kamruzzaman, 2015; SAC, 2017). However, the low level of biosecurity 
in this farming system may put backyard poultry at a high risk of infection by AIVs (Conan et al., 
2012) and backyard poultry are often considered to promote the spread and persistence of AIVs 
(Bavinck et al., 2009; Tiensin et al., 2005). It has been hypothesised that, due to their small flock size, 
the risk of viral introduction into backyard flocks may be substantially lower than in commercial 
flocks (Akey, 2003; Refregier-Petton et al., 2001), and that local breeds raised on backyard farms 
may be less susceptible to infection than exotic breeds reared in commercial chicken farming systems 
(Barua & Yoshimura, 1997; GRAIN 2006). However, there is no experimental and observational 
evidence supporting these hypotheses (FAO, 2019b).  
 
HPAI H5N1 was first reported in Bangladesh in 2007. It is now endemic in Bangladesh with multiple 
AIV subtypes, including LPAI H9N2, circulating in the country’s poultry population raising concerns 
for the emergence of a new AIV variant of significant public health concern (Marinova-Petkova et 
al., 2016; Parvin et al., 2018). 
 
A recent study conducted in Bangladeshi LBMs estimated a prevalence of H5 and H9 AIVs of 1.3% 
and 8.3 % in backyard chickens, 7.6% and 3.4% in waterfowl (ducks and geese), respectively (Kim 
et al., 2018). In contrast, none of the chickens and ducks that we sampled on backyard flocks tested 
positive for H5 AIV, and only 0.2% of chickens tested positive for H9 AIV (Chapter 3). The H5 and 
H9 seroprevalence was 4.2% and 16.0% in backyard chickens, and 14.2% and 15.7% in ducks, 
respectively, indicating a past exposure to circulating H5 and H9 virus (Chapter 3). 
 
The implementation of comprehensive biosecurity practices is notoriously challenging, if at all 
feasible, in a backyard farming system (Rimi et al., 2019). The lack of adherence to recommended 
biosecurity practices is likely influenced by backyard farmers’ belief that their poultry does not play 
a significant role in AIV transmission (Bavinck et al., 2009). It is therefore essential to identify risk 
factors contributing to AIV infection in backyard flocks, in order to develop extension messages on 
AI prevention and control that are tailored to backyard farmers. 
  
59 
 
To our knowledge, only one case-control study was conducted in Bangladesh, more than 10 years 
ago, to identify farm-level factors associated with H5N1 outbreak occurrence on backyard farms 
(Biswas et al., 2009c). Risk factors for current H5 and H9 circulation on largely outbreak free 
backyard farms have not been described. Therefore, this study aimed to identify farm- and village- 
level factors associated with current H5 and H9 seroprevalence on backyard farms in Bangladesh.  
4.2 Materials and methods 
4.2.1 Overview of the study design 
A cross-sectional study was conducted in the Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar districts of Bangladesh 
between February and April 2016. The study was conducted on 144 backyard chicken farms across 
42 villages. The sample size calculations and the selection of study units are described in Chapter 3. 
4.2.2 Data collection 
We used two types of questionnaires to collect information on farm-level and village-level risk factors 
potentially associated with AIV circulation. The questionnaires were developed based on  causal 
diagrams constructed using the software MindMaple Lite version 1.3 (MindMaple Inc., Tustin, USA) 
visualising the hypothesized relationships between the flock-level serological status and potential 
farm- (Figure 4.1) and village-level risk factors (Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.1 Hypothesized causal pathways for farm-level risk factors associated with AI infection on backyard farms in Bangladesh. The red box represent the 
outcome (farm-level seropositivity) in the risk factor analysis, green boxes represent individual risk factors with grey boxes indicating additional categories/levels 
within the risk factor. Yellow-brown headings represent themes or categories under which risk factors can be combined. The causal pathways were used to inform 
the development of questions used in the interviews with backyard farmers and to guide the inclusion of potential confounders and interactions in the final 
multivariable model. 
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Figure 4.2 Hypothesized causal pathways for village-level risk factors associated with AI infection on backyard farms in Bangladesh. The red box represent the 
outcome (The red box represent the outcome (farm-level seropositivity) in the risk factor analysis, green boxes represent individual risk factors with grey boxes 
indicating additional categories/levels within the risk factor. Yellow-brown headings represent themes or categories under which risk factors can be combined. The 
causal pathways were used to inform the development of questions used in the interviews with village-key informants including backyard farmers and to guide the 
inclusion of potential confounders and interactions in the final multivariable model. 
62 
 
The farm-level questionnaire was designed to collect detailed information on husbandry and farm 
management practices, marketing practices, and the farm location. The questionnaire was pilot-tested 
on five backyard farms that were not part of the farms recruited for the study. Twelve out of 58 
questions were subsequently modified as their initial formulation was unclear for interviewed 
farmers. For example, farmers in the pilot study had difficulties understanding the question  ‘Do you 
maintain any quarantine measures for newly introduced poultry into the flock?’ and we modified the 
question to ‘Do you keep newly introduced poultry separate from other poultry in a safe and separate 
place/house before introducing into the existing poultry flock?’. 
A second village-level questionnaire was designed to collect information on environmental or 
ecological features, the village structure, type of agricultural production in the village, poultry density, 
previous disease outbreaks and vaccination campaign in the village. The village-level questionnaire 
contained 26 questions and was divided into two parts. The first part comprising of 15 sections, 
summarized information that were made during observations while walking through the village and 
examining environmental and agricultural village characteristics. The second part included 11 
questions on village demographics, poultry production and marketing within the village. The 
observational information was collected by the author of this thesis, while key informants (see below) 
provided answers to questions in the second part of the questionnaire during a Participatory Appraisal 
(PA). The village-level questionnaire was also pilot-tested with key informants from 2 villages which 
were not included in the final study. The pilot testings resulted in the modification of five questions 
in the village-level questionnaire. For example, the original question, ‘Is there a live bird market in 
this village?’ was modified to ‘Is there any market within the village where trading of poultry is 
conducted?’. The reason for the misunderstanding of the original question was that interviewees 
considered live birds markets as markets that operate daily (while village markets usually operate 
several days per week). 
Both questionnaires were developed in English and then translated into Bengali language. 
A total of 144 backyard chicken farmers were interviewed using the farm-level questionnaire. An 
interview lasted about 35 minutes. The interviews were conducted by one female and one male 
veterinarians trained in data collection. 
The PA were conducted as group discussions involving 5-7 key informants in each village. The key 
informants included at least one village headman, two backyard chicken farmers, one Veterinary Field 
Assistant from the local livestock office, one school/college teacher or/and religious leader and/or a 
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commercial poultry farmer. The key informants were contacted one week before of the visit to the 
village. The PA lasted 20 minutes in each village. 
Informed consent (signature/thumb impression) was obtained from each farmer and village key 
informant before the commencement of the interview/PA and sample collection of birds. 
Of the interviewed 144 backyard chicken farmers, 102 raised both chickens & ducks, and 42 only 
raised chickens. Blood samples were collected from 4 chickens and 2 in-contact ducks from farms 
that had both chickens and ducks, and from 4 chickens from farms that had chickens only. Depending 
on the body weight, 1-3 ml of blood were collected from the wing or jugular vein of each 
chicken/duck and transferred to an individual sterile plastic tube immediately after collection. The 
tube was kept in cool box filled with ice packs and transported to the CVASU laboratory (for samples 
collected in Chittagong) and transported to the local office of the DLS (for samples collected in Cox’s 
Bazaar). Samples were refrigerated overnight, then the serum was separated by centrifugation at 
10,000 rpm for 30 minutes at 40c and transferred to Eppendorf tubes.  
All the serum samples were further processed at the CVASU laboratory, where the samples were first 
screened for the presence of antibodies against Influenza A virus using commercially available 
ELISA kits. Influenza A positive samples were then tested for the presence of H5 and H9 specific 
antibodies using the HI test. A serum sample was considered positive if there was an inhibition at a 
dilution of 1/16 (24) or more against 4 haemagglutinating units of antigen (OIE, 2015). 
4.2.3 Data analyses 
Farm- and village-level data were entered in Microsoft Access 2013 databases (Microsoft 
Corporation, USA). Data analysis was conducted in STATA 14.1 (Stata Corporation, College Station, 
Texas, USA). We used the farm-level H5 and H9 serological status as binary outcome variable: a 
farm was considered positive for a given AIV subtype if at least one chicken or duck on that farm had 
a HI titre of ≥24. Data analysis was conducted separately for H5 and H9. 
A total of 281 farm-level and 96 village-level dichotomous/binary and ordinal categorical variables 
were derived from questionnaire data. For each AIV subtype, the proportion of positive and negative 
farms for each risk factor was calculated.  
To reduce the number of predictors we used correlation analysis and screening of variables based on 
bivariate unconditional associations in the univariate analysis (Dohoo, Martin, & Stryhn, 2009). In 
the univariate analysis associations between the H5/H9 flock-level serological status and each 
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potential risk factor were explored using a mixed-effect logistic regression approach with the village 
as random effect. For predictors with at least 3 modalities p-values were computed using Wald tests 
(‘testparm’ command). 
All farm- and village-level predictors associated with a p-value ≤0.15 in the univariate analysis were 
screened for pairwise correlations. Considering the dichotomous/binary and ordinal nature of the 
predictors, pairwise correlations were examined by estimating the polychoric correlations coefficients 
(UCLA, 2019; Uebersax, 2006) using the –polychoric- command in STATA. If high correlation was 
identified (≥0.9 for H5/H9) one of the two variables which was less biologically justified and/or was 
highly correlated with another variable was excluded. 
Multivariable mixed-effects logistic regression models were built for each AIV subtype with village 
as a random effect, using a backward stepwise elimination procedure. Farm- and village-level 
predictors were considered together in the same models. At each step, the predictors with the highest 
p-value was removed, until all predictors remaining in the model had p-values <0.05. Wald test were 
applied using –testparm- command to test the overall significance of predictors with at least 3 
modalities.  
We also evaluated potential confounding by subsequently adding, eliminated risk factors that were 
considered biological plausible and important based on the hypothesized casual diagrams. A change 
in the Odds Ratio (OR) >30% (Dohoo et al., 2009) for any of the added predictors in the model was 
considered as an indication for confounding. Biologically plausible 2-way interactions of risk factors 
significant at p<0.05 in the final main effect model were also explored (Dohoo et al., 2009). 
Furthermore the residual Intra-class Correlation was estimated. Finally, to identify any specific 
observations that impact or do not fit the models, normality and heteroscedasticity plots of the 
residuals were developed.  
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 H5 and H9 flock-level serology status 
None of the sampled flocks were vaccinated against AI. The farmers reported no HPAI outbreaks or 
abnormal mortalities in chickens or ducks on their farms within the last 12 months before the 
sampling. The flock-level prevalence 27.8% (N=40) for H5 and 60.4% (N=87) for H9. 
 
4.3.2 Farm and village-level risk factors associated with H5 and H9 flock-level seroprevalence 
on backyard chicken farms
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Risk factors (listed 
in risk groups) 
 
Univariate analysis Multivariable analysis 
Category H5 
positive 
(%) 
H5 
negative 
(%) 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
positive 
(%) 
H9 
negative 
(%) 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
Village-level factors (N=144 farms, N=42 villages) 
 
Environmental or ecological features 
Crow abundance 
around a garbage 
dumping place in the 
village 
No or absence of 
garbage dumping 
place 
20 (19.6) 82 (80.4) Reference 
0.001 
53 (52.0) 49 (48.0) Reference 
0.004 
Reference 
0.039 
Reference 
0.004 
Yes 
20 (47.6) 22 (52.4) 3.7 (1.7-8.1) 34 (81.0) 8 (19.1) 4.3 (1.6-11.5) 3.4 (1.1-10.8) 13.1 (2.3-76.8) 
Migratory wild birds 
visiting the village 
No 
14 (18.4) 62 (81.6) Reference 
0.009 
37 (48.7) 39 (51.3) 
Reference 
0.006 
- 
- 
Reference 
0.007 
Yes 
26 (38.2) 42 (61.8) 2.7 (1.3-5.9) 50 (73.5) 18 (26.5) 3.1 (1.4-7.1) - 5.8 (1.6-21.1) 
Forest or jungle is 
present in the village 
No 
23 (33.8) 45 (66.2) 
Reference 
0.128 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 
17 (22.4) 59 (77.6) 
0.6 (0.3-1.2) - - - - - 
Village structure 
A 
pond/river/lake/canal 
was present between 
HHs in the village 
No 10 (19.6) 41 (80.4) Reference 
0.108 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 
30 (32.3) 63 (67.7) 2.0 (0.9-4.4) - - - - - 
Estimated distance 
between the village 
and the closest main 
road 
>3.5 km 5 (14.3) 30 (85.7) Reference 
0.047 
13 (37.1) 22 (62.9) Reference 
0.004 
- 
- 
- 
- 
≤3.5 km 35 (32.1) 74 (67.9) 2.8 (1.0-7.9) 74 (67.9) 35 (32.1) 3.8 (1.5-9.7) - - 
Table 4.1 Results of the univariate and multivariable analysis for village-level and farm-level risk factors associated with H5 and H9 flock-level 
seroprevalence on backyard chicken farms 
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Risk factors (listed 
in risk groups) 
 
Univariate analysis Multivariable analysis 
Category H5 
positive 
(%) 
H5 
negative 
(%) 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
positive 
(%) 
H9 
negative 
(%) 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
Presence of isolated 
HHs within the 
village 
No - - - 
- 
16 (80.0) 4 (20.0) Reference 
0.090 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
 Yes - - - 71 (57.3) 53 (42.7) 0.3 (0.1-1.2) - - 
Road passing through 
the village was 
mainly muddy 
No - - - 
- 
60 (68.2) 28 (31.8) Reference 
0.036 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes - - - 27 (48.2) 29 (51.8) 0.4 (0.2-0.9) - - 
Presence of any kind 
of public vehicle stop 
(e.g. bus train) in the 
village 
No - - - 
- 
36 (52.2) 33 (47.8) Reference 
0.090 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes - - - 51 (68.0) 24 (32.0) 2.1 (0.9-4.9) - - 
Poultry density 
At least one 
commercial poultry 
farm present in the 
village 
No 7 (18.4) 31 (81.6) Reference 
0.138 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 33 (31.1) 73 (68.9) 2.0 (0.8-5.0) 
- - - - - 
Number of  HHs 
rearing backyard 
poultry in the village 
≤300 12 (19.4) 50 (80.7) Reference 
0.052 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
>300 28 (34.2) 54 (65.9) 2.2 (1.0-4.7) - - - - - 
Number of  HHs  
rearing both chickens 
and ducks 
<50 - - - 
- 
15 (45.5) 18 (54.6) Reference 
0.080 
- 
- 
- 
- 
≥50 - - - 72 (64.9) 39 (35.1) 2.5 (0.9-6.7) - - 
Farm-level factors (N=144 farms) 
 
Trading practices 
Number of chickens 
bought from LBMs 
in the last 12 months 
0 25 (20.5) 97 (79.5) Reference 
0.000 
- - - 
- 
Reference 
0.016 
- 
- 1 to 3 6 (54.6) 5 (45.5) 4.7 (1.3-16.5) 
- - - 
9.5 (1.3-69.9) 
- 
>3 9 (81.8) 2 (18.2) 17.5 (3.5- 86.0) 
- - - 
8.8 (1.2-65.9) 
- 
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Risk factors (listed 
in risk groups) 
 
Univariate analysis Multivariable analysis 
Category H5 
positive 
(%) 
H5 
negative 
(%) 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
positive 
(%) 
H9 
negative 
(%) 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
Farmed poultry was 
obtained from LBM 
in the last 12 months 
No - - - 
- 
60 (54.6) 50 (45.5) Reference 
0.015 
- 
- 
- 
- 
  
Yes - - - 27 (79.4) 7 (20.6) 3.6 (1.3-10.0) - - 
Farmed poultry was 
obtained from 
neighbours in the last 
12 months 
No 
- - - 
- 
69 (56.1) 54 (43.9) Reference 
0.025 
- 
- 
Reference 
 
0.020 
 Yes 
- - - 18 (85.7) 3 (14.3) 4.7 (1.2-17.9) - 8.1 (1.4-46.9) 
Number of LBM 
visits by farmers or 
HH members in the 
last month for any 
purpose rather than 
selling poultry and 
eggs 
 
0 times - - - 
- 
12 (46.2) 14 (53.9) Reference 
0.045 
- 
- 
Reference 
0.038 
1 to 5 times - - - 64 (61.0) 41 (39.1) 2.3 (0.8-6.4) - 3.8 (0.9-16.1) 
>5times - - - 11 (84.6) 2 (15.4) 12.7 (1.6-97.2) - 47.2 (2.4-933.3) 
Purchase of poultry 
for consumption from 
LBM and processing 
on backyard farm 
No purchase of 
poultry for 
consumption from 
LBM; or if 
purchase 
processing at LBM 
- - - 
- 
8 (38.1) 13 (61.9) Reference 
0.015 
- 
- 
Reference 
0.021 
Purchase of 
poultry for 
consumption from 
LBM and 
processing on 
backyard farm 
 
- - - 79 (64.2) 44 (35.8) 5.1 (1.4-18.7) - 9.3 (1.4-62.1) 
Frequency of sales of 
eggs, chicken or 
ducks within the last 
12 months 
0 times 8 (15.1) 45 (84.9) 
Reference 
0.014 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- - 
1 to 5 times 10 (25.6) 29 (74.4) 
2.0 (0.7-5.7) - - - - - 
>5 times 22 (42.3) 30 (57.7) 
4.3 (1.6-11.8) - - - - - 
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Risk factors (listed 
in risk groups) 
 
Univariate analysis Multivariable analysis 
Category H5 
positive 
(%) 
H5 
negative 
(%) 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
positive 
(%) 
H9 
negative 
(%) 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
Number of chicken 
eggs sold in the last 
12 months 
0 to 10 
- - - 
- 
62 (55.4) 50 (44.6) Reference 
0.048 
- 
- 
- 
- 
>10 
- - - 25 (78.1) 7 (21.9) 
2.7 (1.0-7.3) 
- - 
Number of poultry 
sold in the last 12 
months 
0 
7 (18.0) 32 (82.1) 
Reference 
0.064 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- - 
1 to 30  26 (28.3) 66 (71.7) 1.9 (0.7-5.0) - - - - - 
>30 7 (53.9) 6 (46.2) 5.8 (1.3-25.2) - - - -  
Number of visits to 
LBMs to sell poultry 
in the last 12 months 
0 times - - - 
- 
42 (50.6) 41 (49.4) Reference 
0.034 
- 
- 
- 
- 1 times - - - 8 (80.0) 2 (20.0) 4.0 (0.7-22.1) - - 
>1 times - - - 37 (72.6) 14 (27.5) 
2.6 (1.1-6.0) 
- - 
Cleaning practices 
Frequency of 
cleaning (dry or wet 
cleaning) of the 
poultry house or 
places where were 
poultry were kept 
Daily 2 ( 10.0) 18 (90.0) Reference 
0.073 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- - 
≥A Week 38 (30.7) 86 (69.4) 4.0 (0.9-18.0) 
- - - - - 
Disposal of garbage, droppings/litter and dead birds 
Garbage piled up 
around the poultry 
house or on the farm 
No 
23 (19.0) 98 (81.0) Reference 
0.000 
66 (54.6) 55 (45.5) Reference 
0.003 
Reference 
0.010 
Reference 
0.002 
Yes 
17 (73.9) 6 (26.1) 30.8 (5.6-168.7) 
21 (91.3) 2 (8.7) 
12.3 (2.3-65.8) 9.1 (1.7-48.8) 
28.6 (3.4-239.8) 
Disposal of 
litter/droppings by 
throwing them into 
nearby rivers, lakes 
or canals 
No 32 (25.0) 96 (75.0) Reference 
0.046 
- - 
- - 
- 
- 
- - 
 
 
 
Yes 8 (50.0) 8 (50.0) 3.1 (1.0-9.2) 
- - - - 
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Risk factors (listed 
in risk groups) 
 
Univariate analysis Multivariable analysis 
Category H5 
positive 
(%) 
H5 
negative 
(%) 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
positive 
(%) 
H9 
negative 
(%) 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
Disposal of dead 
birds by throwing 
them into nearby 
bushes/jungle 
 
No - - - 
- 
57 (55.9) 45 (44.1) Reference 
0.112 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- - 
Yes - - - 30 (71.4) 12 (28.6) 2.0 (0.9-4.8) - - - 
Indirect contact with other animals 
Feeding of different 
poultry species in the 
same feeder or in the 
same location 
No 10 (13.0) 67 (87.0) Reference 
0.000 
41 (53.3) 36 (46.8) Reference 
0.033 
Reference 
0.003 
- 
- 
- - 
Yes 30 (44.8) 37 (55.2) 5.8 (2.4-14.3) 
46 (68.7) 21 (31.3) 2.5 (1.1-5.6) 5.2 (1.7-15.7) - 
Pond water used as 
for source of drinking 
water for poultry 
No 
13 (16.3) 67 (83.8) Reference 
0.002 
42 (52.5) 38 (47.5) Reference 
0.029 
Reference 
0.010 
- 
- 
Yes 
27 (42.2) 37 (57.8) 4.1 (1.7-10.2) 45 (70.3) 19 (29.7) 2.7 (1.1-6.4) 4.6 (1.4-14.9) - 
Holes in the poultry 
house or places 
where poultry were 
kept, allowing 
feral/wild animals to 
enter 
No 
- - - 
- 
23 (45.1) 28 (54.9) 
Reference 
0.010 
- 
- 
Reference 
 
0.001 
 
 
Yes 
- - - 64 (68.8) 29 (31.2) 2.7 (1.3-5.9) - 10.8 (2.8-41.9) 
Outbreak responses 
Selling of sick birds 
at the local LBM 
 
No - - - 
- 
62 (65.3) 33 (34.7) Reference 
0.123 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes - - - 25 (51.0) 24 (49.0) 0.5 (0.2-1.2) - - 
No separation of 
healthy chickens 
during disease 
outbreaks  
No - - - 
- 
75 (58.1) 54 (41.9) Reference 
0.152 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 
- - - 12 (80.0) 3 (20.0) 2.8 (0.7-11.6) - - 
If a disease outbreak 
occurs on a 
neighbouring farm, 
restricting of the 
scavenging area of 
own birds 
No - - - 
- 
56 (65.1) 30 (34.9) Reference 
0.090 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 
- - - 31 (53.5) 27 (46.6) 0.5 (0.2-1.1) - - 
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Risk factors (listed 
in risk groups) 
 
Univariate analysis Multivariable analysis 
Category H5 
positive 
(%) 
H5 
negative 
(%) 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
positive 
(%) 
H9 
negative 
(%) 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
Visit of commercial poultry farms 
Frequency of visits of 
commercial poultry 
farms in the last 12 
months by  farmer or 
family members  
0 times 
29 (26.4) 81 (73.6) 
Reference 
0.051 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 to <50 times 
4 (18.2) 18 (81.8) 
0.6 (0.2-2.0) - - - - - 
≥50 times 7 (58.3) 5 (41.7) 
3.9 (1.2-13.3) - - 
- 
- - 
Consumption of own reared poultry 
Number of  home-
reared poultry 
consumed in the last 12 
months 
0 to 15 39 (30.5) 89 (69.5) 
Reference 
0.073 
- - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
>15 1 (6.2) 15 (93.8) 
0.1 (0.0-1.2) - - - - - 
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A total of 281 farm-level and 96 village-level predictors were screened by univariate analyses and by 
calculating pairwise correlations. For H5, 271 farm-level and 89 village-level predictors were 
excluded resulting in the inclusion of 10 farm-level, and 7 village-level predictors in the multivariable 
analysis. For H9, 14 farm-level and 7 village-level predictors were included in the multivariable 
analysis after excluding 267 farm-level and 89 village-level predictors by univariate analyses and by 
evaluating pairwise correlations (Table 4.1). 
The final multivariable model for H5 contained 1 village-level and 4 farm-level predictors as risk 
factors for H5 seroprevalence on backyard farms. For H9 seroprevalence on backyard farms, 2 
village-level and 5 farm-level predictors remained in the final model (Table 4.1). Of the final village-
level factors, two related to the environmental or ecological features within the village, which one 
common village-level risk factor for both H5 and H9 seropositivity. The final farm-level risk factors 
related to trading practices by backyard farmers and contact with other animals. A common farm-
level risk factor for both H5 and H9 seropositivity was the existence of garbage piled up around the 
poultry house or on the backyard farm. We did not observe any confounding effect of initially 
eliminated variables that were added to final multivariable models. We also did not identify any 
significant 2-way interactions. 
The estimated residual ICCs were 0.11 (95% CI: 0.00-0.87) for the H5 and 0.18 (95% CI: 0.02-0.75) 
for the H9 model, indicative that after including village as random effect, little clustering was 
observed between villages. In general, there were comparatively higher heterogenecity in H5 serology 
status among farms within a village compared to H9 serology. Finally, the normality and 
heteroscedasticity plots of the residuals identified no undue influence of any observations on the final 
models. 
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4.4 Discussion 
This is the first study that explored farm and village-level risk factors associated with H5 and H9 
flock-level serological statuses of backyard chicken farms in Bangladesh. 
4.4.1 Village-level risk factors for H5 and H9 infection on backyard chicken farms 
4.4.1.1 Factors relating to environmental or ecological village features  
Our study identified crow abundance around village garbage dumping places as a risk factor for both 
H5 and H9 seropositivity. The spatial distribution of crows is influenced by the availability of food. 
In Bangladesh, the main sources of food for crows are household scraps and garbage from LBM 
(Biswas et al., 2011). The presence of crows may be indicative of locations, where poultry farming-
related waste, including dead birds, offal, poultry droppings have been disposed. Backyard chickens 
are likely to scavenge around these dumping places, and might be exposed to AIV-contaminated 
material. Indeed, rather than being vectors of infection, crows may well act as sentinels of the AIV-
contaminated environment, and might become infected themselves. Infection of crows with H5N1 
virus resulting from their exposure to garbage dumping places have been previously reported (Khan 
et al., 2014; Tanimura et al., 2006) and H9N2 (Iqbal Yaqub, Mukhtar, Shabbir, & McCauley, 2013; 
Umar et al., 2016).  
The presence of migratory wild birds in villages was associated with increased odds of farms being 
positive for H9. Bangladesh is located in the river delta of two major rivers, the Jamuna 
(Brahmaputra) and Padma (Ganges). These waterways attract many migratory wild birds that travel 
along two major flyways, the ‘Southeastern end of the Central Asian Flyway’ and the ‘Southwestern 
end of the East Asian—Australasian flyway’, to overwinter in Bangladesh. Thus, more than 30 
species of migratory wild birds visit Bangladesh during the winter months, including the Lesser 
Whistling Teals, Greater Whistling Teals, Cotton Pigmy Goose, Pochards, Darters (Snake bird), 
Pintail Ducks, Herons, Comb Duck Gurganis, Kingfishers, Egrets, Bitterns, Storks, and Flycatchers 
(Lepage, 2014; Olsen et al., 2006). Migratory wild birds mingle frequently with domestic water birds 
and thereby provide a potentially source for AIV spread. In fact, active surveillance conducted in wild 
birds and backyard flocks in Northern Italy between 2004 and 2006 confirmed that contacts between 
migratory birds and free-range backyard poultry was a likely route of AIV transmission (Terregino 
et al., 2007). Mixing between chickens and migratory birds may be direct, or more likely mediated 
by domestic ducks, which often share the same water bodies as migratory birds, and eventually 
introduce H9 into backyard farms. 
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4.4.2 Farm-level risk factors for H5 and H9 infection on backyard chicken farms 
4.4.2.1 Factors relating to the disposal of garbage on the backyard farm 
Similarly to the village-level risk factor related garbage disposal, garbage piled up on farms was also 
a risk factor for both H5 and H9 seropositivity. A survey in the United States identified garbage as 
an important source of HPAI virus infection for commercial poultry farms. In this study, potential 
HPAI contaminated or infectious material (poultry carcasses, egg shells, dead wildlife) were disposed 
near poultry farms. The study also suggested that a garbage collection service shared by commercial 
and backyard poultry farmers might have been one of the potential pathways for HPAI virus spread 
(Walz et al., 2018). Considering that AIVs shed in the environment remain infectious at ambient 
temperatures for weeks or months, untreated garbage can play a significant role in the AIV 
epidemiology (Guan et al., 2009; Kurmi et al., 2013; Sakaguchi et al., 2010; Swayne et al., 2008; 
Tiwari, Patnayak, Chander, Parsad, & Goyal, 2006; Wood, Choi, Chappie, Rogers, & Kaye, 2010; 
Yamamoto, Nakamura, Yamada, & Mase, 2010). However, the sometimes extreme seasonal 
variations in rainfall, humidity and temperatures in Bangladesh might impact on the survival of AIV 
in this country (Khatun, Rashid, & Hygen, 2016).  
4.4.2.2 Factors relating to trading practices by backyard farmers 
Visiting LBMs to purchase poultry to be raised as part of farmers’ backyard flocks, and purchase of 
poultry at LBM to be processed and consumed on the backyard farm was associated with H5 and/or 
H9 seropositivity. Indeed, AIVs have been found to circulate at high prevalence in LBMs in countries 
where live bird trading is a common practice, including Bangladesh (Turner et al., 2017), making 
LBMs a likely source of AIV infection for poultry farms. Purchasing poultry from neighbouring farms 
was also found to increase the odds of a farm being positive. Similar observations were made in 
Thailand, further emphasizing the importance of poultry trade in the spread of AIVs (Paul et al. 
(2011).  
4.4.2.3 Factors relating to indirect contact of backyard chickens with other animals  
Farms associated with husbandry practices promoting inter-species contacts were more likely to be 
serologically positive for H5. Using the same equipment to feed multiple species of poultry promotes 
contacts between these species. Furthermore, chickens and ducks are often reared together on 
backyard farms (Alam et al., 2014), and left to scavenge for food during the day (Barua & Yoshimura, 
1997), promoting contacts between domestic poultry and wild birds in the village environment, but 
also along waterways (Terregino et al., 2007). 
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In addition, the type of drinking water supplied to backyard chickens, can play a role in the AIV 
epidemiology, with pond water increasing the odds of both H5 and H9 seropositivity. In Bangladesh, 
ponds are a habitat for ducks and migratory water birds, increasing the likelihood of pond water 
contaminated with AIV.  Indeed, an experimental laboratory-based study conducted by Mihai et al. 
(2011) reported that H5N1 virus can remain infective in water for 12 days at 22-35 0C and up to 20 
days at 4 0C. Ponds might also become contaminated by the disposal of dead poultry, a common 
practice conducted by fish farmers in Bangladesh providing a feed source for their fish.  
Access of feral and wild animals to poultry houses identified in this study, has been described 
previously as a plausible route for H9 virus transmission (Kuiken et al., 2004; Reperant et al., 2008; 
Songserm et al., 2006). 
4.4.3 Limitations of the study 
There are some limitations in our study. Firstly, as in any research involving interviews, recall bias 
may have affected farmers’ responses. However, as we only interviewed the people actually caring 
for the chickens, thus we are confident to have minimised this bias. Secondly, due to the cross-
sectional nature of the study, we could not assess the impact of detailed seasonal variations of some 
predictors. Thirdly, interviewees may have given socially acceptable answers to some sensitive 
questions, for example on those related to cleaning and disinfection practices, which may explain 
why those variables were not selected in the final multivariable model. Finally, chickens infected by 
HPAI H5 are expected to die, although backyard farmers did not report any abnormal mortalities or 
HPAI outbreaks on their farms over the year preceding the sampling. Although, we also collected 
swabs from birds to monitor virus shedding, virus prevalence was very low (flock-level H9 virus 
prevalence was 0.7% and no flocks were H5 virus positive) we were not able to use it as an outcome 
variable in the risk factor analysis. We therefore considered H5 and H9 serological flock status as a 
surrogate for past virus exposure to identify risk factors associated with HPAI infection.  
4.4.4 Recommendations 
The following recommendations based on the findings of this study can reduce the risks of infection 
of AIVs of backyard poultry: 
 Backyard farmers should be encouraged to not pile up garbage. Garbage should be disposed as 
far as possible from farms by burning or burying it deep in the ground, so scavengers are not able 
to access it.  
 Backyard farmers who rear multiple poultry species within the farm should be discouraged to 
feed different poultry species with the same feeder or trough.  
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 As open water sources (e.g. ponds) might be contaminated with AIV excreted by ducks or wild 
birds or through the disposal of poultry carcasses, alternative water sources such as tube-well 
water should be provided to backyard poultry. 
 Backyard farmers should be encouraged to purchase poultry to supplement their own flocks from 
reliable sources. In particular, sources of live poultry with likely contact to infected birds (e.g. 
poultry at LBM) should be avoided.  Backyard farmers should be encouraged to hatch their own 
birds in a bio-secure environment. 
  Live poultry bought from LBM for family consumption should not be slaughtered and/or 
processed at home – it should be slaughtered and processed at LBM.  
 As much as practical and feasible, the movement of backyard farmers or their family members to 
LBM should be minimized. Changing of clothes, disinfecting of shoes and washing of hands and 
feet after returning from LBM is recommended.  
 Backyard farmers need to be encouraged to avoid dumping of poultry droppings or even dead 
birds in waste areas within villages and on their farms as this might attract wild birds (e.g. crows).  
Backyard farmers should also be encouraged to restrict the scavenging of their poultry in waste 
areas. 
 An analytical value chain study is recommended to explore the risks of infection of AIVs in 
backyard poultry along the poultry value chain.” 
We believe, the recommendations based on risk factors identified in this study could help policy 
makers to develop more specific and practical biosecurity measures aiming to mitigate the risk of 
AIV infection in backyard chickens.  
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CHAPTER 5  
FARM-LEVEL RISK FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH AVIAN INFLUENZA A (H5) AND 
A (H9) FLOCK-LEVEL SEROPREVALENCE ON COMMERCIAL BROILER AND 
LAYER FARMS IN BANGLADESH 
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5.1 Introduction 
Commercial poultry production is the main supplier for the consumption of animal protein in 
Bangladesh, which 6.3 kg of broiler meat (WPSA, 2019) and 103 eggs (Abdullah, 2019) consumed 
per capita annually. Due to the increasing demand for poultry meat and eggs, the commercial broiler 
and layer chicken production has undergone a rapid growth in Bangladesh, resulting in a 2.5 fold 
increase in commercial poultry farm density between 1995 and 2017 (Daily Star, 2017; Rahman, 
Jang, & Yu, 2017). 
However, since 2007 the circulation of HPAI H5N1 and LPAI H9N2 subtypes became a major threat 
to commercial chicken production in Bangladesh (Parvin et al., 2018). In response to the first HPAI 
outbreak waves in the Bangladesh, the Government of Bangladesh, with technical assistance from 
the WHO and FAO, developed the first National Avian Influenza and Human Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness and Response Plan for the period 2006-2008 (DGHS, 2006). The second National Avian 
and Human Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan was drafted in 2008 covering the 
period 2009-2011(DGHS, 2009), but unfortunately this draft had not been approved (Chattopadhyay 
et al., 2018), leaving Bangladesh without any national policy framework to tackle the threat of AI. 
The decline of reported H5N1 outbreaks in poultry since 2013 and only one human fatality since the 
emergence of HPAI are the main reasons why the development and implemenation of HPAI policies 
are not considered as a priority in Bangladesh (Rimi et al., 2019). On the other hand, farm and LBM 
investigations in Bangladesh confirmed that H5N1 and H9N2 virus subtypes are widely circulatig in 
commercial broiler and layer flocks (Ansari et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2018), although fewer outbreaks 
and less severe clincal signs in birds are reported by farmers. This might also be indicative for an 
underreporting of cases by farmers, which could favour the persistence and transmisison of H5 and 
H9 viruses in the commerical poulty value chain (Parvin et al., 2018; Rimi et al., 2019). 
Improved biosecurity is considered to be an important tool for controlling and preventing H5N1 and 
H9N2 dissimenation in poultry production systems (FAO, 2011, 2013; Kelly, Hawkins, Sandrock, & 
Boyce, 2008). Thus, biosecurity guidelines to prevent and control infectious poultry diseases, 
including AI, were developed in 2010 for commercial poultry flocks (DLS, 2010).  However many 
of these recommendations are considered not to be practical for small-scale commercial farmers in 
Bangladesh (Rimi et al., 2017).  
Case-control studies conducted before 2011 highlighted biosecurity-related risk factors that were 
associated with H5N1 outbreaks in commercial chicken flocks in Bangladesh (Biswas et al., 2009b; 
Biswas et al., 2011; Osmani et al., 2014), but risk factors associated with the current circulation of 
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AIVs in outbreak-free commercial flocks have not been described. Furthermore, commercial broiler 
and layer chicken farmers following different production cycles and have different management 
systems that might provide different pathways for H5N1 and H9N2 introduction into their flocks (Ali 
et al., 2013; Artois et al., 2018).  A meta-analysis conducted by Wang et al. (2014) also highlighted 
that risk factors for AI infections differ between types of poultry production. 
Thus, an in-depth understanding of factors associated with the ongoing risk of H5 and H9 circulation 
in commercial broiler and in commercial layer chickens is essential to develop an effective avian 
influenza prevention and control strategy for Bangladesh. Therefore the aim of this study was to 
identify and quantify potential farm-level risk factors associated with ongoing H5 and H9 infections 
in apparently healthy layer and broiler chickens in Bangladesh. 
5.2 Materials and methods 
5.2.1 Overview of the study design 
Between February and April 2017, a cross-sectional study was conducted in the Chittagong and Cox’s 
Bazaar districts of Bangladesh involving 106 commercial broiler and 113 commercial layer chicken 
farms. Of the 113 layer chicken farms, 13 farms had their chickens vaccinated against H5 – these 13 
farms were excluded from the analysis.  Details on sample size calculation and the selection of study 
units are described in Chapter 3. 
5.2.2 Questionnaire design 
Using the software MindMaple Lite version 1.3 (MindMaple Inc., Tustin, USA) hypothesized causal 
pathways, that could potentially increase the risk of H5 and H9 infections for broiler (Figure 5.1) and 
layer farms (Figure 5.2), were developed. Based on these hypothesized causal pathways, questions 
were developed focussing on husbandry, management and marketing practices conducted by 
commercial farmers. The questions were then incorporated in a digital questionnaire application using 
the CommCare software (Dimagi, Inc., Cambridge, USA). Although causal pathways were not used 
to inform the structured construction of multivariable statistical models in a dynamic acrylic causal 
framework (Dohoo et al., 2009), they were used to guide the inclusion of confounders and potential 
interactions between risks factors in the data analysis.
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Figure 5.1 Hypothesized causal pathways for farm-level risk factors associated with AI infection on commercial broiler farms in Bangladesh. The red box represent the outcome (farm-level 
seropositivity) in the risk factor analysis, green boxes represent individual risk factors with grey boxes indicating additional categories/levels within the risk factor. Yellow-brown headings 
represent themes or categories under which risk factors can be combined. The causal pathways were used to inform the development of questions used in the interviews with broiler farmers and 
to guide the inclusion of potential confounders and interactions in the final multivariable model. 
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Figure 5.2 Hypothesized causal pathways for farm-level risk factors associated with AI infection on commercial layer farms in Bangladesh. The red box represent 
the outcome (farm-level seropositivity) in the risk factor analysis, green boxes represent individual risk factors with grey boxes indicating additional 
categories/levels within the risk factor. Yellow-brown headings represent themes or categories under which risk factors can be combined. The causal pathways 
were used to inform the development of questions used in the interviews with layer farmers and to guide the inclusion of potential confounders and interactions 
in the final multivariable model. 
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The questionnaire contained 84 questions that were identical for both, broiler and layer farmers. Six 
additional questions in the layer farm questionnaire focussed on the sale of eggs on layer farms.  The 
questionnaire was pilot-tested on five broiler farms and on five layer farms that were not part of the 
finally selected farms. After pitot testing, minor modifications were made to nine questions. 
5.2.3. Data collection 
A total of 106 broiler and 100 unvaccinated layer commercial chicken farmers were interviewed. 
Interviews were conducted with the owner of the farm and each interview lasted about 30 minutes. 
Before each interview and sampling of chickens, consent via signature or by thumb impression was 
obtained in a consent form. All interviews were conducted by one female and one male field 
veterinarians who were trained in data collection using questionnaires.  
Blood samples were collected from 9 and 8 chickens from each layer and broiler farm, respectively 
(Chapter 3). Depending on the body weight, 1-3 ml of blood were collected from the wing or jugular 
vein and transferred into individual sterile plastic tube immediately after collection. The tube was 
then kept in a cool box filled with ice packs and transported to the CVASU laboratory (for samples 
collected in Chittagong) and to the local office of the DLS (for samples collected in Cox’s Bazaar). 
Samples were refrigerated overnight, then the serum was separated by centrifugation at 10,000 rpm 
for 30 minutes at 40c and transferred to Eppendorf tubes.  
All the serum samples were further processed at the CVASU laboratory, where the samples were first 
screened for the presence of antibodies against Influenza A virus using commercial ELISA kits. 
Influenza A positive samples were then tested for the presence of H5 and H9 specific antibodies using 
the HI test. A serum sample was considered positive if there was an inhibition at a dilution of 1/16 
(24) or more against 4 haemagglutinating units of antigen (OIE, 2015). 
5.2.4 Data analyses 
The questionnaire data were downloaded as a csv file from the CommCare web platform and imported 
into STATA 14.1 (Stata Corporation, College Station, Texas, USA) for data analysis.  
A flock/farm was considered seropositive for H5/H9 if at least one chicken within a flock/farm had 
an H5/H9 HI titre of ≥24. The analysis was conducted separately for H5 and H9 with a positive farm 
coded as 1 and negative farm coded as 0. 
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In the data analysis, we explored risk factors associated with H5 and H9 flock-level serpositivity 
separately for broiler farms and layer farms.  A total of 344 and 421 dichotomous and ordinal risk 
factors were derived from the questionnaire data for broiler and layer chicken farms, respectively. 
To reduce the number of predictors to be considered in the regression models, we used correlation 
analysis and screening of variables based on bivariate unconditional (Dohoo et al., 2009). As all the 
risk factor variables were dichotomous and ordinal, pairwise correlations were examined by 
estimating polychoric correlations (UCLA, 2019; Uebersax, 2006) using the –polychoric- command 
in STATA. If the correlation was ≥0.9 for H5/H9 in layer flocks, and ≥0.9 for H5 and ≥0.7 for H9 in 
broilers flocks, the biologically more plausible variable was maintained, while the other variable was 
removed. 
Binomial logistic regression was used to evaluate the unconditional association between H5/H9 flock-
level serology status (positive/negative) and each risk factors in the univariate analysis. For both, 
broilers and unvaccinated layer farms, risk factors associated with H5 and H9 seropositivity at a p-
value ≤0.15 in the univariate analysis were included in the multivariable analysis.  
The multivariable binominal logistic regression models were built using a backward stepwise 
elimination procedure. At each step, the risk factor with the highest p-value was removed until all 
factors retained in the final model had p-values <0.05. To test the overall significance of the risk 
factors with more than two levels, Wald test were conducted using the -testparm- command in 
STATA. We also evaluated potential confounding by subsequently adding eliminated risk factors that 
were considered biological plausible based on the hypothesised casual pathways. Biologically 
plausible 2-way interactions of risk factors in the final main effect model were also explored. 
The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit statistic was used to access the fit of the final model (Hosmer 
& Lemeshow, 2000). Pearson and Deviance residuals and Pregibon leverage were examined to 
explore if any specific observations influenced the fit of the models. Finally, to evaluate power of the 
model in predicting the outcome, the area under the curve for the receiver operating characteristics 
(ROC) was calculated (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). 
5.3 Results  
During the 12 months prior to the sampling, no HPAI outbreaks or abnormal mortalities were reported 
on any of the sampled broiler (N=106) and layer (N=100) farms. 
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5.3.1 H5 and H9 flock-level serology status 
Among the sampled broiler flocks, 9.4% (N=10) were H5 and 5.7% (N=6) were H9 seropositive. 
Similar to the broiler flocks, H5 seroprevalence was higher than H9 seroprevalence in unvaccinated 
layer flocks: it was 31.0% (N=31) and 22.0% (N=22) respectively. 
  
5.3.2 Farm-level risk factors associated with H5 and H9 flock-level seroprevalence on 
commercial, unvaccinated broiler farms 
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Table 5.1 Results of the univariate and multivariable analysis of farm-level risk factors associated with H5 and H9 flock-level seroprevalence on 
unvaccinated broiler farms 
 
 
Risk factors (listed in risk 
groups) 
(N=106) 
Univariate analysis Multivariable analysis 
Category H5 
positive 
(%) 
H5 
negative 
(%) 
H5 
OR (95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
positive 
(%) 
H9 
negative 
(%) 
H9 
OR (95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
H5 
OR (95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
OR ( 95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
Access to backyard ducks 
Access of ducks from 
neighbouring backyard farms to 
the sampled farm 
No 1(1.5) 67(98.5) Reference 
0.005     
1(1.5) 67(98.5) Reference 0.038 Reference 
0.007 
- 
- 
Yes 9(23.7) 29(76.3) 20.8(2.5-171.7) 5(13.2) 33(86.8) 10.2(1.1-90.4)  21.5(2.3-201.1) - 
Farm management 
Owner involved in taking care 
(feeding, watering, cleaning 
etc.) of chickens on sampled 
farm 
No 4(18.2) 18(81.8) Reference 
0.128 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 
6(7.1) 78(92.9) 0.3(0.1-1.4) - - - - - 
Disposal of litter/waste/droppings 
Litter/droppings/waste are 
disposed on sampled farm  
No 7(6.9) 94(93.1) Reference 
0.003 
4(4.0) 97(96.0) Reference 
0.008 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 3(60.0) 2(40.0) 20.1(2.9-141.2) 2(40.0) 3(60.0) 16.2(2.1-125.5) - - 
In- and out farm movements  
Farm owner works or manages 
another commercial poultry 
farm 
No - - - 
- 
2(2.6) 76(97.4) Reference 
0.040 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes - - - 4(14.3) 24(85.7) 6.3(1.1-36.8) - - 
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Risk factors (listed in risk 
groups) 
(N=106) 
Univariate analysis Multivariable analysis 
Category H5 
positive 
(%) 
H5 
negative 
(%) 
H5 
OR (95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
positive 
(%) 
H9 
negative 
(%) 
H9 
OR (95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
H5 
OR (95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
OR ( 95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
Workers from another 
commercial  chicken farm 
visited the sampled farm during 
the current production cycle 
No 4(4.4) 87(95.6) Reference 
0.000   
1(1.1) 90(98.9) Reference 
0.001 
Reference 
0.002 
Reference  
0.001 
Yes 6(40.0) 9(60.0) 14.5(3.4-61.2) 5(33.3) 10(66.7) 45.0(4.8-424.5) 15.1(2.8-80.8) 50.1( 4.5- 552.7) 
Private veterinarians visited the 
sampled farm in the current 
production cycle 
No 8(13.6) 51(86.4) Reference 
0.122 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 2(4.3) 45(95.7) 0.3(0.1-1.4) - - - - - 
Total number of vehicles 
(rickshaw van, pick-up, 
motorized vehicle etc.) used by  
traders to collect the last batch 
of chickens on the sampled 
farm 
0 to 5 4(6.1) 62(93.9) Reference 
0.139 
2(3.0) 64(97.0) Reference 
0.150 
- 
- 
- 
- 
> 5 6(15.0) 34(85.0) 2.7(0.7-10.4) 4(10.0) 36(90.0) 3.6(0.6-20.4) - - 
Total number of workers on the 
sampled farm 
0 to 1 5(6.1) 77(93.9) Reference 
0.040 
2(2.4) 80(97.6) Reference 
0.021 
- 
- 
Reference 
0.041 
≥2  5(20.8) 19(79.2) 4.1(1.1-15.4) 4(16.7) 20(83.3) 8.0 ( 1.4-46.8) - 9.4( 1.1-80.6) 
Marketing practices  
Sale of the last batch of broiler 
chickens to a Feed and Chick 
Dealer (FCD)  
No 2(4.1) 47(95.9) Reference 
0.100 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 8(14.0) 49(86.0) 3.8(0.8-19.0) - - - - - 
Farm characteristics 
Total number of sheds on the 
sampled farm 
1 to 2 - - - 
- 
3(3.5) 84(96.6) Reference 
0.054 
- 
- 
- 
- 
3 to 4 - - - 3(15.8) 16(84.2) 5.3(1.0-28.4) - - 
History of AI outbreaks near farm 
AI outbreaks near the sampled 
farm or within the village 
within the last 12 months 
No 7(7.1) 91(92.9) Reference 
0.013 
4(4.1) 94(95.9) Reference 
0.033 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 3(37.5) 5(62.5) 7.8(1.5-39.6) 2(25.0) 6(75.0) 7.8(1.2-51.7) - - 
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Risk factors (listed in risk 
groups) 
(N=106) 
Univariate analysis Multivariable analysis 
Category H5 
positive 
(%) 
H5 
negative 
(%) 
H5 
OR (95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
positive 
(%) 
H9 
negative 
(%) 
H9 
OR (95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
H5 
OR (95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
OR ( 95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
Farm location or geographical factors 
Total number of broiler farms 
operating with 0.5 km of the 
sampled farm 
0-2 - - - 
- 
1(1.6) 61(98.4) Reference 
0.065 
- 
- 
- 
- 
≥3 - - - 5(11.4) 39(88.6) 7.8(0.9-69.5) - - 
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Of the 344 potential risk factors examined for association with H5 and H9 serpositivity on broiler 
farms, 335 were excluded based on unconditional associations below the cut-off p-value in the 
univariate analysis or because of high pairwise correlations. Thus, nine risk factors associated with 
H5 and nine risk factors associated with H9 seropositivity (Table 5.1) were included in the 
multivariable analysis. Of these 18 risk factors, six risk factors were identical for H5 and H9 
seropositivity (Table 5.1). Two risk factors were retained in the final multivariable models for H5 
and H9 seropositivity, with one common risk factor increasing the odds of H5 and H9 seropositivity 
(i.e. workers from another commercial chicken farm visited the sampled farm during the current 
production cycle) (Table 5.1). 
The Hosmer–Lemeshow goodness-of-fit statistics, with p-values of 0.371 for H5 and 0.755 for H9 
seropositivity indicated good fitting models. The Area Under the ROC Curve was 0.877 and 0.943 
for H5 and H9 models, respectively, indicating excellent predictive power of both models and good 
ability to discriminate between seropositive and seronegative farms (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). 
 
5.3.3 Farm-level risk factors associated with H5 and H9 flock-level seroprevalence on 
commercial, unvaccinated layer farms
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Table 5.2 Results of the univariate and multivariable analysis for farm-level risk factors associated with H5 and H9 flock-level seroprevalence on   
unvaccinated layer farms. LBM=Live Bird Markets. DOC=Day Old Chick. 
Risk factors (listed in risk 
groups) 
(N=100) 
Univariate analysis Multivariable analysis 
Category H5 
positive 
(%) 
H5 
negative 
(%) 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
positive 
(%) 
H9 
negative 
(%) 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
Source of the DOC/pullets and feed 
DOC or pullets were obtained 
from a hatchery or breeding 
farm 
No 30(35.7) 54(64.3) Reference 
0.045 
- - - 
- 
Reference 
0.003 
- 
- 
Yes 1(6.3) 15(93.8) 0.1(0.0-1.0) - - - 0.0(0.0-0.3) - 
Feed and Chick Dealer (FCD) 
provided feed or feed 
ingredients 
No 
- - - 
- 
2(7.4) 25(92.6) Reference 
0.047 
- 
- 
Reference 
0.049 
Yes 
- - - 
20(27.4) 53(72.6) 4.7(1.0-21.8) 
- 5.9(1.0-33.9) 
Stray dogs 
Access of stray dogs to the 
sampled farm 
No 13(24.5) 40(75.5) Reference 0.140 
8(15.1) 45(84.9) Reference 
0.081 
Reference 
0.040 
Reference 
0.039 
Yes 18(38.3) 29(61.7) 1.9(0.8-4.5) 14(29.8) 33(70.2) 2.4(0.9-6.3) 3.1(1.1-9.1) 
4.0(1.1-15.3) 
In- and out farm movements 
Farm owner worked or 
managed another commercial 
poultry farm 
No 
- - - 
- 
14(17.7) 65(82.3) Reference 
0.051 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 
- - - 
8(38.1) 13(61.9) 2.9(1.0-8.2) 
- - 
Visits of LBMs in the last 
month by farmers, workers or 
family members that had 
access to the sampled farm  
No 
- - - 
- 
8(15.7) 43(84.3) Reference 
0.124 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 
- - - 
14(28.6) 35(71.4) 2.2(0.8-5.7) 
- - 
Frequency of LBM visits in 
the last month by farmers, 
workers or family members 
that had access to the sampled 
farm 
0 times 14(27.5) 37(72.6) Reference 
0.027 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 to 10  times 
2(11.1) 16(88.9) 0.3(0.1-1.6) 
- - - - - 
>10 times 15(48.4) 16(51.6) 2.5(1.0-6.3) - - - - - 
90 
 
Risk factors (listed in risk 
groups) 
(N=100) 
Univariate analysis Multivariable analysis 
Category H5 
positive 
(%) 
H5 
negative 
(%) 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
positive 
(%) 
H9 
negative 
(%) 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
Visits of other commercial 
poultry farms in the last 
month by farmers, workers or 
family members who had 
access to the sampled farm 
No 
- - - 
- 
16(18.8) 69(81.2) Reference 
0.076 
- 
- 
Reference 
0.039 
Yes 
- - - 
6(40.0) 9(60.0) 2.9(0.9-9.2) 
- 4.7(1.1-20.6) 
Feed delivery on sampled 
farm in the current production 
cycle 
No 20(26.7) 55(73.3) Reference 
0.109 
 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 11(44.0) 14(56.0) 2.2(0.8-5.5) - - - - - 
Sampled farm used its own 
vehicle for farm 
activities/movements 
Yes 5(17.2) 24(82.8) Reference 
0.064 
3(10.3) 26(89.7) Reference 
0.084 
- 
- 
- 
- 
No 26(36.6) 45(63.4) 2.8(0.9-8.1) 
19(26.8) 52(73.2) 3.2(0.9-11.7) 
- - 
Vehicles entered the sampled 
farm (excluding vehicles of 
traders who purchased 
chicken or eggs) 
No 4(15.4) 22(84.6) Reference 
0.053 
- - - 
- 
Reference 
0.011 
- 
- 
Yes 27(36.5) 47(63.5) 3.2(1.0-10.1) - - - 5.8(1.5-22.4) - 
Total number of workers on 
the sampled farm 
0 to 2 13(22.0) 46(78.0) Reference 
0.062 
- - - 
- 
Reference 
0.013 
- 
- 3 to 4 11(40.7) 16(59.3) 2.4(0.9-6.5) - - - 4.8(1.4-16.3) - 
>=5 7(50.0) 7(50.0) 3.5(1.0-11.9) - - - 5.8(1.2-28.2) - 
Marketing practices 
Total number of spent layers 
sold in the last batch 
0 to ≤950 - - - 
- 
7(13.0) 47(87.0) Reference 
0.044 
- 
- 
Reference 
0.004 
>950≤2000 - - - 7(26.9) 19(73.1) 2.5(0.8-8.0) - 5.9( 1.2-29.1) 
>2000 
- - - 
8(40.0) 12(60.0) 4.5(1.4-14.8) 
- 24.0(3.7-155.0) 
Frequency of sales of spent 
layers sold from the last batch 
0 to 1 time 15(23.1) 50(76.9) Reference 
0.022 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
≥ 2 times 
16(45.7) 19(54.3) 2.8(1.2-6.8) - - - - - 
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Risk factors (listed in risk 
groups) 
(N=100) 
Univariate analysis Multivariable analysis 
Category H5 
positive 
(%) 
H5 
negative 
(%) 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
positive 
(%) 
H9 
negative 
(%) 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
Sale of the last batch of spent  
layers to a Feed and Chick 
Dealer (FCD) 
No 23(26.7) 63(73.3) Reference 
0.029 
16(18.6) 70(81.4) Reference 
0.050 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 8(57.1) 642.9) 3.7(1.1-11.7) 6(42.9) 8(57.1) 3.3(1.0-10.8) 
- - 
Minimum number of spent 
layers sold over the last 24 
months 
0 to <1700 17(25.0) 51(75.0) Reference 
0.113 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- ≥1700≤2000 7(53.9) 6(46.2) 3.5(1.0-11.9) - - - - - 
>2000 7(36.8) 12(63.2) 1.8(0.6-5.2) - - - - - 
Minimum number of eggs 
sold per sale in the last month 
0 to 1000 
- - - 
- 
4(11.1) 32(88.9) Reference 
0.080 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1001 to 5000 
- - - 
12(24.5) 37(75.5) 2.6(0.8-8.8) 
- - 
>5000 
- - - 
6(40.0) 9(60.0) 5.3(1.2-23.1) 
- - 
Cleaning practices and disposal of dead birds 
 
Frequency of replacing litter 
or droppings during the 
current production cycle 
Daily or 
weekly 
- - - 
- 
14(17.5) 66(82.5) Reference 
0.060 
- 
- 
Reference 
0.013 
Fortnightly, 
monthly or 
>monthly 
- - - 
4(30.8) 9(69.2) 2.1(0.6-7.8) 
- 4.6(0.7- 29.0) 
Not at all 
- - - 
4(57.1) 3(42.9) 6.3(1.3-31.3) 
- 
28.3(2.8-  
284.2) 
Sale of litter or droppings to 
fish farmers 
No 27(35.1) 50(64.9) Reference 
0.116 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 4(17.4) 19(82.6) 0.4(0.1-1.3) - - - - - 
Burying of dead birds near 
sampled farm 
No 4(14.8) 23(85.2) Reference 
0.040 
- - - 
- 
Reference 
0.026 
- 
- 
Yes 27(37.0) 46(63.0) 3.4(1.1-10.8) 
- - - 4.6(1.2-17.3) - 
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Risk factors (listed in risk 
groups) 
(N=100) 
Univariate analysis Multivariable analysis 
Category H5 
positive 
(%) 
H5 
negative 
(%) 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
positive 
(%) 
H9 
negative 
(%) 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
H5 
OR(95% CI) 
H5  
P value 
H9 
OR(95% CI) 
H9  
P value 
Garbage piled up near the 
chicken sheds 
No 
- - - 
- 
6(14.3) 36(85.7) Reference 
0.119 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 
- - - 
16(27.6) 42(72.4) 2.3(0.8-6.5) 
- - 
Farm location or geographical factors 
Total number of layer farms 
operating with 0.5 km of the 
sampled farm 
0 13(23.6) 42(76.4) Reference 
0.066 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 1 10(32.3) 21(67.7) 1.5(0.6-4.1) - - - - - 
>1 8(57.1) 6(42.9) 4.3(1.3-14.7) - - - - - 
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Out of 421 potential risk factors associated with H5 and H9 seropositivity on unvaccinated 
layer farms, 408 risk factors were excluded for H5 and 410 were excluded for H9 seropositivity, 
resulting in the inclusion of 13 risk factors for H5 and 11 risk factors for H9 seropositivity 
modelled in the multivariable analysis (Table 5.2). Of these 24 risk factors, 3 risk factors were 
identical for H5 and H9 seropositivity (Table 5.2). The final H5 multivariable model included 
4 risk and 1 protective factors, whereas 5 risk factors were retained in the final H9 multivariable 
model (Table 5.2). Access of stray dogs to the sampled farm was a common risk factor for H5 
and H9 seropositivity in the final multivariable models 
The Hosmer–Lemeshow goodness-of-fit statistics, with p-values of 0.825 for H5 and 0.520 for 
H9 indicated good fitting models. Likewise, the discriminatory abilities of both models were 
excellent with Areas Under the ROC Curve of 0.824 and 0.843 for H5 and H9 models, 
respectively (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000).  
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5.4 Discussion 
Previous research in Bangladesh focused on the identification of risk factors associated with H5N1 
epidemics on commercial farms during the major HPAI outbreak period of 2007-2011 (Biswas et al., 
2009b; Biswas et al., 2011; Osmani et al., 2014). In contrast, our study conducted in 2017 explored 
the associations between farm-level risk factors and H5 and H9 serological status of commercial 
flocks under current endemic conditions. All the chickens in the sampled flocks were apparently 
healthy and no HPAI outbreaks were observed on the farms within the last 12 month before sampling. 
Thus, this is the first research study that explored farm-level risk factors associated with H5 and H9 
seropositivity on HPAI outbreak-free commercial broiler and layer chicken farms in Bangladesh. 
5.4.1 Risk factors for H5 and H9 infection on commercial, unvaccinated broiler farms 
We identified that access of ducks from neighbouring backyard farms to commercial broiler farms 
increased the odds of H5 seropostivity. Free-grazing ducks have been reported to be associated with 
HPAI outbreak occurrence in Thailand in 2004 (Gilbert et al., 2006). In Bangladesh, many backyard 
farmers rear ducks along with chickens (Alam, Ali, Das, & Rahman, 2014). During daytime, ducks 
scavenge for feed around backyard farms, in the villages, on ponds/wetlands or on other agriculture 
lands (Barua & Yoshimura, 1997), and they might enter other backyard or commercial poultry farms. 
As commercial broiler chickens are raised in enclosed sheds it is unlikely that roaming ducks are able 
to enter these sheds. The introduction of virus into broiler flocks might happen through droppings of 
ducks, which contaminate commercial farm premises and then virus is carried mechanically by 
workers (via their clothes or shoes etc.) or through farm equipment ( e.g. waterer, feeders) into the 
broiler sheds. 
Workers from other commercial chicken farms who visited the sampled broiler farms during the 
current production cycle increased the odds of both, H5 and H9 seropositivity. This underpins the 
importance of human movements for H5 and H9 disease spread (Alexander, 1995; Kung et al. 2007).  
An increased number of employees working on farms was also associated with increased odds of H9 
seropositivity on broiler farms. More employees represent more movements and more contacts to 
potential sources of AIV infection.  A case-control study conducted on in Bangladesh also identified 
an increased number of employees as a risk factor for H5N1 outbreak occurrence on commercial 
chicken farms (Osmani et al., 2014). Although an increased number (>5) of vehicles (rickshaw van, 
pick-up, motorized vehicle etc.) used by traders to collect chickens on the sampled farm was 
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associated with increased odds of H5 and H9 seropositivity in the univariate analysis (and would also 
represent increased movements), this variable was not significant in the multivariable analysis. 
5.4.2. Risk factors for H5 and H9 infection on commercial, unvaccinated layer farms 
Stray dogs were associated with increased odds of H5 and H9 seropositivity on unvaccinated layer 
farms. Previously, a case-control risk factor study conducted in Bangladesh (Biswas et al., 2009b) 
highlighted that feral and wild animals including dogs were a strong risk factor associated with H5N1 
infections on commercial farms. Experimental work conducted by Amirsalehy, Nili, and Mohammadi 
(2012) found that H9N2 virus isolated from broiler chickens was able to infect dogs, which were then 
able to shed the virus, while a study in Thailand reported that one dog died following ingestion of an 
H5N1-infected duck during an outbreak (Songserm et al., 2006). This emphasizes that dogs might 
play a role in the transmission of AIVs. 
In Bangladesh, multiple stakeholders are involved in the poultry production chain which can impact 
on the spread of H5N1 (FAO, 2011; Sims, 2007).  We found that purchases of DOCs or pullets 
directly from hatcheries or breeding farms reduced the risk of H5 infection and seropositivity in 
unvaccinated layer chickens compared to purchases of DOC or pullets from FCDs or through middle-
men. FCDs do supply DOC, feed, medicine and equipment to commercial farms, but FCDs also 
conduct regular visits to farms to provide advice on disease management (and might have contact to 
sick birds). Hatcheries on the other hand focus only on chick production and usually have good 
biosecurity, thus representing a source of DOC/pullets of lower AIV infection risk. Similarly, farms 
where chicken feed or feed ingredients were provided through FCD had higher odds ratios for H9 
infection compared to farms without FCD involvement in the feed supply.  
The disposal of carcasses can be a challenge for commercial chicken farmers (Ritz, 2014). We found 
that farmers disposing dead birds by burying them near farm premises had higher odds for H5 
seropositivity.  Disposal of poultry carcasses might include burial, incineration, composting and 
rendering (Blake & Donald, 1992). However, considering the significant risk for human health and 
the environment through contamination of ground water with pathogens, some countries do not 
permit the burial of dead birds (Ritz, 2014). Nevertheless, if burial of dead birds is conducted, 
carcasses need to be buried deeply so that feral and wild animals are not able to retrieve carcasses 
(Aravinth & Prakash, 2015). Busquets et al. (2010) showed that HPAI virus remained infectious in 
carcasses for a duration up to 6 days at temperatures of 22–230C, thus carcasses of birds that died of 
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HPAI and were not buried effectively are an important source of infection. In Bangladesh, not 
properly disposed carcasses might attract dogs, jackals and fox (Rimi et al., 2017; Szabó, Heltai, & 
Lanszki, 2010).  
The frequency of changing litter or droppings in chicken houses during the production cycle was also 
associated with increased H9 seropositivity in unvaccinated layer chickens. Kurmi et al. (2013) 
estimated that AIV can survive up to 18 hours at 42 °C, 24 hours at 37 °C, 5 days at 24 °C and 
8 weeks at 4 °C in dry and wet faeces, respectively; while survival of AIV in poultry sheds for up to 
5 weeks had been reported by others (Webster et al., 1978). Thus, poultry litter can provide a 
favourable environment for AIV spread. 
Farms, where vehicles were entering farm premises to deliver feed or DOCs (except to buy or collect 
chickens or eggs) or to collect litter/droppings had an increased risk of H5 seropositivity compared 
to farms without such vehicle visits. Transport vehicles usually move between farms to deliver feed 
or chicks and thereby might be able to spread AIV from one infected farm to a non-infected farm. In 
addition, poultry droppings are used by fish farmers as fish feed in Bangladesh (Hoq, Das, & Uddin, 
1999) and poultry litter to be used as fish feed is usually collected from multiple poultry farms. Thus 
transport vehicles that collect or deliver chicken faeces might play an important role in the spread of 
H5 virus (Duvauchelle, Huneau-Salaün, Balaine, Rose, & Michel, 2013). 
Layer farms where farmers, workers or their family members visited other commercial poultry farms 
were also at higher risk for H9 infection. The purposes of those visits is mainly for informal 
information exchange or gossiping which is a common cultural practice in Bangladesh and in other 
developing countries and has been linked to increased risk of HPAI outbreaks (Henning et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, we found that farms that sold a larger number of spent layers (>2000) in the last batch 
had higher odds for H9 seropositivity than farms selling fewer spent layers (>950 to ≤2000, 0 to 
≤950). Sales of a larger number of spent layers might involve a larger number of traders or middlemen 
visiting the farm premises. Moreover, we also explored the possibility of risk of management of 
multiples batches at the same time within the farm comparing to all-in-all out management or selling 
practices for H5 and H9 seroprevalence, but, this factor was excluded during the univariate analysis 
at cut-off p value ≤0.15. Kung et al. (2007), also found that farms visited by more than one person 
from retail markets was an important risk factor for H5N1 infection in chickens. Similar to H9 
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infections in broiler chickens, we observed that an increased number of workers on the farms was 
associated with an increased risk of H5 infections in unvaccinated layer chickens.  
5.4.3 Limitations of the study 
This study had some limitations. Firstly, some of the information collected on the marketing and 
production of chickens referred to the last 12 months and therefore relied on the memory recall by 
farmers. However, we tried to limit recall bias by simplifying the questions and focussed on 
dichotomised or simple ordinal responses to questions Secondly, due to the cross-sectional nature of 
the study, we were unable to observe detailed seasonal variation, for example in regards to the number 
of chickens reared or sold per month. However, by including questions on observations of general 
seasonality (e.g. Was there any specific season in the last 12 months when you reared more chickens? 
or Was there any specific season in the last 12 months when you sold more chickens?) we were able 
to include some season-focussed variables as potential risk factors in our analysis.  
5.4.4 Recommendations  
Although we explored H5 and H9 seropositivity separately, many of the risk factors identified could 
be grouped under the same themes, with general movement of people in and out of the farms being 
strongly associated with H5 and/or H9 seropositivity. It is not feasible to restrict the movement of 
people, such as workers or traders. However, it is recommend farms should have facilities for 
changing clothes and footwear before entering or leaving the farm as well as hand and foot washing 
facilities. It is also recommended, that vehicles should be cleaned and disinfected properly before 
entering and leaving farm premises. If possible, access of vehicles should be restricted to only one 
entry and exit point to the commercial farm and parking of vehicles should be conducted not within 
30 meters from chicken sheds (DLS, 2010). Protective perimeter fencing around the farms is highly 
advisable to prevent animals such as ducks or dogs entering farm premises. Daily or at least weekly 
cleaning of litter, and disposal of dead birds as far as possible from the farms (with at least 2 feet deep 
burial of birds) is recommended to reduce the risk of H5 or H9 spread. Farmers also need to be 
educated in risk-reducing behaviours such sourcing DOC from suppliers with good biosecurity (e.g. 
hatcheries). The aforementioned recommendations based on the findings of this study could help 
policy makers to develop more effective prevention and control strategies to reduce the risk of H5 
and H9 infections on commercial broiler and on commercial layer chicken farms.  
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CHAPTER 6      
FACTORS INFLUENCING CHICKEN FARMERS’ DECISIONS TO IMPLEMENT 
PREVENTION AND CONTROL MEASURES TO REDUCE HPAI VIRUS SPREAD IN 
BANGLADESH 
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6.1 Introduction 
HPAI H5N1 was first reported in 1959 on a small poultry farm in Scotland, UK (Capua & Alexander, 
2007). Since then, several localised outbreaks occurred in different countries across the world. 
However, in 1996, HPAI H5N1 emerged in southern China, and subsequently spread across Asia, 
Europe and Africa, resulting in high mortalities of birds, and requiring the culling of many infected 
and unaffected flocks (Alexander, 2000; OIE, 2019). Moreover, the zoonotic potential of the virus 
raises public health concerns (Fournie, Hog, Barnett, Pfeiffer, & Mangtani, 2017). Although the 
combined efforts from national and international communities resulted in the elimination of HPAI 
H5N1 in a number of countries, the virus remains endemic in Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, 
Indonesia and Vietnam (FAO, 2011, 2013; OIE, 2019). 
A long-term approach was recommended by FAO/OIE in 2008 to eliminate HPAI H5N1 virus 
circulation in these endemically infected countries. It includes disease monitoring and surveillance, 
stamping out, the application of country-adjusted preventive measures (e.g. vaccination) and 
improved biosecurity measures (FAO, 2011; OIE,2019). Disease monitoring and surveillance are 
essential for the early detection of HPAI H5N1 in order to trigger a rapid response to reduce the viral 
load in poultry and in the environment (FAO, 2011, 2013; OIE, 2019). Stamping out of HPAI H5N1 
infected flocks has only been partly successful in endemically infected countries, as moving or selling 
poultry by farmers before culling takes place, and the absence or inadequate compensation 
mechanisms are major constraints to control and prevention programs (FAO, 2011, 2013; OIE, 2019; 
USDA, 2017). All endemically infected countries except India are currently using vaccination against 
HPAI with a focus on commercial poultry, but several factors, including poor vaccine-induced 
immune response due to antigenic mismatch or inappropriate cold chains, limit the effectiveness of 
vaccination programmes (FAO, 2011; Kandeil et al., 2018; Kapczynski et al., 2015). Thus, improved 
biosecurity is the first line of defence in HPAI prevention as it establishes a barrier for the introduction 
of HPAI virus onto farms (Conan et al., 2012). Improved biosecurity measures include restricting the 
movement of visitors and vehicles to farms, cleaning and disinfecting of farms and farm equipment 
and wearing of protective gear while handling of poultry. However, the compliance with 
recommended biosecurity measures is often poor in HPAI endemically infected countries (Conan et 
al., 2012; FAO, 2011, 2013; Rimi et al., 2017).  Hence, there is a need to understand the factors that 
influence farmers’ decision to implement HPAI preventive or control measures on their farms. Yet, 
the diversity of husbandry practices, scale of production and livelihood strategies of farmers in HPAI-
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endemic countries may mean that factors influencing their decisions vary greatly between poultry 
production systems (Cui et al., 2017; Cui et al., 2016a; Jemberu et al, 2015). 
Qualitative and semi-quantitative methods can be used to provide insights into farmers’ perceptions 
of and the factors influencing their attitudes towards biosecurity measures (Cui & Liu, 2016; Cui et 
al., 2019b; Oliveira et al., 2018). For example, Knowledge Attitudes and Practices (KAP) approaches 
have been used to describe knowledge, attitudes and and practices of farmers towards HPAI (Ismail 
& Ahmed, 2010; Sarker, Sumon, Khan, & Islam, 2016; Xiang et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2019), but 
these type of studies do not fully consider the integrated nature of farmer’s perceptions and its 
influence on farmers’ behaviours. This limits the applicability of KAP study results in health 
education or promotion programs (Caldwell, Caldwell, & Quiggin, 1989; Cleland, 1973; Green, 
2001; Ratcliffe, 1976; Smith, 1993). A number of psychological or behavioural frameworks (e.g. 
Protection Motivation Theory, Social Cognitive Theory, Theory of Belief Functions or Dempster–
Shafer Theory) have been developed to analyse individual’s perceptions or beliefs that influence their 
decision making (Ajzen, 2011; Bandura, 2001; Rogers, 1975; Shafer, 1992). The Health Belief Model 
(HBM) framework is a social cognition model that is frequently used in health education and 
promotion programs. In the HBM framework, behaviours and actions of individuals are explored 
while their perceptions and attitudes towards diseases and towards negative or positive outcomes of 
certain actions are considered. Thus, the HBM framework considers that the likelihood of 
implementing health-protecting behaviours is influenced by individual’s perception of their 
susceptibility to a disease, the consequences of the disease, the benefits of implementing actions, and 
any constraints or barriers to the implementaiton of those actions. In addition, sources of information 
that may influence individuals’ perceptions are also considered (Champion & Skinner, 2008; Glanz 
& Bishop, 2010; Glanz et al., 2008; Rosenstock, 1974). 
Using the HBM framework, the objectives of our research were 1) to describe biosecurity measures 
implemented by poultry farmers operating under different production systems in Bangladesh to 
prevent HPAI infection in their flocks, and 2) to identify factors influencing the implementation of 
the biosecurity measures by farmers. 
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6.2 Materials and methods 
6.2.1 Theoretical framework 
In the HBM framework, multiple aspects of individuals’ perceptions of a given topic are assessed and 
used to describe the individuals’ decision-making (Glanz, Marcus Lewis, & Rimer, 1997; Glanz et 
al., 2008). Following the HBM framework (Figure 6.1) we aimed to identify the factors that influence 
backyard and commercial chicken farmers to implement HPAI preventive and control measures. Six 
HBM components or constructs were considered as part of a farmer’s decision making (Becker, 1974; 
Champion & Skinner, 2008; Rosenstock, 1974):  
i. Perceived susceptibility: Perception of the risk of chickens or humans becoming 
infected with HPAI virus 
ii. Perceived severity: Perception of the consequences associated with HPAI infection in 
chickens and humans 
iii. Perceived benefits: Perception of the positive impacts of HPAI preventive measures 
on chickens and humans 
iv. Perceived barriers: Perceptions of constraints that refrain farmers to implement HPAI 
preventive measures 
v. Cues to action: Engagement with different sources of information on HPAI preventive 
and control measures 
vi. Self-efficacy: Likelihood of farmers to implement HPAI preventive and control 
measures  
We hypothesized that perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, perceived benefits and perceived 
barriers had a direct influence on the likelihood of farmers to implement HPAI preventive and control 
measures (i.e. self-efficacy), and that cues to action might had: a mediating role on the impact of the 
four perceptive constructs on self-efficacy, and/or (2) a direct influence on self-efficacy. 
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Figure 6.1 Diagram of Conceptual Health Belief Model framework used to explore the drivers that 
influence chicken farmers’ decision to implement Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza control and 
prevention measures 
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6.2.2. Study design 
Two cross-sectional studies were conducted in the Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar districts of 
Bangladesh to explore farmers’ perceptions and attitudes towards HPAI prevention and control. A 
total of 144 backyard chicken farmers were interviewed from February to April 2016, while 106 
commercial broiler and 113 layer chicken farmers were interviewed from February to April 2017. 
Backyard chicken farmers usually raise Deshi (meaning ‘indigenous’ in Bengali language) chickens 
under scavenging or free ranging condition (Barua & Yoshimura, 1997; Das et al., 2008; FAO, 2008), 
whereas commercial farmers raise chickens of mainly exotic strains under confined or intensive 
systems with provision of supplementary feed (FAO, 2008; Huque et al., 2011). The design of these 
cross-sectional studies is described in detail in Chapter 3. 
6.2.3 Questionnaire  
Two questionnaires were designed, one for backyard chicken farmers, and one for commercial broiler 
and layer chicken farmers. The questionnaires were developed in English and then translated into 
Bengali language. Each of the HBM constructs were measured in the questionnaire by a set of 6-12 
questions and all answers were recorded on a 6-Point Likert scale (‘Strongly disagree’, ‘Disagree’, 
‘Neither agree nor disagree’, ‘Don’t know’, ‘Agree’, ‘Strongly agree’). The questionnaires were pilot-
tested with 6 backyard chicken, 5 broiler and 5 layer farmers who were not part of the finally 
interviewed cohort and resulted in minor modifications of 5 questions in the backyard and 3 questions 
in the commercial chicken farmer questionnaires. The interviews were conducted by one female and 
one male field veterinarians who were trained in interviewing techniques. Each interview lasted about 
25 minutes. 
6.2.4 Data analyses 
Frequencies of farmers’ responses to each question were summarized in STATA 14.1 (Stata 
Corporation, College Station, Texas, USA). In the subsequent analytical analysis, the categories 
‘Don’t know’ and ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ were combined in a category ‘Uncertain’. We then 
used Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) to identify factors influencing farmers’ decisions to 
implement HPAI preventive or control measures. SEM is a statistical approach used in behavioural 
sciences (Hox & Bechger, 1998) to explore the theoretical or underlying constructs that cannot be 
directly observed and therefore are named latent variables. The 6 HBM constructs in our study 
represented the latent variables in the SEM models. SEM included two parts: a measurement part, in 
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which latent variables were related to observed variables, and 2) a structural part, in which 
relationships between latent variables were explored (Wuensch, 2009).  
In our study, a conceptual model (Supplementary Figures: Appendices 4-6) was initially developed 
to visualize the observed or questionnaire variables informing each HBM construct, and the 
hypothesized causal relationships between the HBM constructs. 
We then followed the two-step SEM approach developed by Anderson and Gerbing (1988, 1992): for 
the measurement part of the SEM, we used one-factor Confirmatory Factor Analysis to identify for 
each HBM construct the minimum set of observed variables that best represented this constructs. 
Then, in the structural part of the model, we considered perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, 
perceived benefits, perceived barriers and cues to action as independent variables influencing self-
efficacy, the main dependent variable in the model. We also considered cues to action as intervening 
variable that could mediate the effect of the constructs measuring perceptions on self-efficacy. The 
results of the measurement part of the model were displayed using a path diagram. Results were 
displayed as direct effects of perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, perceived benefits, 
perceived barriers and cues to action on self-efficacy, as indirect effects of the four perceived 
constructs via cues to action on self-efficacy, and as total effects. The effects were measured by 
standardized regression coefficients (𝛽). Bootstrapping was used to test the significance (p-values) of 
the effects. Finally, to assess how well the data fitted the final models, we used the Hu and Bentler’s 
Two-Index Presentation Strategy (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Separate models were developed for backyard, commercial broiler and commercial layer chicken 
farmers. The SEM analysis was performed using AMOS software version 25.0 (IBM® SPSS® 
Amos™ 25, IBM Corp., 2017. U.S.A).  
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Study populations  
The background of interviewed farmers (gender, marital status, religion, educational qualification, 
age and experiences in chicken farming) is presented in Table 6.1. Most (>91%) of backyard chicken 
farmers were women and married; in contrast, almost all of the commercial chicken farmers were 
male (>98%), of which more than two-thirds were married. Commercial layer farmers had a higher 
level of education than backyard and commercial broiler chicken farmers. There was no major 
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difference in the mean age of farmers across production systems, but backyard chicken farmers were 
more experienced in raising chickens than commercial farmers. 
Frequency of responses of backyard, commercial broiler and layer chicken farmers to the questions 
on a 6-Point Likert scale are shown in Supplementary Tables (Appendices 1-3).For further analysis, 
responses were summarized on a 5-Point Likert Scale for the SEM (Tables 6.2-6.4).
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Table 6.1 Demographic information on the chicken farmers interviewed. †represents 15 days, ‡ represents 90 days 
 Backyard chicken farmer Commercial broiler chicken 
farmer 
Commercial layer chicken 
farmer 
% (n) % (n) % (n) 
Gender 
Male 6.3 (9) 98.1 (104) 99.1 (112) 
Female 93.7 (135) 1.9 (2) 0.9 (1) 
Marital status 
Single 2.1 (3) 31.1 (33) 31.0 (35) 
Married 91.7 (132) 68.9 (73) 69.0 (78) 
Divorced 0.7 (1) - - 
Widowed 5.5 (8) - - 
Religion 
Muslim 90.3 (130) 94.3 (100) 89.4 (101) 
Hindu 6.9 (10) 5.7 (6) 9.7 (11) 
Buddhist 2.8 (4) - 0.9 (1) 
Education 
Illiterate 12.5 (18) 1.9 (2) 3.5 (4) 
Primary 56.2 (81) 22.6 (24) 15.9 (18) 
Secondary    25.7 (37) 39.6 (42) 38.1 (43) 
Higher Secondary    4.9 (7) 17.0 (18) 16.8 (19) 
Tertiary  0.7 (1) 18.9 (20) 25.7 (29) 
Mean (Minimum, Maximum) 
Age (in years) 38.2 (17, 70) 36.6 (15, 70) 35.0 (6, 58) 
Experience in chicken  
farming (in years) 
20.4 (2, 52) 8.5 (<1†, 23) 9.2 (<1‡, 27) 
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6.3.2 Backyard chicken farmers 
Backyard chicken farmers (Table 6.2) were very willing to implement HPAI preventive and control 
measures, with more than 96% of farmers agreeing or strongly agreeing to conduct actions that would 
reduce the chance of HPAI virus spread from their properties (e.g. informing livestock officers if they 
suspected HPAI outbreaks in their flocks). However, backyard chicken farmers were often concerned 
about constraints to implement these measures on their farms. For example, about a third of backyard 
farmers indicated that washing of hands after handling chickens was not practicable. Backyard 
farmers were strongly influenced by social pressures. For example, almost 30% of them would not 
apply hygienic measures if their neighbours did not use them. However, almost 90% of backyard 
farmers were open to learn more about HPAI and biosecurity if they were provided with information 
through the media or via other sources.
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Table 6.2 Summary statistics (percentage, number of responses) of variables associated with Health Belief Model constructs retained in the final 
Structural Equation Model for backyard chicken farmers 
 
Constructs 
retained in the 
final model 
Observed variables measured the constructs  
(ID used to represent the variable in the model) 
Farmer's responses or perceptions or belief or barrier   
% (n) 
Strongly disagree 
(Very low perception or 
belief or barrier) 
Disagree 
(Low perception or 
belief or barrier) 
Uncertain 
Agree 
(High perception or 
belief or barrier) 
Strongly agree 
(Very high perception or 
belief or barrier) 
Self-efficacy 
It is a good idea to clean poultry house/equipment 
regularly 
( SEff2) 
0.0 (0) 1.4 (2) 0.0 (0) 41.7 (60) 56.9 (82) 
I would be able to identify signs of the disease, if my 
chickens were infected with avian influenza/bird flu  
( SEff3) 
0.7 (1) 0.7 (1) 0.7 (1) 46.5 (67) 51.4 (74) 
I will inform the local livestock related personnel, when 
I suspect that my chickens have avian influenza/bird flu 
( SEff4) 
1.4 (2) 1.4 (2) 0.7 (1) 49.3 (71) 47.2 (68) 
I could wash my hands with soap before and after 
handling poultry, even if my neighbours are not( SEff7) 
1.4 (2) 0.0 (0) 1.4 (2) 46.5 (67) 50.7 (73) 
Perceived 
barriers 
Regular cleaning of poultry house/equipment is time 
consuming and not practical for me, because my 
family/I have to do many other things(PBar3) 
40.3 (58) 35.4 (51) 0.0 (0) 21.5 (31) 2.8 (4) 
Washing hands before and after handling poultry is not 
practical for me, because my family/I have to do many 
other things(PBar4) 
38.9 (56) 28.5 (41) 0.0 (0) 28.5 (41) 4.2 (6) 
I can’t cover my mouth and nose with cloths during 
handling chickens, because they are not conducive for 
work(PBar5) 
37.5 (54) 25.0 (36) 4.2 (6) 29.9 (43) 3.5 (5) 
I don’t cover my mouth and nose with cloths during 
handling chickens,  because my neighbour do 
not(PBar6) 
37.5 (54) 32.6 (47) 0.0 (0) 25.7 (37) 4.2 (6) 
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Constructs 
retained in the 
final model 
Observed variables measured the constructs  
(ID used to represent the variable in the model) 
Farmer's responses or perceptions or belief or barrier   
% (n) 
Strongly disagree 
(Very low perception or 
belief or barrier) 
Disagree 
(Low perception or 
belief or barrier) 
Uncertain 
Agree 
(High perception or 
belief or barrier) 
Strongly agree 
(Very high perception or 
belief or barrier) 
Cues to action 
If I find a program on TV about avian influenza/bird flu 
and other aspects of poultry rearing, then I would watch 
it(Cue2) 
1.4 (2) 2.8 (4) 0.0 (0) 38.2 (55) 57.6 (83) 
If I find a program on the radio about avian 
influenza/bird flu and other aspects of poultry rearing, 
then I would listen to it(Cue3) 
1.4 (2) 2.8 (4) 0.0 (0) 38.9 (56) 56.9 (82) 
If I get invited to a meeting or campaign, etc. about 
avian influenza/bird flu and other aspects of poultry 
rearing, then I would attend it(Cue4) 
2.1 (3) 6.9 (10) 0.0 (0) 41.0 (59) 50.0 (72) 
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The final SEM for backyard chicken farmers (Figure 6.2) highlighted that the likelihood of farmers 
to implement HPAI preventive measures on their farms was strongly reduced by perceived barriers 
(β=-0.52, p<0.001). However, information provided on HPAI marginally reduced this negative 
impact of perceived barriers (β=-0.13, p<0.072), and had a direct positive impact on the likelihood 
of farmers implementing HPAI prevention and control measures (β=0.26, p<0.01). Surprisingly, the 
risk and consequences associated with HPAI infection in chickens and people, and the advantages of 
implementing preventive actions did not influence backyard chicken farmers to implement HPAI 
prevention and control measures.
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Figure 6.2 Final Structural Equation Model for backyard chicken farmers. The total effect for 
Perceived barriersCues to actionSelf-efficacy was β=-0.66 (p<0.01). 
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6.3.3 Broiler chicken farmers 
All (100%) commercial broiler chicken farmers (Table 6.3) either agreed or strongly agreed to 
implement actions that would reduce the chances of HPAI virus spread, such as the proper disposal 
of dead birds or litter.  
Broiler farmers also strongly acknowledged the risk of chickens to become infected by HPAI if 
biosecurity is not properly maintained. For example, 95% of broiler farmers believed that chickens 
have an increased risk of becoming sick if the farm and farm equipment are not regularly cleaned and 
disinfected. However, they were somewhat concerned about constraints to implement these measures 
on their farms, with for example about 8% of farmers indicating that wearing protective gear was not 
conducive for work with chickens. On the other hand, broiler farmers were also aware of the 
advantages of adopting HPAI prevention and control measures, with, for example, more than 85% 
farmers agreeing or strongly agreeing that fewer chickens and farmers will become sick if good 
biosecurity is maintained on farms. Social pressures were reported to have a lesser impact than for 
backyard farmers, with only a small number of broiler farmers (10%) agreeing or strongly agreeing 
that they would not use HPAI vaccine because neighbouring farmers did not do so. Commercial 
broiler farmers also showed a strong interest in being informed about HPAI, with almost all farmers 
(99%) strongly agreeing or agreeing to be interested in receiving information about HPAI. 
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Table 6.3 Summary statistics (percentage, number of responses) of variables associated with Health Belief Model constructs retained in the final 
Structural Equation Model for commercial broiler chicken farmers 
Constructs 
retained in 
the final 
model 
Observed variables measured the constructs  
(ID used to represent the variable in the model) 
Farmer's responses or perceptions or belief or barrier   
%(n) 
Strongly disagree 
(Very low perception 
or belief or barrier) 
Disagree 
(Low perception or 
belief or barrier) 
Uncertain 
Agree 
(High perception or 
belief or barrier) 
Strongly agree 
(Very high perception or 
belief or barrier) 
Self-efficacy 
 I could dispose dead birds/litter/waste  properly  
( SEff5) 
0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 23.6 (25) 76.4 (81) 
I could clean & disinfect poultry house/equipment 
regularly (SEff6) 
0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 25.5 (27) 74.5 (79) 
I could wear protective wear, even if my neighbouring 
poultry farmers are not 
( SEff7) 
0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 31.1 (33) 68.9 (73) 
Perceived 
susceptibility  
My chickens have an increased risk of getting avian 
influenza/bird flu: when  I don’t regularly clean and 
disinfect my farm and farm equipment(PSus3) 
0.0 (0) 4.7 (5) 0.0 (0) 31.1 (33) 64.2 (68) 
My chickens have an increased risk of getting avian 
influenza/bird flu: when I don’t control wild 
birds/backyard poultry from entering into my poultry 
shed/house (PSus4) 
0.0 (0) 5.7 (6) 1.9 (2) 28.3 (30) 64.2 (68) 
My chickens have an increased risk of getting avian 
influenza/bird flu: when my workers don’t wash their 
hands/feet/change clothes before entering poultry 
shed/house (PSus5) 
0.0 (0) 5.7 (6) 
0.9 (1) 
 
27.4 (29) 66.0 (70) 
My chickens have an increased risk of getting avian 
influenza/bird flu: when I don’t clean and disinfect 
vehicles, egg trays, cages, de-beaking machine, vaccination 
gun, etc. before entering into my farm (PSus6) 
0.0 (0) 4.7 (5) 0.0 (0) 33.0 (35) 62.3 (66) 
Perceived 
benefits 
If I maintain biosecurity (proper prevention & control 
measures) in my poultry farm, then my chickens will : not 
get sick from avian influenza and the possibility of disease 
outbreaks in my locality will reduce(PBen2) 
0.0 (0) 7.6 (8) 0.0 (0) 24.5 (26) 67.9 (72) 
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Constructs 
retained in 
the final 
model 
Observed variables measured the constructs  
(ID used to represent the variable in the model) 
Farmer's responses or perceptions or belief or barrier   
%(n) 
Strongly disagree 
(Very low perception 
or belief or barrier) 
Disagree 
(Low perception or 
belief or barrier) 
Uncertain 
Agree 
(High perception or 
belief or barrier) 
Strongly agree 
(Very high perception or 
belief or barrier) 
If I maintain biosecurity(proper prevention & control 
measures) in my poultry farm, then my chickens will : not 
get sick from AI as well as my family members and I will 
not get sick from AI (PBen3) 
0.0 (0) 8.5 (9) 5.7 (6) 28.3 (30) 57.6 (61) 
Perceived 
barriers 
My neighbouring farmer doesn’t use avian influenza 
vaccine, so I don’t use avian influenza vaccine(PBar8) 
67.0 (71 ) 22.6 (24) 0.0 (0) 8.5 (9) 1.9 (2) 
I can’t wear protective gear, because they are not 
conducive for work(PBar9) 
68.9 (73) 23.6 (25) 0.0 (0) 6.6 (7) 0.9 (1) 
I don’t wear protective wear because my neighbouring 
poultry farmers do not(PBar10) 
72.6 (77) 18.9 (20) 0.0 (0) 6.6 (7) 1.9 (2) 
Cues to action 
If I find a program on TV about avian influenza, then I 
would watch it (Cue3) 
0.0 (0) 0.9 (1) 0.0 (0) 15.1 (16) 84.0 (89) 
If I find  a program on the radio about avian influenza, then 
I would listen to it(Cue4) 
0.0 (0) 0.9 (1) 0.0 (0) 14.2 (15) 84.9 (90) 
If I find information about avian influenza in 
leaflet/brochure/billboard, etc., then I would read it(Cue5) 
0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.9 (1) 16.0 (17) 83.0 (88) 
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The final SEM for broiler farmers (Figure 6.3) highlighted that the likelihood to implement HPAI 
preventive or control measures was strongly reduced by perceived barriers to implement these 
measures (β=-0.41, p<0.001), but strongly increased by perceived benefits (β=0.44, p<0.001) and 
perceived susceptibility (β=0.16, p<0.046). Information provided on HPAI (i.e. cues to action) also 
had a direct impact on the implementation of measures (β=0.12, p<0.067), but not a mediating effect. 
Consequences associated with HPAI infection did not influence broiler farmers’ decision to 
implement HPAI preventive measures.
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Figure 6.3 Final Structural Equation Model for commercial broiler chicken farmers. The total effect 
for Perceived barriersCues to actionSelf-efficacy was β= -0.43 (p<0.01), and for Perceived 
benefitsCues to actionSelf-efficacy was β= 0.48 (p<0.01). 
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6.3.4 Layer farmers 
Similarly to backyard and broiler farmers, almost all commercial layer farmers (>98%) agreed or 
strongly agreed to follow recommended actions to avoid HPAI infection and spread (e.g. wearing 
protective equipment even if neighbouring poultry farmers do not) (Table 6.4). Most striking was 
that although layer farmers were aware of the obstacles to implement HPAI preventive measures, 
much fewer (compared to backyard and broiler farmers) highlighted that these obstacles negatively 
influenced their decision-making. They were also less likely to be influenced by social pressures. For 
instance, only 9% would not use HPAI vaccine if their neighbouring farmers did not use it. 
Layer farmers were strongly convinced about the advantages of maintaining good biosecurity on their 
farms, with more than 80% farmers agreeing or strongly agreeing that good maintenance of 
biosecurity measures would results in less HPAI cases in chickens and humans. Once again, almost 
98% of layer farmers were interested in receiving additional information about HPAI and biosecurity 
measures. 
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Table 6.4 Summary statistics (percentage, number of responses) of variables associated with Health Belief Model constructs retained in the final 
Structural Equation Model for commercial layer chicken farmers 
 
Constructs 
retained in the 
final model 
Observed variables measured the constructs  
(ID used to represent the variable in the model) 
Farmer's responses or perceptions or belief or barrier   
%(n) 
Strongly disagree 
(Very low perception 
or belief or barrier) 
Disagree 
(Low perception or 
belief or barrier) 
Uncertain 
Agree 
(High perception or 
belief or barrier) 
Strongly agree 
(Very high perception 
or belief or barrier) 
Self-efficacy 
I could wear protective wear, even if my neighbouring poultry 
farmers are not 
( SEff7) 
0.9 (1) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 35.4 (40) 63.7 (72) 
 I could wash my hands with soap before and after handling 
chickens even if my neighbouring poultry farmers are not 
( SEff8) 
0.9 (1) 0.9 (1) 0.0 (0) 33.6 (38) 64.6 (73) 
Perceived 
benefits 
If I maintain biosecurity (proper prevention & control measures) 
in my poultry farm, then my chickens will  not get sick from 
avian influenza, and  I will not lose income(PBen1) 
0.0 (0) 6.2 (7) 1.8 (2) 28.3 (32) 63.7 (72) 
If I maintain biosecurity(proper prevention & control measures) 
in my poultry farm, then my chickens will not get sick from avian 
influenza and the possibility of disease outbreaks in my locality 
will reduce(PBen2) 
0.9 (1) 8.0 (9) 2.7 (3) 24.8 (28) 63.7 (72) 
If I maintain biosecurity(proper prevention & control measures) 
in my poultry farm, then my chickens will : not get sick from AI 
as well as my family members and I will not get sick from AI 
(PBen3) 
0.9 (1) 15.0 (17) 3.5 (4) 23.0 (26) 57.5 (65) 
If my chickens receive avian influenza vaccine, then they will not 
get sick and die and I will not lose income(PBen4) 
0.9 (1) 7.1 (8) 0.9 (1) 24.8 (28) 66.4 (75) 
Perceived 
barriers 
Washing hands all the time is not practical for me, because I have 
to do many other things(PBar7) 
62.0 (70) 25.7 (29) 0.0 (0) 12.4 (14) 0.0 (0) 
My neighbouring farmer doesn’t use avian influenza vaccine, so I 
don’t use avian influenza vaccine(PBar8) 
62.8 (71) 28.3 (32) 0.0 (0) 8.9 (10) 0.0 (0) 
I don’t wear protective wear because my neighbouring poultry 
farmers do not(PBar10) 
65.5 (74) 28.3 (32) 0.0 (0) 5.3 (6) 0.9 (1) 
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Constructs 
retained in the 
final model 
Observed variables measured the constructs  
(ID used to represent the variable in the model) 
Farmer's responses or perceptions or belief or barrier   
%(n) 
Strongly disagree 
(Very low perception 
or belief or barrier) 
Disagree 
(Low perception or 
belief or barrier) 
Uncertain 
Agree 
(High perception or 
belief or barrier) 
Strongly agree 
(Very high perception 
or belief or barrier) 
Cues to action 
If I find a program on TV about avian influenza, then I would 
watch it (Cue3) 
0.0 (0) 0.9 (1) 0.0 (0) 23.9 (27) 75.2 (85) 
If I find  a program on the radio about avian influenza, then I 
would listen to it(Cue4) 
0.0 (0) 1.8 (2) 0.0 (0) 23.0 (26) 75.2 (85) 
If I get invited to a meeting or campaign, etc. about avian 
influenza, then I would attend it(Cue6) 
0.0 (0) 1.8 (2) 0.9 (1) 23.9 (27) 73.5 (83) 
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In the final SEM for layer farmers (Figure 6.4), the likelihood that farmers implement HPAI 
preventive and control measures on their farms was strongly increased by the perceived benefits 
(β=0.68, p<0.001) and, to a lesser extent, by the information provided on HPAI (i.e. cues to action) 
(β=0.15, p<0.065). Interestingly, perceived barriers did not seem to influence the implementation of 
HPAI preventive measures. Cues to action had no significant mediating effect on preventive 
measures. Likewise, consequences associated with HPAI infection and risk of chickens and humans 
to become infected did not influence layer farmers’ decisions to implement HPAI preventive or 
control measures.
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Figure 6.4 Final Structural Equation Model for commercial layer chicken farmers. The total effect 
for Perceived benefitsCues to actionSelf-efficacy was β= 0.72 (p<0.01). 
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6.4 Discussion 
To our knowledge, this is the first study that used the HBM framework to explore the perceptions of 
farmers across different chicken production systems (backyard, commercial broiler and layer farmers) 
on the implementation of HPAI prevention and control measures. Our research provided new insights 
about factors influencing poultry farmers’ decision-making processes in regards to improved 
biosecurity which can be used to guide the design of more effective preventive behaviour-change 
interventions (Glanz et al., 2008).  
Farmers showed different perceptions on HPAI prevention and control depending on the practiced 
poultry management, reflecting different contexts, needs, and experiences. This is consistent with 
findings by Jemberu et al. (2015) who identified that farmers’ perception on FMD control measures 
differed by cattle production systems, such as crop-livestock, pastoral and market-oriented systems. 
The HBM constructs in our study (perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, perceived barriers, 
perceived benefits and cues to action) had a different impact on the likelihood of implementing HPAI 
preventive measures (self-efficacy) in different poultry production systems. For example, perceived 
barriers refrained broiler and backyard farmers to implement HPAI preventive actions, but did not 
influence commercial layer farmers’ decision-making. One possible explanation for this finding is 
that commercial layer farmers raise flocks over longer periods, manage larger flock size, with 
comparatively larger capital investment, which might make them more conscious of the need to plan 
preventive and control measures in the long term, enabling them to overcome perceived barriers. 
Nevertheless, perceived barriers were the most influential construct affecting poultry farmers’ 
behaviors. A meta-analysis of the effectiveness of HBM variables in predicting human actions 
conducted by Carpenter (2010)  and a critical review carried by Janz and Becker (1984) of 46 HBM-
related studies highlighted that perceived barriers were the HBM construct with the strongest 
influence on individuals’ health-related behaviours. Similary, focussing on preventive medical 
interventions, Tanner-Smith and Brown (2010) indentified that conducting a pap smear, which was 
considered by women as embarassing and time consuming, was a signficant perceived barrier for the 
involvement of these women in cervical cancer prevention programs. Jemberu et al. (2015) also found 
that the cost of vaccination was a strong perceived barrier impacting on farmers’ intentions to 
vaccinate their animals against FMD. 
Our study further highlighted that perceived benefits of preventive and control measures only 
influenced broiler and layer farmers’ decisions, most likely as the potential financial losses due to 
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HPAI outbreaks are more substantial for commercial farmers compared to backyard farmers, with 
backyard poultry raising being usually conducted only for supplementary income (Henning, Pym, 
Hla, Kyaw, & Meers, 2007). This is supported by research conducted in China and Kenya, which 
highlighted that farmers with larger flock sizes were more aware of the advantages of improved 
biosecurity (Cui et al., 2019a; Tiongco et al., 2012). 
Perceived susceptibility of HPAI infection only influenced broiler farmers to implement HPAI 
preventive measures, but it did not influence backyard and layer farmers. A possible reason for this 
finding might be that as the production cycle for backyard and layer chickens is longer, farmers might 
believe that birds develop immunity over time, making them less susceptible to HPAI virus infection.  
Surprisingly, the perceived severity of HPAI infection in chickens and people did not influence 
backyard, broiler and layer farmers’ likelihood to implement HPAI prevention and control measures. 
Poultry farmers might have developed lesser concerns about the impact of HPAI, as there are fewer 
official and media reports on HPAI outbreaks and human infections in endemically infected countries 
like Bangladesh (DLS, 2019; WHO, 2019), or because farmers reduced potential economic 
consequences by conducting rapid sales of their chickens when an HPAI outbreak is experienced 
(Høg et al., 2018).  
Usually little attention is been paid in animal health research to farmers’ willingness to seek 
information (Valeeva et al., 2011). We identified that the availability information on HPAI played an 
important role in the farmers’ decision-making to implement HPAI prevention and control measures 
for all three chicken production systems. Similarly, Toma, Stott, Heffernan, Ringrose, and Gunn 
(2013)  found that the provision of biosecurity information had a positive impact on farmers’ 
biosecurity behaviour while Cui et al. (2019b) also observed that information on AI disseminated 
through TV, web news and chats and via conversations between chicken farmers influenced the 
implementation of HPAI preventive measures. Unfortunately, farmers with different levels of 
intensification are often provided with similar advice on disease management. In our study, farmers 
of different chicken production systems had different perceptions on HPAI prevention and control, 
highlighting that information and extension messages need to be tailored to the respective audiences. 
A study conducted in the UK by Heffernan et al. (2008) found that bio-security behaviours by cattle 
and sheep farmers did not improve despite the provision of information through multiple sources (e.g. 
TV, radio, newspapers, Government agencies, private actors like feed representatives etc.), and the 
authors speculated  that the communication of the information might have been viewed negatively by 
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some farmers. The researchers highlighted the importance of reframing biosecurity messages by 
paying attention to farmers’ perceptions and to the way in which information is delivered to farmers. 
Thus, to communicate advice succesfully, appropriate comunciation methods need to be considered 
that account for the cultural environment, education level and experience of farmers (Henning, Hla, 
& Meers, 2014). Furthermore, behavior change communication through education programs need to 
be interactive and innovative and could include tools like documentaries, docu-drama, social 
marketing campaigns and puppet plays (Jones, Waters, Holland, Bevins, & Iverson, 2010). 
Our study had some limitations. Firstly, we explored farmers’ likelihood to implement HPAI 
prevention and control measures, but if these measures were actually implemented by farmers was 
beyond the scope of our study. Measuring the continuing implementation of measures would require 
a longitudinal study and such a study would be resource intensive to conduct. Secondly, we 
hypothesized and analyzed causal relationships between perceptions and the implementation of HPAI 
preventive measures, but validating these causal relationships was not possible in our cross-sectional 
study design. Finally, the framework used in this research paid more attention to the subjective state 
of an individual rather than other contextual factors, such as social acceptability, which would need 
to be explored through more qualitative approaches.  
Overall, the results of our research can assist policy makers to tailor specific education programs to 
different types of poultry farmers and will thereby support the establishment of a more effective 
strategy to control and prevent HPAI virus spread. 
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CHAPTER 7  
GENERAL DISCUSSION
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7.1 Discussion of the key findings 
  
 
 
Overall, viral prevalence was low. Although all sampled backyard, commercial broiler and layer 
chicken farms tested negative for H5 viral subtype, H5 seropositive birds were found in all three 
systems. There were more unvaccinated commercial farms positive for H9 than backyard farms, and 
the proportions of H9-positive commercial broiler and unvaccinated layer farms were similar. 
Interestingly, no major disease or mortalities were reported by farmers, which raised questions about 
the virulence of the circulating H5 and H9 viruses and their impact on poultry health. It might be 
possible that endmicity of H5 and H9 infection might resulted in reduced pathogenicity of viruses 
due to viral evoloution or that birds became less susceptible to showing disease symtoms due to the 
dvelopment of cell-induced immunity to Influenza A viruses  (Kapczynski, 2008; Wang et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, the H5 and H9 prevalence might differed due to the different epidemiology of each 
subtypes, including varying mortalities (Ducatez, Webster, & Webby, 2008). 
The similar Influenza A and H9 viral prevalence in broiler and layer farms suggests similar levels of 
exposure of both farming systems to AIVs. This finding suggests the importance of considering the 
inclusion of broilers in AI vaccination program, although a detailed cost-benefit analysis and input 
from poultry industry stakeholders would be required before such a prevention strategy can be 
recommended. 
Significant clustering was observed for H5 seroprevalence in backyard ducks, indicating that if one 
duck was H5 seropositive, other ducks in the same flock were also likely to be H5 seropositive. This 
is in contrast to backyard and commercial broiler and layer chickens, where usually only single birds 
out of the sampled chickens had H5 antibodies. This highlights that ducks remain an important source 
of H5 infection as this virus subtype seem to present in a large proportion of the backyard duck 
population (Henning et al., 2011; Hulse-Post et al., 2005; Kishida et al., 2005; Sarkar et al., 2017).  
Furthermore, the occurrence of H5 antibodies in unvaccinated flocks resulting from a cross-
contamination with HVT-vector vaccine that was used in vaccinated flocks has been considered. 
Research question 1 (Chapter 3): How do the patterns of avian influenza A (H5) and A (H9) 
virus infection differ between backyard, commercial broiler and layer chicken farms in 
Bangladesh? 
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However, such a cross-contamination between vaccinated and unvaccinated flocks is unlikely. 
Yasuda et al. (2016) found that neither HVT‐H5 vaccine nor parental HVT vaccine spread from 
vaccinated chickens to non‐vaccinated in-contact chickens. The authors vaccinated one-day-old 
Specific Pathogen Free chickens in ovo with HVT‐H5 vector or parental HVT, and then raised these 
chickens with unvaccinated in-contact chickens. At 10, 14, and 21 days of the age birds were sampled, 
but no virus could be isolated from in-contact chickens, although virus was isolated from the 
vaccinated chickens. 
Finally, the detection of only low antibody titres in H5 vaccinated layer flocks was surprising. This 
poor immune response might have been a result of misapplication of the vaccine or of vaccine 
selection pressure (Zihadi & Vahlenkamp, 2017).  
 
 
 
The risk factors associated with H5 and H9 virus spread were related to the following categories: (1) 
environmental or ecological features in the village, (2) garbage management, (3) trading practices, 
and (4) interspecies transmission. 
The abundance of crows around village garbage places was associated with increased odds of 
backyard farms being seropositive for H5 and H9. An investigation conducted in Bangladesh to 
investigate unusual crow mortality in 2011 speculated about the potential for crows to act as vectors 
of infection for backyard poultry when they were scavenging near backyard poultry farms (Khan et 
al., 2014) (although crows becoming contaminated when near infected poultry might be equally 
important). Alternatively, crows may just be an indicator of abundant and mismanaged garbage, with 
garbage actually being a source of AIV infection as it could contain infected poultry ‘material’ such 
as carcasses of dead birds or intestines of slaughtered poultry (Walz et al., 2018). This interpretation 
is supported by the observation, that garbage piled up around farms was a risk factor for both H5 and 
H9 seroprevalence in the risk factor studies reported in this thesis. In fact, dead poultry, but also 
poultry waste are often disposed into domestic garbage (Cointreau, 2007). A study conducted by 
Sheta et al. (2014) in Egypt found that about 42% of surveyed backyard poultry farms disposed 
poultry faeces and 60% dead poultry into garbage, and this practice was highly correlated with the 
Research question 2 (Chapter 4): What are the village and farm-level risk factors associated 
with avian influenza A (H5) and A (H9) seropositivity of backyard chicken farms in 
Bangladesh? 
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occurrence of H5N1 outbreaks. 
Trading practices, in particular visiting LBMs to purchase poultry for inclusion into backyard flocks 
and the purchase of poultry for household consumption were associated with increased odds of H5 
and H9 infection. Several studies have previously highlighted the role of LBMs and poultry trading 
practices as a source of AIV infection for chicken farms (Henning et al., 2019; Sealy et al., 2019; 
Turner et al., 2017). 
The free-roaming nature of raising backyard poultry means that there are frequent contacts between 
species, including chickens, domestic ducks, wild waterfowl and other domestic poultry and other 
animal species, increasing the likelihood of spreading AIV between infected reservoirs and 
susceptible birds (Gilbert et al., 2006; Henning et al., 2013; Henning et al., 2011; Henning et al., 
2010; Sarkar et al., 2017). Indeed, using the same equipment to feed multiple species of poultry, and 
the presence of migratory birds in villages were risk factors for H5 and/or H9 infection in the research 
studies reported in this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
Movements in and out farms, for instance, involving visitors, contractors, service personnel and farm 
workers are known to be a major route of AIV transmission between farms (Alexander, 1995; 
Duvauchelle et al., 2013; Henning et al., 2019; Kung et al., 2007; Scott et al., 2018). The research 
presented in this thesis, identified visits of other poultry farms by farm workers and movements of 
vehicles supplying production inputs or collecting waste as risk factors for H5 and/or H9 infection in 
broiler and/or layer farms. Other risk factors associated with H5 and H9 virus spread in layer farms 
were related to the following categories: (1) origin of production inputs, (2) stray dogs, (3) marketing 
practices, (4) cleaning practices and disposal of dead birds. 
It has been suggested that the risk of viral transmission may increases as the number of intermediaries 
involved in poultry production increases (FAO, 2011; Sims, 2007). This is supported by the findings 
of the risk factor studies reported in this thesis, where layer farms purchasing DOC or pullets directly 
Research question 3 (Chapter 5): What are the farm-level risk factors associated with avian 
influenza A (H5) and A (H9) seropositivity of commercial broiler and layer farms in 
Bangladesh? 
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from the hatcheries or breeding farms had lower odds of being H5 seropositive compared to farms 
purchasing DOC or pullets from FCDs or middlemen. 
Presence of stray dogs were associated with increased odds of H5 and H9 infection in layer farms, 
suggesting that domestic animal species other than poultry might also play a role in the transmission 
of AIVs (Amirsalehy et al., 2012;  Biswas et al. 2009b; Songserm et al., 2006). 
Regarding specific marketing practices, farms selling larger numbers of spent layers experienced 
higher odds of H9 infection than farms selling less spent layers. Sales of a large numbers of spent 
layers might involve multiple traders, with several vehicles visiting the farm premises, increasing the 
risk of introduction of AIVs into the farms. 
Layer farms of which the litter had not been changed during the production cycle were associated 
with higher odds of being seropositive for H9. Likewise, farms disposing dead birds by burying them 
near the premise had higher odds of being seropositive for H5, as observed in former studies 
(Busquets et al., 2010; Ritz, 2014).  
  
 
 
 
The decision-making process of farmers about the implementation of prevention and control 
measures differed according to the farming system in which they operated. These findings are 
consistent with other studies, e.g. Jemberu et al. (2015), who found that farmers’ perception towards 
implementation of FMD control measures varied by different cattle production systems (crop-
livestock, pastoral and market-oriented systems), for instance, most of the farmers of pastoral and 
market-oriented systems. 
While perceived barriers to the implementation of prevention and control measures (e.g. wearing 
protective equipment when handling chickens) refrained both broiler and backyard farmers to adopt 
interventions, perceived benefits of measures (e.g. maintaining high biosecurity to reduce the risk of 
birds becoming sick) strongly influenced broiler and layer farmers’, but not backyard farmers’ 
Research question 4 (Chapter 6): What drives or hinders backyard, commercial broiler and 
layer chicken farmers to implement HPAI prevention and control measures on their farms? 
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decisions.  Information provided on HPAI through media, meetings or via information campaigns 
played an important role in farmers’ decision making in all production systems (Toma et al., 2013). 
 
7.2 Significance of the research 
The co-circulation of HPAI H5N1 and LPAI H9N2 in Bangladesh has a severe impact on poultry 
production, and raises concerns that it could lead to re-assortments and the emergence of a new virus 
variant of significant public health concern (Marinova-Petkova et al., 2016; Parvin et al., 2018). In 
order to control and prevent the spread of H5N1 and H9N2 viruses, a detailed understanding of the 
factors influencing AIV epidemiology in farms is paramount. 
Unfortunately, previous research on AIV circulation in Bangladesh focussed predominately on LBMs 
(Kim et al., 2018; Sayeed et al., 2017), but rarely on poultry farms. The ease of sampling, as birds 
raised under different production systems are brought together in a single location at this markets, 
and the high expected prevalence of infection in marketed poultry, partly explains the preference for 
LBM research. In contrast, sampling of farmed poultry pose several challenges, including potential 
farmers’ reluctance to have their birds sampled (in particular the collection of blood) and the time 
and resources required to visit farms across large geographical areas. Furthermore, studies conducted 
on farms generally focused on only one production system (Biswas et al., 2009a; Khatun et al., 2013; 
Nooruddin et al., 2006), limiting the understanding of virus circulation across the whole domestic 
chicken population and did not describe the concurrent circulation of different virus subtypes. In 
addition, all studies aiming to assess risk factor for HPAI H5N1 infection in farms in Bangladesh 
were based on outbreak reports (Biswas et al., 2009b, 2011; Loth et al., 2010; Osmani et al., 2014) 
and once again, focussed only on one chicken production system. Finally, although biosecurity plays 
an important role in AI prevention (Conan et al., 2012), compliance with recommended biosecurity 
measures is often poor in HPAI-endemic countries like Bangladesh, (Conan et al., 2012; FAO, 2011, 
2013; Rimi et al., 2017) and no research has studied jointly risk factors for infection and farmers’ 
perceptions on implementing biosecurity measures.  
To address the aforementioned research gaps, this thesis includes four studies, presented in four 
research Chapters (Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5, Chapter 6):  
Chapter 3 concurrently researched endemicity of H5 and H9 viral circulation in different poultry 
production systems and different age groups of chickens. The results obtained provide a deeper 
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understanding of the patterns of H5 and H9 viral circulation in clinically healthy populations of 
backyard, commercial broiler and layer chickens. The research findings will also support the 
prioritisation of implementing control measures across chicken production systems, and do provide 
important parameters for mathematical models exploring the infection dynamics of AIVs in endemic 
settings. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 explored farm- and village-level risk factors associated with the H5 
and H9 serological status of backyard chicken farms and of commercial broiler and layer farms. The 
specific risk factors identified will guide policy makers to develop more specific and practical 
biosecurity measures aiming to mitigate the risk of AIV infection. Finally, Chapter 6 used the HBM 
framework to explored farmers’ perceptions on the implementation of HPAI prevention and control 
measures across all chicken farming systems (backyard, commercial broiler and layer chickens). 
Outcomes of this research can be used to tailor messages on HPAI control and prevention for different 
poultry farming groups by accounting for specific factors influencing their decision-making, instead 
of using one-size-fit-all communication approach. Overall, this thesis provides a comprehensive 
picture of the factors influencing the epidemiology of AIV across all chicken farming systems in 
Bangladesh, by describing AIV infection patterns, risk factors of infection, and farmer’s perceptions 
related to HPAI prevention and control. 
So what is the future for HPAI in Bangladesh? Will it be possible to further reduce AIV prevalence 
or even eradicate HAPI from Bangladesh? Unfortunately, Bangladesh is facing a number of 
ecological, climatic and economic challenges that make it difficult to control the spread of AIV. 
Bangladesh is located in a broad deltaic plain which is prone to frequent flooding of two major rivers, 
the Jamuna (Brahmaputra) and Padma (Ganges). These flood areas and the country’s shallow coastal 
waters attracts large populations of migratory birds, coming from Northern and Central Asia to 
overwinter in Bangladesh (Lepage, 2014), providing many opportunities for mingling of wild birds 
with domestic water birds. Furthermore chickens and ducks are often reared together on backyard 
farms (Alam et al., 2014), and left to scavenge for food during the day (Barua & Yoshimura, 1997), 
promoting contacts between domestic ducks and chickens with wild birds (Terregino et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, disease control activities are expensive and with a Gross Domestic Product of only 
274.0 billion US dollars (WB, 2019a), Bangladesh financial resources are limited to provide 
compensation to poultry farmers when infected flocks need to be culled, or to establish a national 
surveillance and reporting system for HPAI or even support disinfection or vaccination programs. 
Nevertheless, Bangladesh strongly supports collaborative research to identify solutions for AI control 
(UKRI, 2019). 
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Nevertheless, the research presented here identified some interesting infection patterns. 
“Traditionally”, if HPAI H5N1 virus is present, it would be expected to result in the death of all 
infected chickens, and, therefore, the absence of seropositive chickens which could have survived 
infection. Thus, the H5 antibodies detected in the research presented here may have been caused by 
a low pathogenic AIV strain, which would have then not resulted in the death of these chickens. 
Similarly, ducks could have been also infected with a LPAI H5 virus strain. Indeed, multiple H5 
strains have been identified on Bangladeshi LBMs (Yang et al., 2019) and might well be circulating 
on farms as well. Alternatively, the severity of an H5 infection may be reduced due to the 
development of cell-mediated host resistance (Wang et al., 2016) or through cross-protective 
immunity, resulting in the survival of the infected birds. Cross-protective immunity might have 
resulted from the co-circulation of H5 with H9 subtypes. A study conducted by Khalenkov, Perk, 
Panshin, Golender, and Webster (2009) found that 90%-100% chickens previously inoculated with 
H9N2 virus survived subsequent inoculation by HPAI H5N1 viruses 1 to 35 days later. This suggests 
that previous infection by H9N2 viruses, and one may speculate, by other AIVs, may confer cross-
immune protection against infection by HPAI H5N1 viruses. 
Furthermore, it has been speculated that local chicken breeds may be resistant to HPAI H5N1 
(GRAIN, 2006), pointing towards a genetic component of reduced host susceptibility. For example, 
a study conducted by Boonyanuwat, Thummabutra, Sookmanee, Vatchavalkhu, and Siripholvat 
(2006) suggested that the B21 haplotype in the major histocompatibility complex (MHC) class I 
molecule may explain the survival of some Thai indigenous breed chickens during an HPAI H5N1 
outbreak. However, evidence supporting this hypothesis is limited, with experimental trials 
highlighting that B21 induced only partial protection against H5N1 (Hunt, Jadhao, & Swayne, 2010).  
Considering the biological and evolutionary changes that come with AIV being endemic in 
Bangladesh, the potential natural reservoir for AIV in the specific ecological environment of 
Bangladesh, and the complex poultry production and marketing system, inadequate veterinary 
capacity, and farmers’ unwillingness to report outbreaks to the authorities in Bangladesh (Rimi et al., 
2019), raises the question if AI might remain an endemic poultry disease among others, such as 
Newcastle Disease, in Bangladesh with poultry producers needing to learn or already learning “how 
to live with it” (Spradbrow, 1996). 
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7.3 Recommendations for AI control in Bangladesh 
 
The specific recommendations provided in individual Chapters 3-6 could guide policy makers to 
modify current or develop new approaches to control and prevent AIV spread in Bangladesh. In the 
following, further advice on integrating specific suggestions in an overarching policy framework are 
provided. 
 
Firstly, the current AI vaccination program of Bangladesh mostly focus on hatcheries, breeder and 
commercial layer farms. While including broiler farms in the vaccination program could be 
epidemiologically relevant, the cost of the vaccine might refrain farmers from vaccinating their birds. 
Hence, the Government of Bangladesh could provide incentives or motivate broiler farmers to join 
such a vaccination program. 
 
Secondly, although some recommendations need to be tailored to specific production types, others 
can be communicated to all types of poultry producers. For example, while backyard farmers should 
be encouraged to not pile up garbage around poultry houses and discouraged to purchase DOCs and 
pullets from “unreliable” neighbouring backyard farms or markets, commercial farms should have 
facilities for changing clothes and footwear before entering or leaving the farm as well as footbaths 
and facilities to wash hands. However, across all production types, risk factors for AIV spread relating 
to marketing and contact patterns were identified, highlighting the need for a system approach that 
not just focusses on the point of production or point of sale, but includes all linkages and networks 
where AIV could multiply across the poultry chain.  
 
Similarly, messages on HPAI control and prevention for different poultry farming groups have to 
account for their different decision-making process. For example, while barriers to implement control 
measures were important for broiler and backyard farmers, benefits of control measures were only 
important for commercial farmers. On the other hand, the willingness of farmers to learn more about 
biosecurity and HPAI control and the impact of education programs on farmers’ perceptions was 
present across all production systems. 
 
Most importantly, this PhD research has already made some impact by 1) providing advice to two 
Chatham House roundtable policy discussions on AI prevention in Bangladesh (ChatamHouse, 2018; 
ChathamHouse, 2016; Chattopadhyay et al., 2018), 2) guiding the development of the current 
multidisciplinary GCRF One Health Poultry Hub project (UKRI, 2019), and 3) by informing a multi-
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country FAO expert discussion on HPAI in endemically infected countries on the research presented 
in this thesis (FAO, 2019a). Last but not least, we are proud that we chose a truly participatory 
approach and provided detailed feedback on our research outcomes to all farmers involved in the 
research. Thus, we provided a certificate summarizing the test results obtained on each farm and 
information leaflet providing specific recommendations based on our study results to all farmers that 
were part of this research. 
 
7.4 Limitations of the research and recommendations for future investigations 
 
The research presented here had a number of limitations.  
Firstly, some questions posed to farmers required recall of information. However, recall bias was 
limited by interviewing the person who actually worked with the poultry flocks and by taking care of 
the way the questions were asked. For example, farmers might have not remembered details of an 
outbreak (number of birds that died, dates of the outbreak etc.), but they would certainly remembered 
an outbreak occurrence as they are excellent in monitoring the health of their birds (Katcher & Beck, 
1987). Thus the questions asked in the cross-sectional survey focussed not on the number of 
mortalities, but on the existence of mortality events or events with clinical symptoms typical of AIV 
infection over the past 12 months. Similarly, dichotomised or ordinal responses were requested when 
information about marketing and production of chickens was collected.  
Secondly, some farmers were unable to provide detailed information on AI vaccinations (i.e. dates of 
vaccinations, name of AI vaccine used), as written records are rarely made by farmers. Therefore is 
was not possible to explore the association between antibody titres and the dates of vaccination. 
However, farmers were able to specify if birds were vaccinated in the past 12 months and this was 
considered in the data analysis. Nevertheless, only a small group of layer farmers vaccinated actually 
vaccinated against AI. 
Thirdly, the antigen used in the HI test might have impacted on the serological results. The HI test is 
considered as a ‘gold standard’ for AI antibody subtyping because of its very high sensitivity (98·8%) 
and specificity (99·5%), and it is recommended by both EU and OIE for subtype specific AI diagnosis 
(Comin et al., 2013). However, the performance of HI tests might depend on the use of the country 
specific antigen. In the research presented here, the antigen used was prepared from field virus 
isolated from different countries. However, a study conducted by Yamamoto et al. (2007) estimated 
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that the sensitivity and specificity of the HI test were 99% and 90% respectively, even when different 
antigens were used, thus highlighting that number of potentially false positives will be minimal.  
Fourthly, due to the cross-sectional nature of the study, it was not possible to describe detailed 
seasonal variations, for example, in regards to the number of chickens reared or sold per month. 
However, by including some questions about general seasonal patterns, it was possible to include 
these variables in the risk factor analysis. Nevertheless, a year-long longitudinal study with monthly 
or bi-monthly data collection would be recommended. 
 
Fifthly, although causal relationships between perceptions and the implementation of HPAI 
preventive measures were hypothesized, validating these presumed causal relationships was not 
possible in the used cross-sectional study design. Furthermore, the HBM framework used in this 
research paid more attention to the subjective state of an individual rather than other contextual 
factors, such as social acceptability, which would need to be explored through more qualitative 
approaches.  
Finally, although separate risk factor analyses were conducted for H5 and H9 seroprevalence, 
commonalities in risk factors were identified (for example, risk factors related to environmental or 
ecological features, trading practices, poultry movements and sources of the Day Old Chicks, pullets 
and feed) indicting likely similar transmission dynamics for both viruses. Nevertheless, certain farm 
management practices might be associated with a higher probability of either H5 or H9 infection, but 
this could not be confirmed with the study design used.   
Future research could explore in a longitudinal framework the continuing implementation of HPAI 
prevention and control measures by farmers and their direct impact on AIV circulation. Alternatively, 
data of the research presented here could be used to generate a follow-up study by revisiting farms 
and exploring in separated datasets whether farmers’ perceptions and attitudes were predictors of the 
seropositivity status of their flocks, and of the management practices reported by them.  
 
Furthermore, the research presented here estimated that the exposure of broiler chickens to AIVs was 
comparable to layer farms, suggesting that broiler farms may play a substantial role in the spread of 
AIVs, and consequently that broiler farms may need to be considered in AI vaccination program. A 
detailed cost-benefit analysis of the feasibility of AI vaccination in broiler chicken farms would be 
highly recommended.  
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In Bangladesh, most of the molecular studies on H9 relied on LBM sampling (Negovetich et al., 2011; 
Turner et al., 2017). However, the H9 virus isolated from farms in this research could be further 
processed for sequencing and might provide further insights into the molecular evolution of LPAI 
viruses across different chicken production systems in Bangladesh. 
Finally, mathematical transmission modelling, value chain analysis and risk based mapping could be 
additional studies that could be conducted and informed by the data generated in the thesis. 
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Appendix 1: Supplementary Table 1: Descriptive statistics of original responses collected from backyard chicken farmers  
SD= Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, N= Neither agree nor disagree, DK= Do not Know, A=Agree, SA= Strongly Agree 
Perceived susceptibility  
 
  
SD D N  DK A SA  
%(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) 
My chickens have an increased risk of getting avian influenza/bird flu 
When I  rear different species of poultry together(PSus1) 13.2(19) 16.0(23) 1.4(2) 15.3(22) 17.4(25) 36.8(53) 
When I keep chickens and ducks in the same house(PSus2) 13.2(19) 15.3(22) 1.4(2) 11.8(17) 22.2(32) 36.1(52) 
When I don’t regularly clean poultry house/equipment(PSus3) 4.2(6) 9.7(14) 0.0(0) 4.2(6) 30.6(44) 51.4(74) 
When my chickens mix with neighbour sick poultry during 
scavenging(PSus4) 1.4(2) 4.2(6) 2.1(3) 0.0(0) 37.5(54) 54.9(79) 
When my chickens mix with wild birds(PSus5) 14.5(21) 6.3(9) 0.0(0) 24.3(35) 27.1(39) 27.8(40) 
When my family members or I bring back unsold poultry from LBM & put 
together with other poultry(PSus6) 4.9(7) 4.9(7) 0.0(0) 5.6(8) 27.8(40) 56.9(82) 
I am at increased risk of getting avian influenza/bird flu 
Because of my poultry rearing(PSus7) 19.4(28) 20.1(29) 0.0(0) 34.0(49) 15.3(22) 11.1(16) 
When I handle sick poultry(PSus8) 19.4(28) 18.1(26) 0.0(0) 34.0(49) 13.9(20) 14.6(21) 
When I don’t cover my mouth and nose with cloths during handling 
poultry(PSus9) 16.7(24) 17.4(25) 0.0(0) 31.9(46) 14.6(21) 19.4(28) 
When I don’t wash my hands with soap water after handling 
poultry(PSus10) 16.0(23) 17.4(25) 0.7(1) 31.9(46) 13.2(19) 20.8(30) 
My family members are at increased risk of getting avian influenza/bird flu 
Because of my poultry rearing(PSus11) 22.9(33) 18.8(27) 0.0(0) 33.3(48) 13.9(20) 11.1(16) 
Uncooked poultry meat doesn’t pose risk for getting avian influenza/bird 
flu(PSus12) 31.3(45) 17.4(25) 1.4(2) 21.5(31) 22.9(33) 5.6(8) 
Perceived severity 
If my chickens get sick from avian influenza/bird flu 
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SD D N  DK A SA  
%(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) 
Then the illness would be very bad, and the chickens will most likely 
die(PSev1) 0.7(1) 2.8(4) 0.0(0) 0.7(1) 39.6(57) 56.3(81) 
Then avian influenza/bird flu could be passed to other poultry in my 
locality(PSev2) 0.0(0) 0.7(1) 0.0(0) 1.4(2) 43.8(63) 54.2(78) 
Then avian influenza/bird flu could be passed on to me(PSev3) 18.8(27) 18.1(26) 0.0(0) 33.3(48) 13.9(20) 16.0(23) 
If my chickens get sick and die from avian influenza/bird flu 
Then I will lose income and family consumption(PSev4) 1.4(2) 1.4(2) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 44.4(64) 52.8(76) 
If I get sick from avian influenza/bird flu 
Then other members in my home will get sick(PSev5) 20.8(30) 19.4(28) 0.0(0) 33.3(48) 13.2(19) 13.2(19) 
Then I will die(PSev6) 27.1(39) 18.8(27) 1.4(2) 39.6(57) 7.6(11) 5.6(8) 
If my family members get sick from avian influenza/bird flu 
Then they will die(PSev7) 27.8(40) 18.8(27) 1.4(2) 39.6(57) 9.0(13) 3.5(5) 
Chickens that catch avian influenza/bird flu cannot be treated( PSev8) 37.5(54) 11.1(16) 4.2(6) 21.5(31) 15.3(22) 10.4(15) 
Perceived benefits 
My chickens will not get sick from avian influenza/bird flu 
If I don’t rear different species of poultry together(PBen1) 13.2(19) 16.0(23) 1.4(2) 15.3(22) 17.4(25) 36.8(53) 
If I don’t keep chickens and ducks together in same house(PBen2) 13.2(19) 15.3(22) 1.4(2) 11.8(17) 22.2(32) 36.1(52) 
If  I regularly clean poultry house/equipment(PBen3) 4.2(6) 9.7(14) 0.0(0) 4.2(6) 30.6(44) 51.4(74) 
If my family members or I don’t bring unsold poultry from LBM/don’t put 
unsold poultry with other poultry after bring back from LBM(PBen4) 4.9(7) 4.9(7) 0.0(0) 5.6(8) 27.1(39) 57.6(83) 
If  my chickens will not get sick from avian influenza/bird flu 
I will not lose income and family consumption(PBen5) 1.4(2) 1.4(2) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 44.4(64) 52.8(76) 
The possibility of disease outbreaks in my locality will reduce(PBen6) 0.7(1) 0.7(1) 0.0(0) 1.4(2) 43.1(62) 54.2(78) 
My family members and I will not get sick from avian influenza/bird 
flu(PBen7) 18.8(27) 18.8(27) 0.0(0) 34.0(49) 13.9(20) 14.6(21) 
Perceived barriers 
Construction of separate house to keep chickens and ducks separately is 
expensive and required more spaces which I don’t have ( PBar1) 13.2(19) 16.0(23) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 36.8(53) 34.0(49) 
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SD D N  DK A SA  
%(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) 
It’s not worth to protect my chickens from avian influenza/bird flu, because 
I don’t earn sufficient money from rearing chickens (PBar2) 52.1(75) 37.5(54) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 9.0(13) 1.4(2) 
Regular cleaning of poultry house/equipment is time consuming and not 
practical for me, because my family/I have to do many other things (PBar3) 40.3(58) 35.4(51) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 21.5(31) 2.8(4) 
Washing hands before and after handling poultry is not practical for me, 
because my family/I have to do many other things ( PBar4) 38.9(56) 28.5(41) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 28.5(41) 4.2(6) 
I can’t cover my mouth and nose with cloths during handling chickens, 
because they are not conducive for work (PBar5) 37.5(54) 25.0(36) 2.8(4) 1.4(2) 29.9(43) 3.5(5) 
I don’t cover my mouth and nose with cloths during handling chickens,  
because my neighbour do not (PBar6) 37.5(54) 32.6(47) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 25.7(37) 4.2(6) 
Cues to action 
I would receive training regarding avian influenza/bird flu prevention & 
control and other aspects of poultry rearing, if DLS or any other organization 
would provide it ( Cue1) 2.8(4) 9.0(13) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 36.1(52) 52.1(75) 
If I 
Find a program on TV about avian influenza/bird flu and other aspects of 
poultry rearing, then I would watch it(Cue2) 1.4(2) 2.8(4) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 38.2(55) 57.6(83) 
Find a program on the radio about avian influenza/bird flu and other aspects 
of poultry rearing, then I would listen to it(Cue3) 1.4(2) 2.8(4) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 38.9(56) 56.9(82) 
Get invited to a meeting or campaign, etc. about avian influenza/bird flu and 
other aspects of poultry rearing, then I would attend it(Cue4) 2.1(3) 6.9(10) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 41.0(59) 50.0(72) 
It is a good idea for me to talk 
With local livestock related personnel about risks of avian influenza/bird flu 
disease transmission between chickens(Cue5) 0.7(1) 5.6(8) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 53.5(77) 40.3(58) 
With community health workers or nearby hospital doctor about risks of 
disease transmission between chickens and humans(Cue6) 3.5(5) 5.6(8) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 46.5(67) 44.4(64) 
Self-efficacy 
It is a good idea 
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SD D N  DK A SA  
%(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) 
To invest in separate houses for chicken and duck(SEff1) 1.4(2) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 43.8(63) 54.9(79) 
To clean poultry house/equipment regularly(SEff2) 0.0(0) 1.4(2) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 41.7(60) 56.9(82) 
I would be able to identify signs of the disease, if my chickens were 
infected with avian influenza/bird flu(SEff3) 0.7(1) 0.7(1) 0.7(1) 0.0(0) 46.5(67) 51.4(74) 
I will inform the local livestock related personnel, when I suspect that my 
chickens have avian influenza/bird flu (SEff4) 1.4(2) 1.4(2) 0.7(1) 0.0(0) 49.3(71) 47.2(68) 
I could 
Dispose dead birds properly(bury them)( SEff5) 0.7(1) 1.4(2) 1.4(2) 0.0(0) 39.6(57) 56.9(82) 
Cover my mouth and  nose with cloths during handling poultry, even if my 
neighbours are not(SEff6) 0.7(1) 0.7(1) 0.7(1) 0.7(1) 46.5(67) 50.7(73) 
Wash my hands with soap before and after handling poultry, even if my 
neighbours are not( SEff7) 1.4(2) 0.0(0) 0.7(1) 0.7(1) 46.5(67) 50.7(73) 
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Appendix 2: Supplementary Table 2: Descriptive statistics of original responses collected from commercial broiler chicken farmers 
SD= Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, N= Neither agree nor disagree, DK= Do not Know, A=Agree, SA= Strongly Agree 
Perceived susceptibility 
 
  
SD D N  DK A SA  
%(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) 
My chickens have an increased risk of getting avian influenza/bird flu 
When I don’t vaccinate them (PSus1) 2.8(3) 7.6(8) 0.9(1) 5.7(6) 34.0(36) 49.1(52) 
When I don’t restrict who comes onto my farm(PSus2) 0.9(1) 8.5(9) 0.9(1) 0.0(0) 35.9(38) 53.8(57) 
When I don’t regularly clean and disinfect my farm and farm 
equipment(PSus3) 0.0(0) 4.7(5) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 31.1(33) 64.2(68) 
When I don’t control wild birds/backyard poultry from entering into my 
poultry shed/house(PSus4) 0.0(0) 5.7(6) 0.0(0) 1.9(2) 28.3(30) 64.2(68) 
When my workers don’t wash their hands/feet/change clothes before 
entering poultry shed/house(PSus5) 0.0(0) 5.7(6) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 27.4(29) 66.0(70) 
When I don’t clean and disinfect vehicles, egg trays, cages, de-beaking 
machine, vaccination gun, etc. before entering into my farm(PSus6) 0.0(0) 4.7(5) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 33.0(35) 62.3(66) 
I am at increased risk of getting avian influenza/bird flu 
Because of my poultry business(PSus7) 7.6(8) 17.9(19) 0.0(0) 23.6(25) 34.0(36) 17.0(18) 
When I don’t wear protective equipment (mask, gloves, dedicated 
sandals/shoes, apron, etc.) during handling chickens(PSus8) 0.9(1) 13.2(14) 0.0(0) 18.9(20) 36.8(39) 30.2(32) 
When I don’t wash my hands with soap water after handling 
chickens(PSus9) 0.9(1) 13.2(14) 0.0(0) 18.9(20) 31.1(33) 35.9(38) 
My family members are at increased risk of getting avian influenza/bird flu 
Because of my poultry business(PSus10) 9.4(10) 21.7(23) 0.0(0) 22.6(24) 28.3(30) 17.9(19) 
Uncooked poultry meat doesn’t pose risk for getting avian influenza/bird 
flu(PSus11) 31.1(33) 47.2(50) 0.9(1) 10.4(11) 7.6(8) 2.8(3) 
Perceived severity 
If my chickens get sick from avian influenza/bird flu 
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SD D N  DK A SA  
%(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) 
Then the illness would be very bad, and the chickens will most likely 
die(PSev1) 0.0(0) 6.6(7) 0.0(0) 5.7(6) 35.9(38) 51.9(55) 
Then avian influenza could be passed to other poultry farms in my 
locality(PSev2) 0.0(0) 3.8(4) 0.0(0) 6.6(7) 30.2(32) 59.4(63) 
Then avian influenza could be passed on to me(PSev3) 5.7(6) 12.3(13) 0.0(0) 23.6(25) 34.9(37) 23.6(25) 
If my chickens get sick and die from avian influenza/bird flu 
Then I will lose income (PSev4) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 0.0(0) 2.8(3) 14.2(15) 82.1(87) 
If I get sick from avian influenza/bird flu 
Then other members in my family will get sick(PSev5) 8.5(9) 22.6(24) 0.0(0) 22.6(24) 33.0(35) 13.2(14) 
Then I will die(PSev6) 17.9(19) 24.5(26) 1.9(2) 31.1(33) 18.9(20) 5.7(6) 
If my family members get sick from avian influenza/bird flu 
Then they will die(PSev7) 17.9(19) 23.6(25) 1.9(2) 32.1(34) 18.9(20) 5.7(6) 
Chickens that catch avian influenza/bird flu cannot be treated( PSev8) 9.4(10) 50.0(53) 0.0(0) 7.6(8) 19.8(21) 13.2(14) 
Perceived benefits 
If I maintain biosecurity(proper prevention & control measures) in my poultry farm, then my chickens will : 
Not get sick from avian influenza, and I will not lose income(PBen1) 0.0(0) 5.7(6) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 26.4(28) 67.0(71) 
Not get sick from avian influenza and the possibility of disease outbreaks in 
my locality will reduce(PBen2) 0.0(0) 7.6(8) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 24.5(26) 67.9(72) 
Not get sick from AI as well as my family members and I will not get sick 
from AI(PBen3) 0.0(0) 8.5(9) 0.0(0) 5.7(6) 28.3(30) 57.6(61) 
If my chickens receive avian influenza vaccine, then they will not get sick :  
And die and I will not lose income(PBen4) 0.0(0) 6.6(7) 0.0(0) 1.9(2) 22.6(24) 68.9(73) 
And the possibility of disease outbreaks in my locality will reduce(PBen5) 0.0(0) 9.4(10) 0.0(0) 1.9(2) 27.4(29) 61.3(65) 
From AI as well as my family members and I will not get sick from 
AI(PBen6) 1.9(2) 14.2(15) 0.0(0) 9.4(10) 33.0(35) 41.5(44) 
Perceived barriers 
Maintaining biosecurity (proper prevention & control measures) is expensive 
( PBar1) 41.5(44) 19.8(21) 0.0(0) 1.9(2) 32.1(34) 4.7(5) 
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SD D N  DK A SA  
%(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) 
Vaccination of chickens for avian influenza is expensive (PBar2) 36.8(39) 21.7(23) 0.0(0) 16.0(17) 21.7(23) 3.8(4) 
There is a shortage of quality avian influenza vaccine for chickens in 
Bangladesh (PBar3) 1.9(2) 23.6(25) 1.9(2) 46.2(49) 24.5(26) 1.9(2) 
Vaccine can’t protect chickens from getting avian influenza ( PBar4) 3.8(4) 44.3(47) 0.0(0) 17.9(19) 27.4(29) 6.6(7) 
My chickens may get sick from the avian influenza vaccine (PBar5) 8.5(9) 17.9(19) 0.0(0) 12.3(13) 57.6(61) 3.8(4) 
Cooking meat thoroughly takes so much time (PBar6) 42.5(45) 50.0(53) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 5.7(6) 1.9(2) 
Washing hands all the time is not practical for me, because I have to do many 
other things(PBar7) 64.2(68) 24.5(26) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 10.4(11) 0.9(1) 
My neighbouring farmer doesn’t use avian influenza vaccine, so I don’t use 
avian influenza vaccine(PBar8) 67.0(71) 22.6(24) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 8.5(9) 1.9(2) 
I can’t wear protective gear, because they are not conducive for work(PBar9) 68.8(73) 23.6(25) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 6.6(7) 0.9(1) 
I don’t wear protective gear because my neighbouring poultry farmers do 
not(PBar10) 72.6(77) 18.9(20) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 6.6(7) 1.9(2) 
Cues to action 
I would receive training regarding avian influenza prevention and control, if 
DLS or any other organization would provide it( Cue1) 0.9(1) 3.8(4) 0.9(1) 0.0(0) 14.2(15) 80.2(85) 
If I 
 See an article in a newspaper about avian influenza, then I would read 
it(Cue2) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 14.2(15) 84.9(90) 
Find a program on TV about avian influenza, then I would watch it(Cue3) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 15.1(16) 84.0(89) 
Find a program on the radio about avian influenza, then I would listen to 
it(Cue4) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 14.2(15) 84.9(90) 
 Find information about avian influenza – leaflet/brochure/billboard, etc., 
then I would read it(Cue5) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 16.0(17) 83.0(88) 
Get invited to a meeting or campaign, etc. about avian influenza, then I 
would attend it(Cue6) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 15.1(16) 84.9(90) 
It is a good idea for me to talk 
With local livestock officers about risks of avian influenza disease 
transmission between birds(Cue7) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 16.0(17) 83.0(88) 
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SD D N  DK A SA  
%(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) 
  With my family doctor about risks of disease transmission between birds 
and humans(Cue8) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 20.8(22) 77.4(82) 
Self-efficacy 
It is a good idea 
To invest in biosecurity (proper prevention & control measures)  at my 
farm(SEff1) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 23.6(25) 76.4(81) 
To invest in avian influenza vaccination of my chickens(SEff2) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 24.5(26) 74.5(79) 
I would be able to identify signs of the disease, if my chickens were infected 
with avian influenza(SEff3) 7.6(8) 10.4(11) 4.7(5) 9.4(10) 27.4(29) 40.6(43) 
I will inform the local livestock office, when I suspect that my chickens 
have avian influenza (SEff4) 0.9(1) 2.8(3) 10.4(11) 2.8(3) 35.9(38) 47.2(50) 
I could 
Dispose dead birds/litter/waste  properly( SEff5) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 23.6(25) 76.4(81) 
Clean & disinfect poultry house/equipment regularly(SEff6) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 25.5(27) 74.5(79) 
Wear protective gear, even if my neighbouring poultry farmers are not 
( SEff7) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 31.1(33) 68.9(73) 
Wash my hands with soap before and after handling chickens even if my 
neighbouring poultry farmers are not(SEff8) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 25.5(27) 73.6(78) 
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Appendix 3: Supplementary Table 3: Descriptive statistics of original responses collected from commercial layer chicken farmers 
SD= Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, N= Neither agree nor disagree, DK= Do not Know, A=Agree, SA= Strongly Agree 
 
Perceived susceptibility 
  
  
SD D N  DK A SA  
%(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) 
My chickens have an increased risk of getting avian influenza/bird flu 
When I don’t vaccinate them (PSus1) 0.9(1) 6.2(7) 0.9(1) 2.7(3) 42.5(48) 46.9(53) 
When I don’t restrict who comes onto my farm(PSus2) 0.0(0) 2.7(3) 0.0(0) 1.8(2) 36.3(41) 59.3(67) 
When I don’t regularly clean and disinfect my farm and farm 
equipment(PSus3) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 33.6(38) 64.6(73) 
When I don’t control wild birds/backyard poultry from entering into my 
poultry shed/house(PSus4) 0.0(0) 1.8(2) 0.0(0) 1.8(2) 34.5(39) 62.0(70) 
When my workers don’t wash their hands/feet/change clothes before 
entering poultry shed/house(PSus5) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 0.0(0) 2.7(3) 32.7(37) 63.7(72) 
When I don’t clean and disinfect vehicles, egg trays, cages, de-beaking 
machine, vaccination gun, etc. before entering into my farm(PSus6) 0.0(0) 2.7(3) 0.0(0) 1.8(2) 31.0(35) 64.6(73) 
I am at increased risk of getting avian influenza/bird flu 
Because of my poultry business(PSus7) 9.7(11) 14.2(16) 0.9(1) 23.0(26) 32.7(37) 19.5(22) 
When I don’t wear protective equipment (mask, gloves, dedicated 
sandals/shoes, apron, etc.) during handling chickens(PSus8) 1.8(2) 9.7(11) 0.0(0) 17.7(20) 42.5(48) 28.3(32) 
When I don’t wash my hands with soap water after handling 
chickens(PSus9) 0.9(1) 9.7(11) 0.0(0) 17.7(20) 26.6(30) 45.1(51) 
My family members are at increased risk of getting avian influenza/bird flu 
Because of my poultry business(PSus10) 12.4(14) 23.0(26) 0.9(1) 24.8(28) 26.6(30) 12.4(14) 
Uncooked poultry meat doesn’t pose risk for getting avian influenza/bird 
flu(PSus11) 29.2(33) 47.8(54) 0.0(0) 13.3(15) 8.0(9) 1.8(2) 
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SD D N  DK A SA  
%(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) 
Perceived severity 
If my chickens get sick from avian influenza/bird flu 
Then the illness would be very bad, and the chickens will most likely 
die(PSev1) 0.0(0) 5.3(6) 0.0(0) 10.6(12) 42.5(48) 41.6(47) 
Then avian influenza could be passed to other poultry farms in my 
locality(PSev2) 0.0(0) 4.4(5) 0.0(0) 9.7(11) 34.5(39) 51.3(58) 
Then avian influenza could be passed on to me(PSev3) 7.1(8) 11.5(13) 0.0(0) 24.8(28) 29.2(33) 27.4(31) 
If my chickens get sick and die from avian influenza/bird flu 
Then I will lose income (PSev4) 0.0(0) 2.7(3) 0.0(0) 4.4(5) 15.0(17) 77.9(88) 
If I get sick from avian influenza/bird flu 
Then other members in my family will get sick(PSev5) 11.5(13) 23.0(26) 0.9(1) 23.9(27) 22.1(25) 18.6(21) 
Then I will die(PSev6) 18.6(21) 29.2(33) 2.7(3) 31.0(35) 14.2(16) 4.4(5) 
If my family members get sick from avian influenza/bird flu 
Then they will die(PSev7) 17.7(20) 29.2(33) 2.7(3) 31.9(36) 14.2(16) 4.4(5) 
Chickens that catch avian influenza/bird flu cannot be treated( PSev8) 10.6(12) 49.6(56) 0.0(0) 8.9(10) 18.6(21) 12.4(14) 
Perceived benefits 
If I maintain biosecurity(proper prevention & control measures) in my poultry farm, then my chickens will : 
Not get sick from avian influenza, and I will not lose income(PBen1) 0.0(0) 6.2(7) 0.0(0) 1.8(2) 28.3(32) 63.7(72) 
Not get sick from avian influenza and the possibility of disease outbreaks in 
my locality will reduce(PBen2) 0.9(1) 8.0(9) 0.0(0) 2.7(3) 24.8(28) 63.7(72) 
Not get sick from AI as well as my family members and I will not get sick 
from AI(PBen3) 0.9(1) 15.0(17) 0.9(1) 2.7(3) 23.0(26) 57.5(65) 
If my chickens receive avian influenza vaccine, then they will not get sick :  
And die and I will not lose income(PBen4) 0.9(1) 7.1(8) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 24.8(28) 66.4(75) 
And the possibility of disease outbreaks in my locality will reduce(PBen5) 1.8(2) 7.1(8) 0.9(1) 0.9(1) 25.7(29) 63.7(72) 
From AI as well as my family members and I will not get sick from 
AI(PBen6) 3.5(4) 12.4(14) 0.9(1) 6.2(7) 33.6(38) 43.4(49) 
Perceived barriers 
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SD D N  DK A SA  
%(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) 
Maintaining biosecurity (proper prevention & control measures) is expensive 
( PBar1) 36.3(41) 24.8(28) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 30.1(34) 8.9(10) 
Vaccination of chickens for avian influenza is expensive (PBar2) 31.0(35) 20.4(23) 0.9(1) 12.4(14) 27.4(31) 8.0(9) 
There is a shortage of quality avian influenza vaccine for chickens in 
Bangladesh (PBar3) 0.9(1) 21.2(24) 0.9(1) 38.9(44) 31.9(36) 6.2(7) 
Vaccine can’t protect chickens from getting avian influenza ( PBar4) 3.5(4) 42.5(48) 1.8(2) 8.0(9) 31.9(36) 12.4(14) 
My chickens may get sick from the avian influenza vaccine (PBar5) 6.2(7) 18.6(21) 0.9(1) 8.9(10) 60.2(68) 5.3(6) 
Cooking meat thoroughly takes so much time (PBar6) 34.5(39) 59.3(67) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 5.3(6) 0.9(1) 
Washing hands all the time is not practical for me, because I have to do many 
other things(PBar7)  62.0(70) 25.7(29) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 12.4(14) 0.0(0) 
My neighbouring farmer doesn’t use avian influenza vaccine, so I don’t use 
avian influenza vaccine(PBar8) 62.8(71) 28.3(32) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 8.9(10) 0.0(0) 
I can’t wear protective gear, because they are not conducive for work(PBar9) 66.4(75) 23.9(27) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 9.7(11) 0.0(0) 
I don’t wear protective gear because my neighbouring poultry farmers do 
not(PBar10) 65.5(74) 28.3(32) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 5.3(6) 0.9(1) 
Cues to action 
I would receive training regarding avian influenza prevention and control, if 
DLS or any other organization would provide it( Cue1) 0.0(0) 10.6(12) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 19.5(22) 69.9(79) 
If I 
 See an article in a newspaper about avian influenza, then I would read 
it(Cue2) 0.0(0) 3.5(4) 0.9(1) 1.8(2) 20.4(23) 73.5(83) 
Find a program on TV about avian influenza, then I would watch it(Cue3) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 23.9(27) 75.2(85) 
Find a program on the radio about avian influenza, then I would listen to 
it(Cue4) 0.0(0) 1.8(2) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 23.01(26) 75.2(85) 
 Find information about avian influenza – leaflet/brochure/billboard, etc., 
then I would read it(Cue5) 0.0(0) 2.7(3) 0.9(1) 1.8(2) 20.4(23) 74.3(84) 
Get invited to a meeting or campaign, etc. about avian influenza, then I 
would attend it(Cue6) 0.0(0) 1.8(2) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 23.9(27) 73.5(83) 
It is a good idea for me to talk 
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SD D N  DK A SA  
%(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) %(n) 
With local livestock officers about risks of avian influenza disease 
transmission between birds(Cue7) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 0.0(0) 28.3(32) 70.8(80) 
  With my family doctor about risks of disease transmission between birds 
and humans(Cue8) 0.9(1) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 34.5(39) 64.6(73) 
Self-efficacy 
It is a good idea 
To invest in biosecurity (proper prevention & control measures)  at my 
farm(SEff1) 0.9(1) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 32.7(37) 66.4(75) 
To invest in avian influenza vaccination of my chickens(SEff2) 0.9(1) 0.9(1) 0.0(0) 0.9(1) 31.9(36) 65.5(74) 
I would be able to identify signs of the disease, if my chickens were 
infected with avian influenza(SEff3) 10.6(12) 4.4(5) 0.9(1) 5.3(6) 40.7(46) 38.1(43) 
I will inform the local livestock office, when I suspect that my chickens 
have avian influenza (SEff4) 0.0(0) 6.2(7) 3.5(4) 3.5(4) 45.1(51) 41.6(47) 
I could 
Dispose dead birds/litter/waste  properly( SEff5) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 31.0(35) 69.0(78) 
Clean & disinfect poultry house/equipment regularly(SEff6) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 34.5(39) 65.5(74) 
Wear protective gear, even if my neighbouring poultry farmers are not( 
SEff7) 0.9(1) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 35.4(40) 63.7(72) 
Wash my hands with soap before and after handling chickens even if my 
neighbouring poultry farmers are not(SEff8) 0.9(1) 0.9(1) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 33.6(38) 64.6(73) 
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Appendix 4: Supplementary Figure 1: Conceptualization of a Structural Equation Model using the 
Health Belief Model framework to explore drivers influencing backyard chicken farmers’ decision to 
implement Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza control and prevention measures 
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Appendix 5: Supplementary Figure 2: Conceptualization of a Structural Equation Model using the 
Health Belief Model framework to explore drivers influencing commercial broiler farmers’ decision 
to implement Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza control and prevention measures 
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Appendix 6: Supplementary Figure 3: Conceptualization of a Structural Equation Model using the 
Health Belief Model framework to explore drivers influencing commercial layer farmers’ decision to 
implement Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza control and prevention measures 
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Appendix 7:  Human Ethical approval by Behavioural & Social sciences Ethical review committee 
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Appendix 8: Animal Ethical approval by Animal Welfare Unit, UQ Research and Innovation, The 
University of Queensland. 
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Appendix 9: Questionnaire used to collect information on backyards farms 
                                           
1Form ID:  Serial no. (continuous)/BQ/village code e.g. 01/BQ/COX01  
 PART 1: INTERVIEWEE DETAILS AND FARM LOCATIONS 
 
[Tick appropriate box(s) or write in the blank space/cell as appropriate] 
 
Interview details 
 
 
1.Date of interview: ________/________/2016 
 
2.Form ID1:        ........../BQ/COX....... 
 
Details of the interviewee 
 
3.Position of the interviewee in household(NB: Please select the person as  interviewee who actually deal with poultry):  
    1=  Farm owner        2= Son of the owner        3= Daughter of the owner         4= Spouse of the owner 
    5=Other(specify)............. 
 
4.Name: 
 
5.Age: ....................Years........................Months  
6.Gender:   1= Male         2= Female         
7.Educational qualification:  
    1= Illiterate        2= Primary        3= Secondary        4= Higher Secondary   5= Tertiary (i.e. graduate & above )   
    6=Other (specify)............. 
 
8.Marital status:  1=Single/Never married  2=Married   3=Divorced/Separated  4=Widowed   5=Don’t response 
 
9.Religion:   1=Muslim     2=Hindu     3= Buddhist  4= Christian   5=Don’t response 
 
10. How long have you been in poultry farming?............................................................. 
 
11. Mobile number(at least on request number): 
 
12.  What is the source of income of the family?    [ Please tick() the appropriate box(s) and/or RANK(if answer is multiple) 
the frequency of SOURCES in the blank spaces (highest frequency=1) ] 
 
1=Poultr
y rearing 
2=Livestock 
(cattle/goat/ 
sheep etc.) 
rearing 
3=Agricultur
al crop 
production 
4=Fishin
g 
5=Family business (other 
than poultry, livestock, 
agricultural crop and 
fishing) 
6=Daily 
labor 
7=GO/ 
NGO Job 
8=Other 
(specify) 
 
 
........ 
 
........ 
 
........ 
 
..... 
 
............ 
 
....... 
 
........ 
 
........ 
 
 
 
Location details of farm 
 
13.1 House/Bari/Para(if applicable): 
13.2 Village: 
 
13.3Union: 
13.4 Upazilla: 
 
13.5 District: 
13.6 Latitude(N): 
 
13.7 Longitude (E): 
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PART 2: POULTRY FLOCK 
 
14. What species, breed, ages, sex  and number of  poultry do you have TODAY? 
 
Species Breed Age Sex: M/F/DK(Don’t 
Know) 
Number 
 
Chicken 
 
.................weeks/months/years 
  
 
.................weeks/months/years 
  
 
Duck 
 
.................weeks/months/years 
  
 
.................weeks/months/years 
  
 
Pigeon 
 
.................weeks/months/years 
  
 
.................weeks/months/years 
  
Goose 
 
.................weeks/months/years 
  
 
.................weeks/months/years 
  
Other(Specify).....
. 
 
.................weeks/months/years 
  
15. Where did you get your poultry in the LAST 12 MONTHS? How many and how often did you get poultry from the 
source(s)?  For source: Please tick() the appropriate box(s) ‘’. For how many?: Put the number of poultry (if farmer could 
provide no.) OR RANK the frequency (if farmer couldn’t provide no.) in the blank space ‘......’(highest frequency=1 for individual 
species). For how often?: Write( eg. one time/two times/three times etc.) within the bracket ‘[  ..... time(s)]’ 
 
 1=Hatched in own 
farm 
2=Local 
Market 
3=Middlmen/bepar
i 
4=Neighbour 5=Relatives 6=Others 
     (specify) 
Chicken 
.......................... 
[..........time(s)] 
................. 
[..........time(s)] 
................. 
[..........time(s)] 
................. 
[..........time(s)] 
..............[....
.....time(s)] 
...............[..
......time(s)] 
Duck 
.......................... 
[..........time(s)] 
................. 
[..........time(s)] 
................... 
[..........time(s)] 
.................  
[..........time(s)] 
.................[.
........time(s)] 
...............[..
......time(s)] 
 
If the source is ‘2=Local Market’, please ask: 
15.1 What is the name, address (only village name/location) and distance of local market/LBM where you get poultry? 
 
Name of the LBM Name of the village/location where market located Distance between your HH & LBM 
 
 
  
.............................. Feet/Meter/Km 
 
PART 3: HOUSING, FEEDING, WATERING AND OTHERS 
 
16.Where did your poultry scavenge in the LAST 12 MONTHS?   [ Please tick() the appropriate box(s) and/or RANK(if 
answer is multiple) the frequency  in the blank spaces (highest frequency=1 for individual species)] 
 
 1=Household 
premises 
2=Rice paddies 3=Rivers/wetlands/
ponds 
4=Vegetable land  5= No 
scavenging 
6=Others(specify
) 
Chicken ................... ................ 
 
................ .............. ........... ............. 
Duck ................... ................ 
 
................ .............. ........... .............. 
If answer is ‘No Scavenging’, go to Q 18 
17. Do your poultry mix/come into contact with  neighboring backyard waterfowls during scavenging? 
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[Please tick() the appropriate box] 
 
1=YES 2=NO 3=Don’t Know 
   
 
If answer is ‘No’, please ask  
17.1 Why your poultry do not mix with other scavenging backyard waterfowls?........................................... 
 
18. What is the estimated distance between your farm & nearest standing body of water (pond, lake, dam, river etc.)? 
 
Type of the nearest standing body 
of water 
Estimated distance between your farm & 
nearest standing body of water 
If possible, coordinates of the body of water 
Latitude (N) Longitude (E) 
 
 Pond 
 
...................…………. Feet/Meter/Km 
  
 
 Lake/River/Canal 
 
...................………….Feet/Meter/Km 
  
 
19. What is the estimated distance between your farm and the nearest commercial poultry farm? 
 
Estimated distance between your farm 
& nearest commercial poultry farm 
Name of the location/village  
 
If possible, coordinates of the nearest farms  
Latitude (N) Longitude (E) 
 
...…………. Feet/Meter/Km 
 
 
  
 
...…………. Feet/Meter/Km 
 
 
  
 
20. Do you provide any house to the poultry?    1=YES         2=  NO 
 
If answer is ‘NO’, please ask following question: 
 
 20.1 Where do you keep your poultry at night?………………………………………………………. 
 
If answer is ‘YES’, please ask following questions(20.2, 203, 20.4): 
 
 20.2 What kind of house do you have? [Please tick() the appropriate box(s)] (observed by the interviewer, if possible please 
take picture)  
 
1=Wooden 2=Bamboo 3= Muddy 4= Concrete 5=Metallic 6=Other (Specify) 
     ................... 
 
    20.3 Do you keep different species of poultry together in the same house?    1=YES   2= NO   3= NA 
 
    20.4 Is there any unwanted holes/openings in the house that can allow rats, snakes, wild animals etc.?  
            (observed by the interviewer, if possible please take picture)   1= YES      2=NO 
 
    20.5 Do you provide any litter in the house/space where poultry keep?  1=YES      2= NO 
 
     If answer is ‘YES’, please observe: 
 
     20.5.1 What kind of litter do they use? [Please tick() the appropriate box(s)]  
 
1=Rice husk 2=Saw dust 3=Wood 
shavings 
4=Sand 5=Straw pieces 6=Ash 7=Other 
(Specify) 
      .......... 
 
21. Do you provide NEST BOX for the poultry?   1=YES      2= NO 
If answer is ‘YES’, please OBSERVE (if possible take picture): 
 
21.1What kind of NEST BOX do they provide to poultry?      [Please tick() the appropriate box(s)] 
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1=Wooden 2=Bamboo 3=Concrete 4=Plastic 
 
5=Metallic 6=Other (Specify) 
     ................... 
 
 21.2 What do they use in the NEST BOX? [Please tick() the appropriate box(s)] 
 
1=Ash 
 
2=Straw  
 
3=Rice husk 4=Saw dust 5= Wood shavings  
 
6= Sand  7=Other(Specify).... 
      .............. 
 
22. Do you keep newly introduced poultry separate from other poultry in a safe and separate place/house before introducing 
into the existing poultry flock?       
 1= YES       2=NO  3= NA   
If yes, please ask following questions: 
 
22.1 Where do you keep? 22.2 How many days do you keep separate?  
  
 
 
23. What do you feed your poultry?   [ Please tick() the appropriate box(s) and/or RANK(if answer is multiple) the frequency  
in the blank spaces (highest frequency=1 for individual species)] 
 
 1= Rice 
bran 
2=Rice 
polish 
3=Paddy 4=Whole 
rice 
5=Cooked 
rice 
6=Scraps 
from the 
family food 
7=Commercial 
feed 
8=Grain 9=Slaughter 
remnants of 
purchased 
chickens 
10=Nothing other 
than what they find 
outside 
11=Other 
(Specify) 
Chicken 
....... ....... ...... ..... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .... 
Duck 
....... ....... ...... .... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ... 
 
If answer is ‘10=Nothing other than................outside’, please GO TO Q 26 
 
If answer is ‘7=Commercial feed’, please ask following question: 
 23.1 Where do you get your feed?  [Please tick() the appropriate box(s)] 
 
1=Local market 2=Feed dealer 3=Other(please specify) 
  .............................. 
 
24. How do you feed your poultry? [Please tick() the appropriate box(s)]  
 
1=Use separate 
feeder 
2=Use same trough for both feeding and 
watering 
3=Scattered on the 
yard 
4=Other(please specify) 
   ............................. 
 
25. Do you feed different species of poultry in a same feeder/trough/space? 
 
1=YES 2=NO  3=NA (if rear only one species) 
   
 
26. Do you provide water to the poultry?    
 1=YES      2=NO 
 
If answer is ‘NO’, please GO TO Q 27 
26.1 How do you provide water to poultry? [Please tick() the appropriate box(s)] 
 
1=Use separate waterer 2=Use same trough for both watering and 
feeding 
 3=Other(please specify) 
  .............................. 
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26.2 What is the source of water? [Please tick() the appropriate box(s)] 
 
1= Tube-well 2= Deep tube-well 
 
3= Pond 4= River/lake 
 
5= Supply water by govt.authority 6=Other (Specify) 
     ................... 
 
 26.3 Do you provide water to different species of poultry in a same WATERER/trough? 
 
1=YES 2=NO  3=NA (if rear only one species/don’t have waterer or trough) 
   
 
 
 
PART 4: FAMILY, VISITORS AND THEIR MOVEMENT 
 
27. Please fill-in the following table: 
 
27.1 Who take care(feeding, watering, 
cleaning etc) of the poultry? 
27.2  What type of care the person usually takes? 27.3 Did the person receive any 
training on poultry? 
 
 Interviewee 
Feeding           Watering    Cleaning of poultry house/equipment     
 
 Other(specify)..............................        
 Yes            No 
 Husband/Wife   Daughter  
         
 Son     Other (specify)... 
Feeding           Watering    Cleaning of poultry house/equipment     
 
 Other(specify)..............................        
 Yes             No 
 
 
28. Do you or your family members WORK at commercial poultry farms?   
 
  1=YES      2=NO 
 
If answer is ‘YES’, please ask following questions: 
 
28.1 Name & address (only village 
name/location) of the farm(s) where 
you/they work 
28.2 Type of work 
you/they do on that farm 
28.3 How Frequently 
you/they go to the farm? 
28.4 When  visited last time 
to the farm? 
  
 
  
............. days/weeks ago 
 
29. Did you or your family members VISIT commercial poultry farms within the last 12 months for which they do not work 
? 
        1=YES    2=NO 
 
If  answer is ‘YES’, please ask following questions: 
 
29.1 Purpose 29.2 How Frequently? 29.3 When  visited last time to the farm? 
   
 
....................... days/weeks/months  ago 
 
30. Did you/family members VISIT homes of relatives/friends within the last 12 months who own poultry farms?    
 
 1=YES       2= NO 
 
If  answer is ‘YES’, please ask following questions: 
 
30.1 How Frequently? 30.2 When  visited last time? 
  
........................... days/weeks/months  ago 
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31. Stakeholders (other than trader/collector/bepari/middlemen) movement or access to the HH/farm: Please  
      fill-in the following table: 
 
31.1 Which type of stakeholders visit 
your HH/farm? 
31.2 How frequent they 
visit your HH/farm? 
31.3 When  they visited last time to your 
HH/ farm? 
31.4 Do you allow them 
within less than 1 meter 
of the poultry house area? 
 
 Poultry vaccinator 
  
............. days/weeks/months  ago 
 
 YES         NO 
 
 Veterinarian 
  
............ days/weeks/months  ago 
 YES         NO 
 
 Village quack 
  
............ days/weeks/months  ago 
 YES         NO 
 
 Paravet/Vet.Field Assistant(VFA) 
  
............ days/weeks/months  ago 
 YES         NO 
 
 Community Workers (NGO) 
  
............ days/weeks/months  ago 
 YES         NO 
 
 Others(specify)..................... 
  
............ days/weeks/months  ago 
 YES         NO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 5: CLEANING AND DISINFECTION PRACTICE 
 
32. Please fill-in the following table as appropriate: 
 
 POULTRY HOUSE FEEDER WATERER NEST BOX 
3
2
.1
 D
o
 y
o
u
 c
le
a
n
 
&
 d
is
in
fe
c
t.
..
?
 
1=Clean only  
2=Disinfect only 
3=Both clean & disinfect 
4=Don’t clean & disinfect 
5=NA 
6=Others(specify)… 
1=Clean only  
2=Disinfect only 
3=Both clean & disinfect 
4=Don’t clean & disinfect 
5=NA 
6=Others(specify)……… 
1=Clean only  
2=Disinfect only 
3=Both clean & disinfect 
4=Don’t clean & disinfect 
5=NA 
6=Others(specify)…... 
1=Clean only  
2=Disinfect only 
3=Both clean & disinfect 
4=Don’t clean & disinfect 
5=NA 
6=Others(specify)……… 
3
2
.2
 H
o
w
 f
r
e
q
u
e
n
tl
y
 
d
o
 y
o
u
 c
le
a
n
..
.?
 
1=Daily 
2=Once a week 
3=Twice a week 
4=Once a month 
5=NA 
6=Others(specify)…… 
1=Every time after use 
2=Once a day 
3=Once a week 
4=Once a month 
5=NA 
6= Others(specify)…… 
1=Every time after use 
2=Once a day 
3=Once a week 
4=Once a month 
5=NA 
6= Others(specify)…… 
1=Every time after use 
2=Once a day 
3=Once a week 
4=Once a month 
5=NA 
6= Others(specify)…… 
3
2
.3
 H
o
w
 
fr
e
q
u
e
n
tl
y
 
d
o
 y
o
u
 
d
is
in
fe
c
t.
.?
 1=Daily 
2=Once a week 
3=Twice a week 
4=Once a month 
5=NA 
6=Others(specify)… 
1=Every time after use 
2=Once a day 
3=Once a week 
4=Once a month 
5=NA 
6= Others(specify)…… 
1=Every time after use 
2=Once a day 
3=Once a week 
4=Once a month 
5=NA 
6= Others(specify)…… 
1=Every time after use 
2=Once a day 
3=Once a week 
4=Once a month 
5=NA 
6= Others(specify)…… 
3
2
.4
 H
o
w
 &
 
w
h
a
t 
d
o
 y
o
u
 
u
se
 
fo
r 
c
le
a
n
in
g
?
 
    
3
2
.5
 
H
o
w
 
&
 
w
h
a
t 
d
o
y
o
u
 
u
se
 f
o
r
 d
is
in
f.
?
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33. Do you or your family member wash hands and feet with water before handling poultry/poultry house/equipment? 
 
1=Always 2=Often 3=Sometimes 4=Never 
    
 
If answer is ‘Never’,please GO TO Q 34: 
 
33.1 Do you or your family member use soap to wash hands and feet? 
 
1=Always 2=Often 3=Sometimes 4=Never 
    
 
 
PART 6: POULTRY DROPPINGS/WASTE/LITTER AND DEAD BIRDS MANAGEMENT 
 
34.  How frequently do you change or clean the litter/ droppings/waste? 
1= Once a day 
 
2= Once a week 3= Twice a week 
 
4= Once a month 
 
5= Not at all 6= Other (specify) 
     .................. 
 
35. How do you dispose litter/droppings/waste?    [Please tick() the appropriate box(s) and/or RANK(if answer is multiple) 
the frequency  in the blank spaces (highest frequency=1 ] 
 
1=Spread 
on your 
fields 
2=Compost it & 
then spread it on 
your fields 
3=Bury 
them 
4=Burn 
them 
5=Throw in 
the nearby 
pond 
6=Throw in the 
nearby 
river/lake/canal 
7=Left in 
the yard 
8=Throw on 
nearby 
bushes/jungle 
9=Throw on 
roadside 
10=Other 
(specify) 
 
....... ....... ..... ...... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... 
 
36. How do you dispose dead birds?  [Please tick() the appropriate box(s) and/or RANK(if answer is multiple) the frequency  
in the blank spaces (highest frequency=1 ] 
1=Bury 
them 
2= Feed to 
dogs/fox/other 
animals 
3=Throw in the 
nearby pond 
4=Throw in the 
nearby 
lake/river/canal 
5=Throw on 
nearby 
bushes/jungle 
6=Throw on 
roadside 
7=Burn 
them 
8=Other 
(specify) 
 
....... ....... ....... 
                             
....... ....... ....... ....... ....... 
 
PART7: PEST MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF WILD BIRDS & OTHER ANIMALS 
 
37. Do you have rodents in your household?    
  1=Yes         2=No 
 
  If  answer is ‘YES’, please ask following question:     
 
37.1 How do you control rodent? ………………………………………………………… 
 
 
38. Do they allow trash and junk to pile up around the poultry house? (Observed by the interviewer) 
 
 1=Yes         2=No     3=NA 
 
39. Do they trim grass and weeds around poultry house regularly? (Observed by the interviewer) 
                                   
                                  1=Yes          2= No     3=NA 
 
40. How do you keep feed/feed ingredients? (Observed by the interviewer) 
 
1= Keep in closed container 2=Keep open 3=Other, please specify 
  ......................... 
 
41. Can stray dogs and cats enter into your household area?          1=Yes         2=No       
   If  answer is ‘YES’, please ask following question: 
        
41.1  How do you control stray dogs and cats?……………………………………………………..... 
42. Do you rear wild birds within the household/farm premises?    1=YES      2=NO 
If  answer is ‘YES’, please ask following questions: 
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42.1 What species and 
number?  
42.2 Do wild birds that you 
rear come in contact with 
the poultry? 
42.3 Do you share the same 
feeder use for wild birds 
with poultry? 
42.4 Do you share the same 
waterer use for wild birds with 
poultry? Species No. 
  
 YES          NO 
 
 YES         NO 
 
 YES         NO 
   
43. Information on mixing or contact of migratory & non-migratory wild birds(which aren’t reared) with domestic poultry: 
Please ask following questions 
 
43.1 Do your poultry mix/come into contact with migratory and/or non-migratory wild birds in the last 12 months?  [Please 
tick() the appropriate box(s)] 
1=Mix/contact with 
migratory wild birds 
2= Mix/contact with non-
migratory wild birds  
3=Don’t mix/contact with either 
migratory or non-migratory wild birds 
4=Don’t know 
    
 
43.2 Do you limit contacts between domestic and wild birds?   1=YES      2=NO 
 
43.2.1 If YES, how?.......................................................... 
 
 
 
PART 8: HEALTH HISTORY, VACCINATION 
 
44. What kind of problem(s)/constraint(s) do you have with management of the poultry? [Please tick the appropriate box(s) 
and/or RANK (if answere is multiple) the frequency in the blank spaces (highest frequency=1)] 
 
1=Disease 2=Predators 3=High 
price of 
feed 
4=Shortage of 
quality 
vaccine 
5=Irregular/insuf
ficient Govt. 
vaccination 
campaign  
6=High 
price of 
vaccine 
7=Marketing of the 
farm products 
8=Others 
(specify) 
 
....... ........ .......... ............ 
              ........... 
........... ................ ............. 
 
45. Morbidity and mortality details: please fill-in the following table 
 
Species Describe diseases (if confirmed) or clinical 
signs/symptoms you have seen in your 
poultry during the LAST 12 MONTHS? 
How many birds were sick during 
the LAST 12 MONTHS? 
How many birds were died 
during the LAST 12 
MONTHS? 
Chicken    
Duck    
 
46. Was there any specific season/month  in the LAST 12 MONTHS when poultry died more?                                                     
         1=YES      2=NO 
 
If  answer is ‘YES’, please ask following questions: 
 
46.1 Which season/month poultry died more? 
 
Name of the season Name of the month 
  
  
 
47. Please tick the appropriate boxes and RANK the frequency for individual column(47.1, 47.2, 47.3). For each column 
highest frequency=1. 
 
 When your farm affected by disease, what do you do with 
the.....? 
47.3 When your birds are not sick, but some birds around your 
farm/within the village are sick; what do you do  WITH YOUR 
BIRDS 47.1 SICK BIRDS 47.2 BIRDS WHICH ARE NOT SICK YET  
 
Sell to the local market 
 
............. ............ ............ 
Slaughter and eat ............. ............ ............ 
Go to the local DLS office with sick 
poultry ............. ............ ............ 
Buy medicine from local vet. 
pharmacy & treat poultry ............. ............ ............ 
Contact with village quack ............. ............ ............ 
Do nothing  ............ ............ ............ 
Others(specify).............  ............ ............ ............ 
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48. Had there been any unusual death (sudden increased number of bird mortality within a short period of time) of  birds 
around your farms/within the village in the LAST 12 MONTHS?     1=YES      2=NO 
       
 48.1 Have you heard about....? 
 
Avian Influenza/Bird Flu  YES       NO 
 
Disease that cause high number of bird mortality  YES       NO 
   
 
49. Do you vaccinate your poultry?    1=YES      2=NO 
 
1 If  answer is ‘YES, 
49.1 Please fill-in the following table: 
 
 
Species 
Against what diseases birds 
in the present flock have 
already been vaccinated in 
the last 12 months? 
A
t 
w
h
at
 a
g
e?
 
R
o
u
te
 o
f 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
 
N
am
e 
o
f 
th
e 
v
ac
ci
n
e 
S
o
u
rc
e 
o
f 
th
e 
 
v
ac
ci
n
e 
Next vaccination plan 
Against what 
diseases 
At what 
age 
Name of the 
vaccine (if known) 
Chicken 
 
 
       
 
 
       
Duck  
 
       
     
 49.2 Who vaccinate your birds?  
 
1= Private poultry vaccinator   2= Government poultry 
vaccinator   
3= Village quack      4= Others(specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
..................................... 
 
49.3 How do you dispose of vaccine vial/bottle, used needle & syringes etc. after vaccination? [Please tick()  
        the appropriate box(s) and/or RANK(if answer is multiple) the frequency  in the blank spaces (highest frequency=1 ] 
 
 
1=Burn in a pit or 
above ground of HH 
premises 
2=Bury at HH 
premises 
3=Throw on the 
ground of HH 
premises 
4=Throw on 
roadside 
5=Throw in the 
river 
6=Other (specify) 
 
....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... 
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PART 9: PRODUCTION AND MARKETING 
 
50. Information on production: Please ask  following questions in the table and fill-in the blank cells( Note: A batch = a group of 
eggs produced in the laying period of a hen) 
 
 Chicken  Duck 
Ave. Min. Max. Ave Min. Max. 
50.1 How many batches are produced by EACH hen per year?       
50.2  How many eggs does A hen produce in a batch?       
50.3 How many eggs are set under EACH hen to be hatched?       
50.4 How many chicks/ducklings are hatched PER BATCH?       
 
51. Of these ………..........(write the AVERAGE number from the question 50.4) AVERAGE number of chicks/ducklings 
hatched PER BATCH, specify the total number of losses and the cause-specific number of losses per age group: 
 
                          Chicken  Duck 
Chicks 
(< 2months) 
Growers  
(2-5months) 
Adults 
 (> 5 months) 
Ducklings 
(< 2 months) 
Growers  
(2-5 months) 
Adults 
 (> 5 months) 
TOTAL LOSSES       
Diseases       
Predators       
Theft       
Exposure to climate 
(rain/wind/heat/cold)  
      
Unknown       
Other (specify) ……….       
 
52. Do you sell EGGS?    1=YES      2=NO 
       If  answer is ‘YES’,  
      
52.1 Please ask following questions: 
 
 52.1.1 How many times did you sale eggs within the 
LAST 12 MONTHS? 
52.1.2 Number of eggs sold per sale 
Average Min Max 
Chicken     
Duck     
 
 52.2 Where did you sell your eggs in the LAST 12 MONTHS? [Please tick the appropriate box(s) and/or RANK (if answere is 
multiple) the frequency in the blank spaces (highest frequency=1)] 
 
 1= At local 
LBM 
2=To trader(s) /local 
collector/bepari visiting 
village/HH 
3= To traders/local 
collector/bepari on the 
roadside/elsewhere 
4=To neighbor 5=Other, specify 
Chicken 
............ ................. ................. ............... ................ 
Duck 
............ ................. ................. ............... ................ 
 
If EGGS sell to traders/local collector/bepari visiting the village, please ask following questions(52.2.1-52.2.6): 
 
52.2.1 How do you deal with the traders/local collector/bepari? 
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1=Call them to let know that you have eggs to 
sell 
2=They come regularly to see whether 
eggs are offered for sale 
3=Other(specify) 
  ........................ 
 
 
 
52.2.2 How often a trader/local collector/bepari comes to your farm? 
 
1=Once a month               2=Twice a month          3=Thrice a month            4=Other(specify) 
   .......................... 
 
52.2.3  HOW MANY different traders/local collector/bepari visit your HH/farm in average PER MONTH?  
 
 
 
 52.2.4 Do you work with: 
 
1=Always the same traders/local 
collector/bepari 
2=Mostly the same but sometimes new or 
different traders/local collector/bepari  
3=Neverthe same traders/local 
collector/bepari 
   
 
 52.2.5 When trader/local collector/bepari visited your HH last time? 
       
 
52.2.6 Do you allow trader/bepari/local collector/middlemen  within less than 1 meter of the poultry house area?         
   1=YES     2= NO 
 
If EGGS sell at LBM, please ask following questions (52.2.7-52.2.10): 
 
 52.2.7 What is the name, address(only village name/location) and distance of LBM where you sell eggs? 
 
Name of the LBM Name of the village/location where market located Distance between your HH & LBM 
 
 
  
.............................. Feet/Meter/Km 
 
 52.2.8 How frequently do you go to LBM for selling eggs? 
 
1=Once a week            2=Once a month          3= Twice a month 4= Thrice a month 5=Other(specify) 
 
    ......................... 
 
      52.2.9 When you visited LBM last time for selling eggs? 
 
 
       
      52.2.10 How many eggs do you sell when go to LBM? 
 
Average Min. Max. 
......................................eggs sold/visit ......................................eggs sold/visit 
 
......................................eggs sold/visit  
 
53. Do you sell your POULTRY?    1=YES    2=NO 
 
       If  answer is ‘YES’,  
           53.1 Please ask following questions: 
 
 
... .....days/weeks/months ago 
.......... .....days/weeks/months ago 
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53.1.1 At what age do you usually sell poultry? 
53.1.2 How many times 
did you sell poultry in the 
LAST 12 MONTHS? 
53.1.3 Number of birds  sold per 
sale 
Male Female Average Min. Max. 
Grower/Adult Spent 
Hen/Duck 
Chicken 
 
......weeks/months ......weeks/months 
 
  ......months 
    
Duck 
 
......weeks/months ......weeks/months 
 
  ......months 
    
 
 
 53.2 Was there any specific season or festival within the LAST 12 MONTHS when you sold more POULTRY?  
 
                            1=YES      2=NO 
 
 53.2.1 If YES, please fill in the table below: 
 
 
 SEASON  
 
FESTIVAL 
Name of 
the 
season 
Mont
h 
How many 
times did you 
sell during that 
season? 
Average no. 
of poultry 
sold per sell 
Name of 
the  
festival 
Month How many 
times did you 
sell during 
that festival? 
Average no. 
of birds sold 
per sell 
Chicken 
        
        
        
        
        
  
Duck         
        
        
 
 53.3 Where did you sell poultry  in the LAST 12 MONTHS?   [Please tick the appropriate box(s) and/or RANK  
                (if answere is multiple) the frequency in the blank spaces (highest frequency=1 for individual species)] 
 
 
 1=At local 
LBM 
2=To trader(s) /local 
collector/bepari visiting 
the village 
3=Totraders/localcollector/bepari on 
the roadside/elsewhere 
3=To 
neighbor 
4=Other, 
specify 
Chicken 
 
.............. ....................... ....................... 
.............
.. ................. 
Duck 
 
............... ....................... ....................... 
.............
.. ................. 
 
If POULTRY sell to traders/local collector/bepari VISITING THE VILLAGE, please ask following questions(53.3.1-
53.3.6): 
 
  53.3.1 How do you deal with the traders/local collector/bepari? 
 
1=Call them to let know that you have 
poultry to sell 
2=They come regularly to see whether birds 
are offered for sale 
3=Other(specify) 
  ........................ 
 
 
  53.3.2  How often a trader/local collector/bepari comes to your HH/farm? 
 
1=Once a month               2=Twice a month          3=Thrice a month            4=Other(specify) 
   .......................... 
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  53.3.3 HOW MANY different traders/local collector/bepari visit your HH/farm in average PER  
             MONTH?  
 
 
   
 
53.3.4 Do you work with: 
 
1=Always the same traders/local 
collector/bepari 
2=Mostly the same but sometimes new or 
different traders/local collector/bepari  
3=Neverthe same traders/local 
collector/bepari 
   
 
            
 53.3.5 When trader/local collector/bepari visited your farm last time? 
           
 
53.3.6 Do you allow trader/bepari/local collector/middlemen  within less than 1 meter of  the poultry house area?     
                        1=YES     2= NO 
 
If POULTRY sell at LBM, please ask following questions(53.3.7-53.3.13): 
 53.3.7  What is the name, address(only village name/location) and distance of LBM where you sell  poultry?    
       
Name of the LBM Name of the village/location where market located Distance between your HH & LBM 
 
 
  
.............................. Feet/Meter/Km 
 
 
53.3.8 How frequently do you go to LBM for selling poultry? 
 
1=Once a month           2=Twice a month          3= Every after two 
months 
4= Every after three months 5=Other(specify) 
 
    ......................... 
 
 53.3.9 When you visited LBM last time for selling poultry? 
 
 
   
 
53.3.10 How many poultry do you sell when go to LBM? 
 
Average Min. Max. 
....................................birds sold/visit ....................................birds sold/visit ....................................birds sold/visit 
 
 
53.3.11 How often do you have unsold POULTRY in the last 12 months?........................................... 
 
 
 
53.3.12 Doyou or your family bring back any unsold POULTRY from a market?  1=YES  2=NO  3=NA   
 
 
 
 
 
... .....days/weeks/months ago 
.......... .....days/weeks/months ago 
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53.3.12.1 If YES, What do you do with the unsold POULTRY after bringing them back from  market? [Tick the appropriate 
box(s) and/or RANK (if answer is multiple) the frequency in the blank spaces] 
 
 
1= Put together with other poultry 
in the same house/coop           
2= Keep separate before 
mixing with other poultry 
 
3= Slaughter and eat 
 
4= Give it to friend 
 
5=Other(specify) 
 
.......... ......... ......... .......... .................... 
 
         
53.3.13 Do you bring back any  baskets, crates or other equipment back to your poultry houses/coop after trading at live 
bird market?             
 
 1=YES     2=NO 
                            
53.3.13.1 If YES, What do you do with the baskets, crates or other equipment? 
 
 
1= Clean before using again 
 
2= Clean & disinfect before using again 
 
3= Don’t clean & disinfect 
 
4=Other(specify) 
   .................... 
 
         If answer is ‘3=Don’t clean & disinfect,  please GO TO Q 54 
 
             
53.3.13.1.1 If answer is 1/2/4, please fill-in the following table as appropriate: 
 
How and what do you use for cleaning? How and what do you use for disinfection? 
 
 
 
 
54. Do you or your family membersVISIT live bird markets for other purpose?     1=YES       2=NO 
 
54.1 If  YES, please fill-in the following table: 
 
Purpose to visit How Frequently? When  visited last time? 
  
 
 
.................days/weeks/months ago 
 
55. Do you or your family members buy poultry from LBM for consumption?     1= YES     2= NO 
 
55.1 If YES, please ask, Where do you slaughter and process it? 
 
1=Only slaughter at 
LBM 
2=Both slaughter & 
process at LBM 
3=Process at home 4=Both slaughter 
& process at home 
5=Other(specify) 
    ............................... 
 
56. Do you or family slaughter & process POULTRY (that you rear) at home for consumption?   
                            
 1=YES      2=NO 
 
56.1 If YES, please fill-in the following table: 
 
Species 
Breed 
Age at which birds are slaughtered 
Male Female 
Grower/Adult Spent Hen/Duck 
Chicken  
 
................weeks/months 
 
................weeks/months 
 
................months 
Duck 
 
................weeks/months 
 
................weeks/months 
 
       ................months 
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 56.2 How many poultry(that you rear) did your family consume in the LAST 12 MONTHS?  
 
 
 Average 
Chicken  
Duck  
 
 
57.Was there any specific season or festival in the LAST 12 MONTHS when your family  CONSUMED more POULTRY? 
                             1= YES    2= NO 
 
 57.1 If YES, please fill-in the following table: 
 
 SPECIFIC SEASON  
 
SPECIFIC FESTIVAL 
Name of the 
season 
Month 
 
Average no. of poultry 
consumed/month during 
that specific season 
Name of the 
festival 
Month 
 
Average no. of 
poultry 
consumed/month 
during that 
specific festival 
Chicken       
      
      
      
      
      
  
Duck       
      
      
      
 
 
58. Please fill-in the following table considering  period of LAST 12 MONTHS.  [Tick the appropriate box(s) and/or RANK (if 
answer is multiple) the frequency in the blank spaces] 
 
S
p
ec
ie
s 
EGGS  
(Rank the frequency, highest frequency=1) 
 
 
POULTRY 
(Rank the frequency, highest frequency=1) 
1=Consume 2=Own 
reproduction 
3= Sale 4=Give to 
neighbor/ 
relatives 
 
5=Other,  
specify... 
1=Consume 
 
2=Sale 3=Give to 
neighbor/ 
relatives 
 
4=Other, 
specify 
 
Chicken ....... .......... ..... ........... ........ ...... ...... ........... ...... 
Duck ........ .......... ..... ........... ........ ...... ...... ........... ...... 
 
 
Name of the interviewer:............................................................................... 
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Appendix 10: Questionnaire used to collect information on village 
 
1.Village address: 
 
Name of the village: Union:    Upazilla: District: 
 
 
PART 1: OBSERVATION (Q2-Q15)  
[ When necessary, please also cross-check during interview with headman/key informants] 
 
 
2. Distribution of  HH within the village: [Tick the appropriate box(s) and/or RANK the frequency in 
the blank space (highest frequency=1)]  
 
Colony type (>1 HH grouped 
together) 
Isolated Other(specify 
   ...... 
 
 
3. The structure of the HHs is made of:[Tick the appropriate box(s) and/or RANK the frequency in the 
blank space (highest frequency=1)]  
 
 
 
4. Agricultural enterprises prevail within the village: [Tick the appropriate boxes  and RANK the 
frequency in the blank space (highest frequency=1)] 
 
 
Cattle/buffalo/goat/
sheep rearing 
Backyard 
poultry rearing 
Commercial 
poultry rearing 
Agricultural crop 
production 
Fishing Other(speci
fy) 
.... .... .... .... ...  ...... 
 
5. Agricultural crop land/production prevails within the village: [Tick the appropriate boxes and 
RANK the frequency in the blank space(highest frequency=1)] 
 
 
Rice Wheat Betel leaf Sugarcane Vegetables Other(specify) 
.... .... ... ... ...  ...... 
 
 
 
Mud Bamboo Bricks, cement, 
concrete etc 
Tin  Other(specify 
     ...... 
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6. Kinds of available wetland/water body prevail within the village: [Tick the appropriate box(s) and 
collect GPS coordinates]  
 
 Pond Canal/River/Lake No wetland/water 
body 
Other 
(specify).....
.. 
How many 
ponds? 
N E 
How many 
canals/rivers/lakes? 
N E 
 
N E 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
7. Presence of any forest/hill/jungle in the village:    YES        NO 
 
8. Presence of commercial poultry farm in the village:   YES        NO 
     8.1 If YES, Type:  Layer        Broiler    Sonali/Fayoumi   Other (specify)....... 
 
 
 
9. Separation of one HH/colony from the other HH/colony: [Tick the appropriate box(s) and/or RANK 
the frequency in the blank space (highest frequency=1)]  
 
 
           
 10. Kind of road passed through the village? [Tick the appropriate box(s) and/or RANK the frequency 
in the blank space (highest frequency=1)]  
 
 
Kacha/Muddy Pacca/Concrete,brick etc Other(specify) 
   
 
 
 
11. Estimated distance between the village and highway road: 
...........................................Feet/Meter/km 
 
 
 
 
By crops field By 
lake/river/pond 
etc. 
By 
forest/hill/jungle 
By road Other(specify 
     ...... 
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12. Kind of transports people usually use to move from one village to another village: [Tick the 
appropriate box(s) and/or RANK the frequency in the blank space (highest frequency=1)]  
 
 
By rickshaw/rickshaw 
van 
By motorized vehicle  CNG/taxi By boat Other(specify) 
     
 
 
 
13. Presence of any kind of following stoppage in the village: [Tick the appropriate box(s) and/or 
RANK the frequency in the blank space (highest frequency=1)]  
 
Bus Train CNG/Taxi Absence of 
any kind of  
stoppage 
Other(specify) 
    ....... 
 
 
14. Presence of any garbage dumping place in the village where people dispose wastage:  
 YES        NO 
 
If YES, 14.1 Crow abundance around the garbage dumping place:  YES        NO 
 
15. How frequent crows observe in the village? 
Always Often Sometimes Never 
    
 
PART 2: INFORMATION TO BE COLLECTED FROM VILLAGE HEADMAN/ KEY 
INFORMANTS (Q16-Q26) 
 
 
16. What is the family size of the 
HH? 
 
17. What is the educational background of the village people? [Tick the appropriate boxes and RANK 
the frequency in the blank space (highest frequency=1)]    
 
1= 
Illiterate 
2= 
Primary         
3= 
Secondary         
4= Higher 
Secondary    
5= Tertiary (i.e. graduate &  
above )   
6=Other(spec
ify) 
....... ....... ....... ...... ..... ..... 
 
 
18. Which ethnic group is more common within the village? [Tick the appropriate box(s)] 
 
 1=Muslim      2=Hindu     3= Buddhist   4= Christian    5= Other (specify)..........   6= Don’t 
response 
Average:  Min.: Max.: 
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19. Information on HHs with or without backyard poultry: 
 
19.1 How many 
HHs have in the 
village? 
19.2 How many 
HHs have 
backyard poultry? 
19.3 How many HHs 
have both chicken & 
duck? 
19.4 How many 
HHs have 
chicken only? 
19.5 How many 
HHs have duck 
only? 
     
 
20. Which species of backyard poultry are reared by HHs? [Tick the appropriate box(x) and RANK 
the frequency in the blank space (highest frequency=1)] 
 
 
 
Chicken Duck Pigeon Goose Other(specify) 
    ........... 
 
21. How many backyard poultry are reared by EACH HH? 
 
 
 Average Min. Max. 
Chicken    
Duck    
 
 
 
 
22. Was there any poultry disease outbreak within the village in the last 12 months?   YES      NO 
       If YES, please ask 
 
22.1 How long ago? ........................days/weeks/months ago 
22.2 What type of farm 
affected? 
 Commercial                                               Backyard 
22.3 Do you know which 
disease outbreak happened? 
 YES, if yes please ask 
name of the disease: 
............................. 
 NO, if no please ask what clinical 
signs/abnormality observed: 
............................................................... 
 
 
23. Was there any village vaccination campaign on Ranikhet/ND in the last 12 months within the 
village?     
        YES    NO  If YES, please ask  
 
       23.1 How long ago?.................days/weeks/months ago 
 
       23.2 Who organized the campaign?  DLS       NGO      Other (specify)........................... 
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24. Is there any village market within the village where trading of poultry takes place?   
 YES        NO 
If YES, please ask,  
       24.1 Name of the market (If possible take GPS 
coordinates)..................................N:.....................E:................... 
       24.2 Business day of the market: 
Daily Once  a week Twice a week Other (please specify) 
    
 
 
25. What is the name and estimated distance of nearest LBM (outside the village) where villagers go 
to buy/sell poultry? 
Name of the LBM: Estimated distance(If possible take GPS coordinates): 
............m/km 
N:                                                  E: 
 
 
26. Do migratory wild birds visit village?  YES        NO 
 
        If YES, 25.1 Are they mix with domestic poultry?  
 
 
YES No Don’t know 
   
 
GPS COORDINATES, PICTURE AND LAYPOUT MAP OF THE VILLAGE 
 Take GPS coordinates(at least 4) at different points on the edges of the village: 
 
 
Latitude(N) Longitude(E) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 Take pictures of the village 
 Sketch a simple map of the layout of the village( indicating main roads, river/wetland, HH 
density, place where wild bird come, market where trading of poultry take place, any 
stoppage, any commercial poultry farm, type of agricultural land) 
 
Name of the village headman/key informant:........................................................... 
 
Designation:................................................................ 
 
Mobile No:...................................................... 
Name of the interviewer:................................. 
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Appendix 11: Health Belief Model (HBM) Questionnaire  
 
Backyard Poultry Farmers  
Health Belief Model (HBM) Questionnaire  
 
P E R C E I V E D  S U S C E P T I B I L I T Y  
 
A = Strongly 
disagree 
B = Disagree C = Agree D = Strongly agree E = Neither agree nor disagree F=Don’t Know 
My chickens have an increased risk of getting avian influenza/bird flu 
When I  rear different species of poultry together A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
When I keep chickens and ducks in the same house A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
When I don’t regularly clean poultry house/equipment A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
When my chickens mix with neighbour sick poultry during scavenging A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
When my chickens mix with wild birds A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
When my family members or I bring back unsold poultry from LBM & put together with 
other poultry 
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
I am at increased risk of getting avian influenza/bird flu 
Because of my poultry rearing A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
When I handle sick poultry A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
When I don’t cover my mouth and nose with cloths during handling poultry A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
When I don’t wash my hands with soap water after handling poultry A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
My family members are at increased risk of getting avian influenza/bird flu 
Because of my poultry rearing A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
Uncooked poultry meat doesn’t pose risk for getting avian influenza/bird flu A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
P E R C E I V E D  S E V E R I T Y  
 
A = Strongly 
disagree 
B = Disagree C = Agree D = 
Strongly 
agree 
E = Neither agree nor disagree F=Don’t Know 
If my chickens get sick from avian influenza/bird flu 
Then the illness would be very bad, and the chickens will most likely die A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
Then avian influenza/bird flu could be passed to other poultry in my locality A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
Then avian influenza/bird flu could be passed on to me A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
If my chickens get sick and die from avian influenza/bird flu 
Then I will lose income and family consumption A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
If I get sick from avian influenza/bird flu 
Then other members in my home will get sick A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
Then I will die A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
If my family members get sick from avian influenza/bird flu 
Then they will die A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
Chickens that catch avian influenza/bird flu cannot be treated 
 
 
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
P E R C E I V E D  B E N E F I T S  
 
A = Strongly 
disagree 
B = Disagree C = Agree D = Strongly agree E = Neither agree nor disagree F=Don’t Know 
My chickens will not get sick from avian influenza/bird flu 
If I don’t rear different species of poultry together A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
If I don’t keep chickens and ducks together in same house A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
If  I regularly clean poultry house/equipment A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
If my family members or I don’t bring unsold poultry from LBM/don’t put unsold poultry 
with other poultry after bring back from LBM  
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
If  my chickens will not get sick from avian influenza/bird flu 
I will not lose income and family consumption A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
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 The possibility of disease outbreaks in my locality will reduce A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
My family members and I will not get sick from avian influenza/bird flu A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
P E R C E I V E D  B A R R I E R S  
 
A = Strongly 
disagree 
B = Disagree C = Agree D = Strongly agree E = Neither agree nor disagree F=Don’t Know 
Construction of separate house to keep chickens and ducks separately is expensive and 
required more spaces which I don’t have 
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
It’s not worth to protect my chickens from avian influenza/bird flu, because I don’t earn 
sufficient money from rearing chickens 
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
Regular cleaning of poultry house/equipment is time consuming and not practical for me, 
because my family/I have to do many other things 
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
Washing hands before and after handling poultry is not practical for me, because my 
family/I have to do many other things  
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
I can’t cover my mouth and nose with cloths during handling chickens, because they are 
not conducive for work 
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
I don’t cover my mouth and nose with cloths during handling chickens,  because my 
neighbour do not 
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
C U E  T O  A C T I O N  
 
A = Strongly 
disagree 
B = Disagree C = Agree D = Strongly agree E = Neither agree nor disagree F=Don’t Know 
I would receive training regarding avian influenza/bird flu prevention & control and 
other aspects of poultry rearing, if DLS or any other organization would provide it 
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
If I  
Find a program on TV about avian influenza/bird flu and other aspects of poultry 
rearing, then I would watch it  
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
Find a program on the radio about avian influenza/bird flu and other aspects of poultry 
rearing, then I would listen to it 
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
Get invited to a meeting or campaign, etc. about avian influenza/bird flu and other 
aspects of poultry rearing, then I would attend it 
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
It is a good idea for me to talk 
With local livestock related personnel about risks of avian influenza/bird flu disease 
transmission between chickens 
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
With community health workers or nearby hospital doctor about risks of disease 
transmission between chickens and humans 
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
S E L F - E F F I C A C Y  
 
A = Strongly 
disagree 
B = Disagree C = Agree D = Strongly agree E = Neither agree nor disagree F=Don’t Know 
It is a good idea 
To invest in separate houses for chicken and duck A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
To clean poultry house/equipment regularly  
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
I would be able to identify signs of the disease, if my chickens were infected with avian 
influenza/bird flu 
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
I will inform the local livestock related personnel, when I suspect that my chickens have 
avian influenza/bird flu  
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
I could 
Dispose dead birds properly(bury them) A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
Cover my mouth and  nose with cloths during handling poultry, even if my neighbours 
are not 
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
Wash my hands with soap before and after handling poultry, even if my neighbours are 
not  
A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F ☐ 
  
 
